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     A strong version of the Humean theory of motivation (HTM) that includes two theses 
is defended here.  First, desire is necessary for action, and no mental states are necessary 
for action other than a desire and an appropriate means-end belief.  Second, desires can 
be changed as the conclusion of reasoning only if a desire is among the premises of the 
reasoning.  Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational 
force cannot accept HTM, even as a contingent truth, since HTM implies that no beliefs 
have intrinsic motivational force.  Many of them argue that there are cases where HTM 
fails to explain how we deliberate.  The response is to develop a novel account of desire 
and show that HTM provides superior explanations even in their cases.   
     On this account, desire necessarily motivates action when combined with an 
appropriate means-end belief.  Desire necessarily causes pleasure when our subjective 
probability of satisfaction increases or when we vividly imagine satisfaction, and likewise 
causes displeasure when the subjective probability of satisfaction decreases or when we 
  iv 
vividly imagine dissatisfaction.  It is contingently true that desire directs attention 
towards things one associates with its object, is made more violent by vivid sensory or 
imaginative representations of its object, comes in the two flavors of positive desire and 
aversion, and satisfies the second principle above.   
     This account of desire helps HTM provides superior explanations of deliberation even 
in the cases that its opponents offer as counterexamples.  In response to Darwall’s 
proposed counterexample to the second principle and some 20th century writers 
discussing the feeling of obligation, it is shown that Humeans can provide superior 
explanations of agents’ emotions in their cases.  In Searle’s case of akrasia, Scanlon’s 
case of bracketing, and Schueler’s case of deliberation, it is shown that Humeans can 
build the structures of deliberation more simply than their opponents can.  Against 
Korsgaard, it is argued that agents cannot choose the aims for which they act. 
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Chapter 1  The Humean Theory and the Moral Problem 
 
Introduction 
     This initial chapter will begin by presenting a version of the Humean theory of 
motivation.  Then I will examine cognitivism and internalism, the other two components 
of what Michael Smith calls the “Moral Problem.”  Of these three plausible theses, only 
two can be maintained, and there is much disagreement about which among the three 
theses should be rejected.  Some philosophers have defended a combination of 
cognitivism and internalism while arguing that the Humean theory should be rejected.  I 
will show that these philosophers need to argue against even the contingent truth of the 
Humean theory.  As I will argue in later chapters, these objections are unsuccessful, and 
the Humean theory can respond to them in a way that demonstrates its superiority over 
competing views of motivation.  This gives us a reason to reject cognitivist internalism.   
 
The Humean Theory of Motivation 
     The central idea of the Humean theory of motivation is that desire is the source of all 
of our motivations to act.  Desire plays an essential role in explaining motivation, and this 
role cannot be usurped by any other mental state.  While Humean theorists generally 
regard both a desire and a means-end belief as necessary for action, they distinguish 
themselves from other theorists by giving desire a more important role in motivating 
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action than their opponents do.  Furthermore, they hold that these two mental states are 
sufficient for a psychological explanation of all action.   
     On a Humean view, desires and beliefs are what Hume called “distinct existences” – 
the existence of one does not imply the existence of the other.  This view is fairly 
intuitive.  Two people with exactly the same beliefs may act very differently if they differ 
in their desires.  And two people with exactly the same desires may act very differently if 
they differ in their beliefs.  
     Hume himself goes even farther than this.  He not only holds that beliefs and desires 
are logically distinct existences – that the presence of a belief does not entail the presence 
of a desire – but that no belief or combination of beliefs is itself sufficient to create any 
particular desire through a process of reasoning.  Since he also thinks that all action is 
motivated by the combination of a desire and a means-end belief, Hume accepts that 
processes of reasoning are only able to influence action by providing the means to 
antecedently desired ends.  He expressed this view in A Treatise of Human Nature, 
offering perhaps the most famous slogan of the Humean theory: “Reason is, and ought 
only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to 
serve and obey them” (2.2.3).   
     I will defend a version of the Humean theory of motivation [HTM] which consists of 
both of the following claims:  
The Desire-Belief Theory of Action [DBTA]: Desire is necessary for action, and 
no mental states other than a desire and a means-end belief are necessary for 
action.   
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Desire Out? Desire In! [DODI]: Desires can be changed as the conclusion of 
reasoning only if a desire is among the premises of the reasoning. 
Here I will consider two other formulations of the Humean theory – one from Michael 
Smith, and one from Ralph Wedgwood – and explain why I have formulated the theory 
as I have.   
     When he presents his detailed discussion of the Humean theory in The Moral 
Problem, Michael Smith presents and defends two principles that Humeans are 
committed to.  The stronger principle, which he regards as the crucial one, comes from 
Davidson, and goes as follows: 
P1: R at t constitutes a motivating reason of agent A to φ iff there is some Ψ such 
that R at t consists of an appropriately related desire of A to Ψ and a belief that 
were she to φ she would Ψ.   
For the desire and belief to be “appropriately related,” Smith says, is for the agent to 
mentally put both of them together, so that they can interact to cause action.  “Motivating 
reasons” are to be contrasted with normative reasons.  Motivating reasons explain action, 
while normative reasons justify action.  Smith says that “motivating reasons would seem 
to be psychological states, states that play a certain explanatory role in explaining action” 
(96).   
     One significant difference between HTM and P1 is that HTM allows views on which 
actions can be motivated with no assistance from beliefs to count as Humean, while P1 
requires that a belief play some role in motivating the action.  Consider a situation where 
an agent has a desire to engage in some immediate bodily action – perhaps, a desire to 
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move his hand.  If he moves his hand as a result of this desire, is his action also the result 
of a belief that were he to move his hand, he would move his hand?  A defender of P1 
would have to suggest that this trivially true belief is a motivating reason for his action.  
Nothing in the phenomenology of acting on a desire to engage in some immediate bodily 
action licenses us to ascribe some explanatory role to trivially true beliefs as part of the 
process.  In order to avoid the consequence that trivial beliefs like this explain immediate 
bodily actions, a theorist might reject P1 while accepting DBTA and saying that desires 
alone can sometimes cause action. Such a view would belong naturally within the 
Humean camp, as desire is given a fundamental role in explaining action – indeed, a 
more fundamental role than belief.   
     A defender of P1 might respond to this by arguing that trivially true beliefs have a role 
in motivating actions driven by a desire to engage in some immediate bodily movement, 
and that our formulation of the Humean theory should make room for this.  One way to 
test for whether particular beliefs have a role in explaining action is to consider 
counterfactual situations in which agents lack these beliefs, and see whether action 
ensues in these situations.  So to test whether the belief that by moving his hand he would 
move his hand plays a role in explaining action, the defender of P1 might suggest that we 
consider a strange counterfactual situation – the situation in which an agent desires to 
move his hand, but does not believe that by moving his hand he can move his hand.  If 
beliefs are necessary for action, such an agent would be unable to act.  But if beliefs are 
not necessary, such an agent would be able to act.  While it is common for agents to lack 
belief in complex conceptual truths like the truths of advanced mathematics, it is harder 
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to imagine an agent who lacks belief in the simple conceptual truth that by moving his 
hand he would move his hand.   
     What would it even mean to not believe this?  One possibility is that the agent would 
do things that are usually evidence of having a desire to move one’s hand, and that do not 
require any sort of belief – happily daydreaming about moving his hand, for instance.  
But perhaps such an agent would be unable to engage in behaviors that required such a 
belief – for instance, actually acting.   
     One might want to say, instead, that there is something incoherent about an agent’s 
lacking a belief on such a simple topic.  If a functional characterization of belief is 
correct, and if there is no coherent set of inputs and outputs that would license the 
attribution of such a belief, then this belief would be incoherent.   
     It is hard to know what to say about these kinds of cases, so I have formulated the 
Humean theory in a way that is neutral as to whether belief is required for action.  The 
important thing that the Humean theory says about beliefs is that no belief can be 
sufficient for action, and (as I will discuss further) no belief can generate action through a 
process of reasoning whose other premises consist entirely of beliefs.  The insufficiency 
of belief for action is part of DBTA.  DBTA and DODI together entail that processes of 
reasoning which have only beliefs as premises will not produce action.  Since desires are 
necessary for action, and since beliefs cannot cause desires through processes of 
reasoning, no collection of beliefs will be sufficient to generate action through reasoning.   
     HTM, through DODI, denies the Humean label to views on which desires can be 
generated, eliminated, or altered in strength through processes of reasoning that do not 
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have desires as premises.  On these views, beliefs might be able to motivate action 
indirectly, by giving rise to desires through processes of reasoning that involve no other 
desires.  P1 allows such views to count as Humean.  In this regard, HTM is truer to the 
historical origins of the Humean theory, and to the central thought that drives it.  If 
beliefs can create new desires through processes of reasoning that do not include desires 
as premises, reason is far more than the slave of the passions.  Rather than merely serving 
and obeying an agent’s desires, reason can raise an army of new desires to oppose them.  
While all motivation may still involve desire in some way, some kinds of motivation – 
namely the kinds of motivation caused by desires created through these processes of 
reasoning – will not have desire itself as their ultimate source.  So a DODI-style 
constraint on the ability of reason to generate new desires will be part of a properly 
formulated Humean theory.   
     In “Practical Reason and Desire,” Ralph Wedgwood considers a version of the 
Humean theory of motivation that consists of three propositions, the first two of which 
are similar to the two propositions I have presented above as constituting the Humean 
theory.  They run as follows: 
1 Whenever one acts with the intention to φ, one’s action is motivated (at least in 
part) by the desire to φ.  (346) 
This first component is analogous to DBTA.  Like DBTA, it allows that desire alone may 
be able to motivate action.  It does not, however, explicitly mention belief.   
     The Humean theory should be formulated in such a way that mental states other than 
desire and belief – for example, states of will or intention irreducible to desire and belief 
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– cannot be necessary conditions for action.  DBTA restricts the set of necessary 
conditions for action to desire and belief, while 1 does not.  It is part of the theoretical 
motivation for the Humean theory to provide a simple and economical explanation of 
deliberation and action, and the inclusion of more necessary motivational components 
would thus go against the Humean spirit.   
2 Whenever a desire is motivated at all, its motivational history includes some 
further desire.  (346) 
This component is similar to DODI.  The “motivational history” of some mental state, in 
Wedgwood’s terms, includes “not only the mental states that motivated it, but also the 
mental states that motivated those further motivating states, and so on” (346).  If a 
desire’s being motivated is equivalent to its being generated by some process of 
reasoning, 2 and DODI will be equivalent.  
3 All motivation must flow, ultimately and in part, from unmotivated contingent 
desires. (347) 
An unmotivated contingent desire is “a desire that one is not rationally required to have” 
(347).   
     First I will explain why I do not include anything similar to 3.  One problem with 
including 3 is that it makes the nature of the Humean theory depend on normative 
questions about the rational requirements on agency.  If it turned out to be part of the 
correct theory of practical rationality that having some particular desire were rationally 
required – perhaps a desire for pleasure, or a desire to do what one has the most reason to 
do, or a desire to do the good – then the Humean theory of motivation would have to say 
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that this desire could not motivate action.  This would be a strange consequence.  While 
the Humean theory of motivation, when combined with other plausible claims, has 
implications for various aspects of our normative theorizing, its content and its truth 
should not be regarded as dependent on normative facts in any way, and thus it should 
not be defined in normative terms.   
     If there is anything essential to the Humean theory that 3 captures, it is the idea that 
the mental states that motivate action cannot be the product of rational requirements that 
apply to all agents, regardless of what they desire, or whether they desire anything at all.  
If it is true that all agents to whom a rational requirement applies have the capacity to 
reason in accordance with this requirement, then agents will have the capacity to produce 
new desires, no matter what their pre-existing desires are.  But Wedgwood’s 2, like 
DODI, already blocks this sort of desire-generation.  So it seems that 3 is superfluous.   
     We can formally represent HTM as it applies to the relation between belief and action 
in the following way, with B standing for the predicate “is a belief,” C standing for the 
predicate “is capable of causing action by itself,” and R standing for the predicate “is 
capable of causing action through processes of reasoning whose other premises include 
only beliefs.”   
HTM on Belief and Action [HTMBA]: (∀x) (Bx¬ (Cx v Rx)) 
 
Smith and the Moral Problem 
     The idea that Humean views about the structure of motivation have consequences for 
the objectivity of morality and the motivational force of moral judgments is at least as old 
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as David Hume himself.  Having argued that reason itself cannot give rise to a 
motivation, he continues:  
Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it 
follows, that they cannot be deriv’d from reason; and that because reason alone, 
as we have already prov’d, can never have any such influence.  Morals excite 
passions, and produce or prevent actions.  Reason of itself is utterly impotent in 
this particular.  The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.  
(3.1.1)   
 
Since moral judgments have an intrinsic power to influence our motivational and 
affective states, and – as Hume’s view of motivation claims – reason cannot do this, 
moral judgments must not be derived from reason.   
     Both the additional premise of Hume’s argument and the negation of his conclusion 
are widely regarded as intuitively appealing.  The additional premise is that moral 
judgments “have an influence on the actions and affections.”  The negation of the 
conclusion is that the rules of morality are conclusions of our reason.  Someone who 
accepted both of these views, then, might respond to Hume’s argument by denying his 
theory of motivation.   
     The claims at stake here have been laid out as follows by Michael Smith in The Moral 
Problem: 
1 Moral judgments of the form ‘It is right that I φ’ express a subject’s beliefs 
about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for her to do.   
2 If someone judges that it is right that she φ s, then, ceteris paribus, she is 
motivated to φ.   
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3 An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an 
appropriate desire and a means-end belief, where belief and desire are, in Hume’s 
terms, distinct existences.  (12) 
The first claim is cognitivism.  The second claim is internalism.  The third claim is a 
version of the Humean theory of motivation.   
     If cognitivism is true, moral judgments must express beliefs.  If internalism is true, 
moral judgments carry intrinsic motivational force – they need not be combined with any 
other mental state to cause action.  But if the Humean theory is true, beliefs do not have 
intrinsic motivational force, since desires are necessary for motivation.  The cognitivist 
thesis that moral judgments express beliefs contradicts the thesis – derivable from the 
other two propositions – that moral judgments express mental states other than belief.  If 
all three of these theses are true, it seems impossible for any agent to make a moral 
judgment.   
     While Smith decribes the three propositions making up the moral problem as 
“apparently inconsistent,” he holds that they are not actually inconsistent, and goes on to 
present a theory that can reconcile them later in the book (12).  According to Smith’s 
view, while actions are always motivated by desire-belief pairs, agents can change their 
desires through processes of deliberation in which desires do not figure as premises.  He 
claims that “by far the most important way in which we create new and destroy old 
underived desires when we deliberate is by trying to find out whether our desires are 
systematically justifiable” (158-159).  We determine the systematic justifiability of a 
desire in a process similar to Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium, by “trying to 
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integrate that desire into a more coherent and unified desiderative profile and evaluative 
outlook” (159).  A coherent and unified set of desires, according to Smith, is rationally 
preferable, and the belief that a particular arrangement of desires would be rationally 
preferable is capable of changing a rational agent’s desires towards that arrangement.  
Smith describes how our evaluative beliefs generate desires: “an evaluative belief is 
simply a belief about what would be desired if we were fully rational, and the new desire 
is acquired precisely because it is believed to be required for us to be rational” (160).   
     While the concept of desire figures in the contents of the beliefs involved in reasoning 
one’s way towards new desires, no actual desires are among the premises of the 
reasoning.  Smith’s account, then, violates DODI and runs afoul of the Humean theory as 
I have defined it.  However, Smith still regards himself as a Humean, as he operates with 
a weaker formulation of the Humean theory than I do.  His formulation, P1, requires only 
that actions be motivated by desire-belief pairs, and he places no restrictions on how the 
desires themselves are generated.  A stronger formulation of the Humean theory like 
HTM would rule out the sort of belief-driven desire-creation and desire-elimination that 
Smith’s solution to the Moral Problem relies on.  If one regarded HTM as a more suitable 
formulation of the Humean theory, one might criticize Smith for setting up a defective 
version of the Moral Problem containing an excessively weak Humean theory, and 
exploiting this defect to offer a solution.   
     Having criticized Smith’s formulation of the Humean theory in setting up the Moral 
Problem, I will now look into the other two components of the problem and examine 
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them to see exactly how they should be formulated.  Then I will return to the Moral 
Problem itself. 
 
Formulating Cognitivism 
     The central idea of cognitivism is that moral judgments express beliefs, and that they 
are thus evaluable in terms of their truth or falsity.  One of the most significant 
motivations for cognitivism is that it seems like the most natural way to account for the 
nature of moral thought and discourse.  As Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton say, “A classic 
problem for noncognitivists is that moral judgments have so many earmarks of claims to 
objective truth” (16).1  Participants in moral discussion take some moral judgments to be 
true and others to be false, and they often embed moral judgments in larger linguistic 
expressions, including conditionals, questions, and counterfactual statements, which have 
close relations to truth and falsity.  Cognitivists think that these features of moral 
discourse can be explained very well if we accept that moral judgments express beliefs.  
The connection between moral judgments and the truth is dealt with particularly well by 
cognitivism, as belief distinguishes itself from many of our other mental states by aiming 
at the truth.  Ordinary descriptive judgments, which are uncontroversially regarded as 
expressing beliefs, can be embedded in many of the same contexts that moral beliefs can.  
If cognitivism is true, this would explain how the same logical apparatus that we use in 
accounting for the semantics of nonmoral descriptive discourse can be extended to cover 
moral cases and give us a satisfactory account of embeddings.   
                                                
1 “Towards Fin De Siecle Ethics: Some Trends” 
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     Recent noncognitivists have tried to show that their theories are capable of matching 
the success of cognitivism in accounting for these features of moral discourse.  They have 
offered innovative proposals that seek (for example) to explain how moral judgments can 
be embedded in larger expressions much the way that ordinary descriptive judgments 
can, even on the assumption that moral judgments do not express beliefs.  Cognitivists 
have responded by arguing that the noncognitivists’ semantic proposals are not 
successful, and that some aspects of moral thought and discourse resist noncognitivist 
treatments.2  For reasons of space and focus, I will not give detailed consideration to 
these issues.  Instead, I will consider how cognitivism ought to be formulated.   
     Mark Van Roojen3 has divided noncognitivism into two theses: semantic factualism 
and psychological noncognitivism.  
Semantic Nonfactualism: Moral judgments do not express propositions or have 
truth conditions. 
Psychological Noncognitivism:  Moral judgments do not express beliefs or any 
other similarly cognitive state.   
On Van Roojen’s taxonomy of views about moral semantics, acceptance of either thesis 
is sufficient for noncognitivism.4  Cognitivists accept the negations of both of these 
theses.  
                                                
2 A characteristic cognitivist response is Bob Hale’s “Can There Be A Logic of Attitudes?” (1993).   
3 “Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
4 Van Roojen discusses two theories that only accept one of the theses, and he labels both of these theories 
noncognitivist.  One of the theories is moral fictionalism, and the other is the nondescriptivist cognitivism 
of Timmons and Horgan.  Of these, he says, “if the views are coherent this would suggest the two negative 
theses are logically independent.”   
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    Since beliefs are mental states with truth conditions, psychological non-cognitivism 
and semantic non-factualism are very tightly linked.  It seems generally plausible that if a 
mental state has truth conditions and is capable of linguistic expression, the linguistic 
expression of that mental state will have truth conditions.  If this conditional holds, 
psychological cognitivism will imply semantic factualism.  The logical properties of a 
linguistic expression should be derived, in some similar way, from the logical properties 
of the mental state that they express.  In view of this plausible relation between semantic 
nonfactualism and psychological noncognitivism, and because I am more concerned with 
psychological issues than linguistic issues, I will regard cognitivism as being the negation 
of the thesis that Van Roojen calls “psychological noncognitivism,” which deals with the 
psychological states expressed in moral judgment.   
     Should cognitivism be regarded as holding that moral judgments express only beliefs, 
or can a cognitivist say that moral judgments express a combination of mental states 
including belief and some noncognitive state?  Saying that moral judgments express only 
beliefs, and that they do not express any other mental state, is traditionally regarded as 
truer to the spirit of cognitivism.  On Van Roojen’s taxonomy, theories are termed 
noncognitivist if they say that moral judgments express collections of mental states 
including some noncognitive state.  He says that “many non-cognitivists hold that moral 
judgments' primary function is not to express beliefs, though they may express them in a 
secondary way.”  Theorists like R. M. Hare, who held that moral judgments had both a 
prescriptive and descriptive function, are usually regarded as falling within the 
noncognitivist camp.   
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     It is not hard to see why views on which some additional state is necessary for moral 
judgment as well as belief are widely regarded as being noncognitivist.  Such views will 
not be able to account for moral discourse using the same logical apparatus that is used 
for nonmoral descriptive discourse, and which cognitivists regard as sufficient for 
handling moral discourse.  Consider the following argument: 
A:  Arson is wrong. 
B:  If arson is wrong, then getting your little brother to commit arson is wrong.   
C:  Getting your little brother to commit arson is wrong.   
Theorists of all stripes will want to say that A and B together imply C.  And on a standard 
cognitivist account where moral judgments express only beliefs, the logic of ordinary 
descriptive statements that express beliefs can be deployed to account for this conclusion.  
By modus ponens, C follows from A and B.   
     But if we think that moral judgments express some additional mental state that is not 
truth-evaluable, and if we think that the truth-evaluability of a linguistic expression is 
dependent on the truth-evaluability of the mental state it expresses, we will have to regard 
A and C, and possibly B as well, as expressing some non-truth-evaluable state.  The 
familiar logic of descriptive statements does not account for whatever sorts of logical 
relations might hold between statements with non-factual content.  To account for the 
relationship between A, B, and C on a theory where moral judgments express combined 
mental states, we will need to go beyond our logical apparatus for dealing with 
descriptive statements.  The proponent of the theory on which moral judgments express 
combinations of belief and a noncognitive state will have to bear the burden of 
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developing a logic of non-cognitive attitudes that can explain how inferential relations 
hold between the non-factual contents of A, B, and C, and also between the mental states 
they express.  This burden is characteristic of noncognitivist theories that attempt to make 
sense of ordinary moral discourse.   
     Here I will not inquire into whether this burden can be discharged.  Certainly, if 
noncognitivists are successful in building a logic of non-cognitive attitudes that accounts 
for the features of moral discourse, the appeal of cognitivism will be diminished, and 
noncognitivism will offer an appealing solution to the moral problem.  My point is just 
that the project of developing a logic of non-cognitive attitudes is a distinctively 
noncognitivist project, and a substantial one.   
     The foregoing discussion leads us to this formulation of cognitivism: 
Cognitivism: All mental states whose expressions are moral judgments are 
beliefs.   
Cognitivism can be formally represented as follows, with J standing for the predicate “is 
a mental state whose expression is a moral judgment,” and B standing for “is a belief”: 
Cognitivism: (∀x) (JxBx) 
 
Formulating Internalism 
     Michael Smith begins his discussion of internalism with the following example: 
Suppose we debate the pros and cons of giving to famine relief and you convince 
me that I should give.  However when the occasion arises for me to hand over my 
money I say ‘But wait!  I know I should give to famine relief.  But you haven’t 
convinced me that I have any reason to do so!’  And so I don’t.  (60) 
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As Smith says, this outburst would “occasion serious puzzlement… Believing I should 
seems to bring with it my being motivated to – at least absent weakness of will and the 
like” (60).   
     Following the schema of naming introduced by Stephen Darwall in “Reasons, 
Motives, and the Demands of Morality: an Introduction,”5 we can call the variety of 
internalism suggested in Smith’s example “morality/motivations judgment internalism”.   
According to this view, whenever an agent makes a moral judgment that it would be right 
to do something, she will feel some motivation to do that thing.  To incorporate Smith’s 
last proviso that I have presented above, this connection between morality and 
motivations will hold at least in cases where the agent is not subject to weakness of will, 
depression, or some other kind of state that inhibits her motivation or powers of 
reasoning.  What is important is that there be pathways of reasoning and motivation by 
which the moral judgment can motivate action, even if occasional defects in the agent’s 
rationality and motivational capacity sometimes interfere.  The motivation to do the right 
thing in cases where an agent makes a moral judgment need not be able to override other 
motivations in generating action, but some motivation to do actions one judges to be right 
or to refrain from actions one judges to be wrong must be present.   
     Traditionally, internalists have held that the connection between moral judgment and 
motivation is logically necessary.  According to William Frankena, who was among the 
first to formulate it, internalism is the thesis that it is “not logically possible… for an 
                                                
5 Darwall only mentions morality/reasons and reasons/motives internalism in his article.  These views 
together imply the truth of morality/motives internalism.    
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agent to have or see that he has an obligation even if he has no motivation, actual or 
dispositional, for doing the action in question” (40-41).  The versions of internalism that 
Smith considers all have the same modal strength as the one that Frankena proposes – 
each of them involve a “conceptual connection” between moral judgment and motivation.  
(The nature of the conceptual connection differs in Smith’s three formulations – in one it 
is a conceptual truth that moral judgment entails motivation, in another it is a conceptual 
truth that moral judgment entails motivation unless the agent is irrational, and in a third 
moral judgment entails having a reason to act.)  The role of characters far from actuality 
like Milton’s Satan as examples in the internalist-externalist debate further testifies to the 
modal strength of the internalist thesis as it is generally defended.   
     There is no need for internalists to claim that the mental state expressing the moral 
judgment must itself be the proximal cause of action.  Smith’s solution to the Moral 
Problem, for example, involves beliefs modifying an agent’s desires, which end up being 
the proximal causes of action.  The possibility that internalists are concerned to reject is 
that moral judgments might be entirely motivationally inert.  If they are motivationally 
potent, but only in virtue of their power to generate other mental states that can be 
proximal causes of action, the basic intuition underlying internalism will be satisfied.  
Looking back at Smith’s famine relief example, it would not “occasion serious 
puzzlement” if he was willing to give to famine relief because his new moral belief had 
generated a desire in him to give to famine relief, and this desire had motivated him to 
act.   
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     When internalists say that moral judgments are sufficient for motivation, they do not 
mean that the mental states expressed in these judgments would have to bring about 
action without any aid from means-end beliefs.  Even if I judge that it would be right to 
give money to famine relief, I may not act if I do not believe that I have any money.  
What internalists want of the mental states expressed in moral judgment is that they can 
play a role similar to the role that Humeans attribute to desire in motivating action, or 
produce mental states capable of playing this role.  It would suffice for the truth of 
internalism if the mental states expressed in moral judgments, while not themselves being 
desires, were capable of producing desires through processes of reasoning, and if these 
desires could be combined with beliefs through further processes of practical reasoning to 
bring about action.   
     What internalists cannot allow is that motivational mental states – that is, states like 
desire – which are not expressed in our moral judgments are necessary conditions of our 
acting on our moral judgments.  (Of course, if noncognitivism is true and moral 
judgments express desires or similar states, the necessity of desire for moral action will 
be consistent with internalism.)  If motivational states in addition to the states expressed 
in moral judgment were necessary, the power to motivate action would not be intrinsic to 
the mental states expressed in moral judgment.  It would then be possible for someone to 
respond in the puzzling manner that Smith describes in his example, without any faulty 
reasoning, if they merely lacked the desire to do what was right.  Furthermore, Smith 
holds than an agent who acts out of a belief that some particular thing is right to do and a 
desire to do the right thing, where “do the right thing” is read de dicto, is not genuinely 
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acting out of a moral judgment.  This, Smith says, is merely a “moral fetish” (76).  For an 
agent’s honest action to genuinely issue from a moral judgment, the agent cannot merely 
desire to do the right thing de dicto, believe that the honesty of a particular course of 
action will make it right, and from these premises derive a desire to do the honest thing.  
Rather, the agent must be motivated by an intrinsic desire, not derived from any 
processes of means-end reasoning, which either issues from or is constituted by the moral 
judgment.  
     We can formulate internalism as follows:  
Internalism: All mental states expressed in moral judgment are capable of 
causing action, either by themselves or through processes of reasoning whose 
premises include only beliefs.   
Internalism can be formally represented as follows, with J standing for the predicate “is a 
mental state whose expression is a moral judgment,” C standing for the predicate “is 
capable of causing action by itself,” and R standing for the predicate “is capable of 
causing action through processes of reasoning whose other premises include only 
beliefs.”   
Internalism: (∀x) (Jx(Cx v Rx)) 
This formulation is not intended to capture the modal status that internalists usually 
ascribe to their position.   
 
The Moral Problem Revisited 
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     Now I will return to the moral problem.  Here are cognitivism, internalism, and the 
portion of the Humean theory that deals with belief, together.   
Cognitivism: (∀x) (JxBx) 
Internalism: (∀x) (Jx(Cx v Rx)) 
HTMBA: (∀x) (Bx¬(Cx v Rx)) 
These theses do not generate a contradiction.  To get a contradiction, this fourth thesis 
should be added, with E representing the existential quantifier: 
Moral Judgment: (∃x) (Jx) 
This fourth thesis is simply that mental states whose expressions are moral judgments 
exist.  When added to cognitivism, internalism, and HTMBA, it forms a contradictory 
tetrad.   
     Smith describes the three propositions constituting his version of the Moral Problem 
as “apparently inconsistent” (12).  It is because of his solution, which relies on an 
excessively weak version of the Humean theory, that he thinks that cognitivism, 
internalism, and the Humean theory are actually consistent.  As it turns out, internalism 
and cognitivism are jointly consistent even with a stronger version of the Humean theory.  
But this consistency does not offer anything resembling an attractive solution to the 
Moral Problem, because if one holds all three theses, one is committed to denying that 
mental states whose expressions are moral judgments exist.  This consequence amounts 
to a reductio ad absurdum of the three theses taken jointly.   
     If one wanted to reformulate the Moral Problem as a contradictory triad instead of a 
tetrad, one could try to make cognitivism, internalism, and the Humean theory 
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inconsistent by attaching existential commitments to cognitivism or internalism.  One 
would do this by making it part of the cognitivist or internalist thesis that moral 
judgments exist.  But there is good reason not to go this route.  If someone says that 
cognitivism is necessarily true, it would be beside the point to respond that there are 
possible worlds containing only asteroids and no minds capable of making moral 
judgments.  Such possibilities should not be taken to refute Frankena’s claims about the 
conceptual necessity of internalism either.  So we should interpret both cognitivism and 
internalism as lacking existential commitment.   
     In the end, the metaethical state of play involving the Moral Problem is much as it 
originally appeared.  Of cognitivism, internalism, and the Humean theory, one must 
choose at most two.  This is not because the three theses are contradictory, but because 
they together commit one to deny the existence of mental states whose expressions are 
moral judgments.  Humean internalists, then, have to deny cognitivism.  Humean 
cognitivists have to deny internalism.  Cognitivist internalists have to deny HTMBA (and 
thus HTM).  It is to this last position, cognitivist internalism, that I will now turn.   
 
Cognitivist Internalism vs. The Contingent Humean Theory 
     Whether they accept both theses or just one of them, cognitivists and internalists both 
hold that their views are true at least about the actual world.  They do not merely argue 
that it is a counterfactual possibility that moral judgments express beliefs or motivate 
action.  Cognitivists argue that we can best account for actual moral discourse if we 
accept that moral judgments express beliefs.  Internalists have traditionally held that 
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connections to motivation are conceptually necessary for a mental state’s being such that 
its expression constitutes a moral judgment, and this implies that moral judgments in the 
actual world express mental states that can motivate action.   
     Defenders of the combined cognitivist internalist position who accept that there are 
actual moral judgments are thus committed to the actual truth of three of the four jointly 
inconsistent theses in the Moral Problem as I have laid it out.  So these cognitivist 
internalists cannot declare victory after showing that it is conceptually or metaphysically 
possible for beliefs to motivate action.  They cannot merely argue that the Humean theory 
of motivation is not a metaphysically necessary or logically necessary truth.  They need 
to argue for the falsity of the Humean theory in the actual world.  Opponents of the 
cognitivist internalist position, meanwhile, can argue against the conjunction of 
cognitivism and internalism by arguing for nothing more than the contingent truth of 
HTM.  If we find convincing evidence for the contingent truth of HTM, cognitivism and 
internalism can only be jointly true if no actual mental states exist whose expressions are 
moral judgments.  This would be a reductio ad absurdum of cognitivist internalism.   
     It is this argumentative strategy that I will pursue in the next two chapters.  While 
cognitivist internalists have argued that the Humean theory is unable to account for 
structural and phenomenological features of actual deliberation, I will respond to them by 
showing that the Humean theory offers us a better overall explanation of how we 
deliberate and act than its competitors do.  The elegant and powerful explanations that 
Humeans can offer in the anti-Humeans’ cases show why we ought to accept the Humean 
theory.  This gives us reason to think it is correct, and to reject cognitivist internalism.   
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     My arguments will not give us reason to regard the Humean theory of motivation as a 
conceptually or metaphysically necessary truth.  I will concede to my opponents that we 
can imagine creatures whose deliberative processes and actions are not accurately 
described by the Humean theory.  These, however, would be creatures for whom the 
psychological laws governing deliberation and action are deeply different from the 
psychological laws governing the deliberation and action of human beings.  If, in the face 
of my arguments, cognitivist internalists want to stick to their guns and hold that the 
capacity for a kind of deliberation that violates the Humean theory is indeed necessary for 
moral judgment, they will be forced to defend the deeply counterintuitive position that 
while some conceivable creatures might be able to act morally, nothing humans are 
psychologically capable of could count as a moral judgment.   
     While humans are universally regarded as psychologically capable of moral judgment, 
the idea that some creatures lack this capacity because they lack the appropriate 
psychological features is uncontroversial.  Some cognitivist internalists have offered 
accounts of the features in virtue of which humans and animals differ.  Christine 
Korsgaard, for example, holds that the human capacity for moral judgment rests on the 
ability of humans to generate new motivational states in a way that is inconsistent with 
the Humean theory.  Animals are incapable of moral judgment, she thinks, because their 
motivational psychology follows the basic outlines of the Humean theory, and they are 
unable to generate new motivational states in the way that we can. 6  If Humean views 
about motivational psychology are correct, human motivation is governed entirely by the 
                                                
6 This view is expressed in the 3rd and 4th of her Locke Lectures.   
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laws that Korsgaard regards as the laws of animal motivation.  The laws of animal 
psychology that Korsgaard sketches out adequately characterize the way that humans can 
generate new desires through reasoning.  (This does not mean that humans are 
psychologically the same as animals – certainly there are differences, and humans are 
capable of many mental processes that many animals are incapable of.)  Combining 
Korsgaard’s claims about the necessary psychological conditions for moral judgment 
with the psychological laws governing humans would give us the conclusion that humans 
cannot make moral judgments.  This is why Korsgaard’s claims about the necessary 
conditions for moral judgment, which involve commitments to both cognitivism and 
internalism, should be rejected.   
     How is it possible that human beings could be psychologically incapable of some 
processes of reasoning of which some conceptually possible nonhumans are capable?  
Considering the Korsgaardian position that I have described may be instructive here.  It 
does not seem intuitively implausible that animals are psychologically incapable of some 
processes of reasoning that human beings are psychologically capable of.  After all, the 
biological hardware and wiring of human and animal brains are different, and the 
physical structure of a creature’s brain determines which psychological laws govern its 
mind.  Perhaps we humans are similarly incapable of some processes of reasoning that 
higher beings yet, whose brains physically differ from ours, would be capable of.  And 
perhaps we would still regard the distinctively nonhuman processes by which their 
mental states interacted as processes of reasoning, despite our own inability to reason in 
these ways.  This opens up the farfetched but eye-catching possibility that we could, 
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despite lacking moral agency ourselves, come to learn that other beings with different 
mental capacities are genuine moral agents.   
     Since I hold that it is conceptually possible for creatures with non-Humean 
motivational psychologies to exist and engage in action, I will not be able to argue that 
the Humean theory is true as a matter of conceptual necessity.  Nor will I argue that it is 
true as a matter of metaphysical necessity, like the identity between water and H2O.  In 
my view, the Humean theory is a correct empirical psychological theory.  We will 
discover the truth of the Humean theory by seeing that it offers simpler and more 
powerful explanations of our observations than its competitors do.   
     Unfortunately, very little rigorously collected data from the disciplines of empirical 
psychology and neurobiology has come to light on the particular questions that would 
confirm or disconfirm the Humean theory.7  So I will meet the opponents of the Humean 
theory on the same methodological terrain that they argue from in presenting their 
counterexamples.  They argue that the Humean theory is unable to deliver successful 
explanations of the observations that underlie our commonsense folk psychology.  I will 
argue that the Humean theory not only explains these observations adequately, but that it 
outperforms its competitors in terms of simplicity and explanatory power.  Many of the 
                                                
7 Part of this has to do with the ways that the particular groups of psychologists to whom one might look for 
data have focused their research.  Cognitive scientists do very systematic work on the operations of the 
mind, but focus much more on belief and theoretical reasoning than on desire and practical reasoning, 
while social psychologists often come up with interesting results about motivation, but rarely build their 
findings into a sufficiently systematic theory to be useful for the purposes of this project.  The impression 
of this that I got while sifting through the psychology literature was confirmed by Art Markman.  While 
some cognitive scientists, like Markman, are focusing on motivation, I have yet to find results from them 
on the particular questions that would bear on the truth of the Humean theory.  For example, I have not 
found rigorously collected empirical results on when people have experiences of pleasure and displeasure 
during processes of reasoning, and I have been told that such results are not currently available.   
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cases that are presented as problematic for Humeans have features that are actually better 
explained by the Humean theory than by its competitors.   
     My argument for the contingent truth of the Humean theory will have two stages.  In 
the next chapter, I will set out the conceptually necessary conditions for a mental state’s 
being a desire, as well as the properties that desire has throughout the actual world and 
throughout the space of human psychological possibility.  To understand the empirical 
predictions that the Humean theory generates, one must first understand the properties of 
desire and its relations to other mental states.  Having set out the properties of desire, I 
will be in position to construct explanations of how we deliberate, even in the most 
complex situations, that are rooted in the way that desire motivates decision and action in 
the simplest situations.   
     In the third and final chapter, I will consider the objections that anti-Humeans have 
offered against the ability of the Humean theory to explain the structure and 
phenomenology of deliberation.  The Humean theory I lay out will provide a simple and 
powerful explanation of many features of how we deliberate and act.  While anti-
Humeans charge that it cannot satisfactorily explain many actual cases of deliberation, I 
will argue that its explanations account for all the data in these cases, and defeat the anti-
Humean explanations by fitting into a simpler total picture of motivation.  This gives us 
some reason to accept the Humean theory, and to reject the cognitivist internalist position 
that is in tension with it.   
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Chapter 2: What Humeans Say About Desire 
 
 
 
Introduction 
     This chapter, which focuses on desire, has two major aims.  The first is to characterize 
the way in which desire interacts with other mental states and mental phenomena, 
including belief, pleasure, imagination, and action.  It is from an understanding of these 
interactions that a Humean model of practical deliberation can be built.  Empirical data 
from psychology and neuroscience will be useful in explaining how these interactions go.  
The second aim of this chapter is to determine which among these features of desire are 
necessary.  There is much disagreement, even among philosophers who accept a broadly 
Humean theory, about which relations to other mental states are necessary for something 
to be a desire, and which relations merely constitute contingent facts about desire.  Over 
the course of this chapter, I will work out an analysis of desire.   
     In the course of determining what desires actually and necessarily are like, I will 
consider what previous philosophers sympathetic to Humean views about action have 
said about the nature of desire and the role of desire in practical deliberation.  Many 
different views of desire – dealing both with its actual properties and its essential nature – 
have been offered by Humeans.  Considering their views will both allow me to find 
useful components for my own theory of desire and give me opportunities to criticize 
competing positions.  As I survey the views of Humeans present and past, I will also 
mine their writings for material that will be useful in overcoming the objections to the 
Humean theory which will be discussed in the next chapter.  Some of the philosophers 
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whom I will discuss in this chapter have offered desire-based explanations of phenomena 
that might otherwise be regarded as troublesome for the Humean theory, and I will take 
note of these helpful explanations.   
     Six theses about desire, each of which concerns the way that it interacts with other 
mental states, will be advanced in this chapter.  Each one describes a functional property 
of desire, and it holds throughout the space of human psychological possibility.  That 
these propositions are true of desire will be defended with reference to common-sense 
folk psychology as well as psychological and neurobiological research.  While there are 
many other interesting contingent facts about desire, some of which will be discussed in 
this chapter, I highlight the ones below because some of them are necessary conditions 
for desire, and some are important for the explanations that are offered in the next 
chapter.  Each formulation below will be presented again in this chapter, once suitable 
arguments for it have been offered. 
The Motivational Aspect: If an agent occurrently desires D, and she occurrently 
believes that she can bring about D by doing A, she will have a motivational 
tendency to do A.  Her motivational tendency to do A will increase with the 
strengths of the desire and the belief.  If at any time there is some action that she 
has the greatest motivational tendency to do, she will initiate that action.   
The Hedonic Aspect: If an agent occurrently desires D, increases in the 
subjective probability of D or vivid sensory or imaginative representations of D 
will cause her pleasure roughly proportional to the strength of the desire and the 
change in subjective probability or the vividness of the representation.  Decreases 
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in the subjective probability of D or vivid sensory or imaginative representations 
of situations incompatible with D will likewise cause displeasure.   
The Attention-Direction Aspect:  Desiring that D will make an agent more 
likely to focus her attention on things she associates with D than things she does 
not associate with D.   
The Two Flavors:  Agents who desire that D either have positive desires that D, 
or aversions to not-D.  The pleasures and displeasures associated with positive 
desires are delight and disappointment; the pleasures and displeasures associated 
with aversions are relief and anxiety.   
Intensification By Vivid Images:  When an agent is presented with vivid images 
she associates with a state of affairs she desires, either in imagination or by her 
senses, that will strengthen the desire’s causal powers.  The desire’s phenomenal 
effects increase sharply, and its motivational powers increase substantially as 
well. 
Desire Out? Desire In! [DODI]: Desires can be changed as the conclusion of 
reasoning only if a desire is among the premises of the reasoning.   
DODI is one of the two propositions making up the Humean theory of motivation, as it 
was laid out in the previous chapter.   
     If all these things are actually true of desire, which are necessarily true?  Intuitions are 
very strong in favor of the necessity of the motivational aspect.  Many people also have 
intuitions in favor of the necessity of the hedonic aspect, though some do not.  I will 
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defend the necessity of both of these aspects, and argue that all the others are only 
contingently associated with desire.   
     Before I begin, it may be useful here to say a word about the role of appeals to normal 
conditions in describing psychological states.  Overuse of measures like the appeal to 
normal conditions can lead to a theory that tells us nothing in cases where we rely on it 
for explanation or prediction.  While it seems clear that desire-belief pairs motivate 
action, an agent may not do A when she desires D and knows that doing A will bring 
about D, if she knows that doing A will leave her unable to satisfy some stronger desire.  
Attempts to use some notion of normal conditions to push these cases aside, by limiting 
the domain of the theory to normal cases and excluding cases involving conflicting 
desires as abnormal, can seem unsatisfactory.  Situations where an agent has conflicting 
desires ought to be dealt with as normal cases.  They are among the cases that we will 
rely on desire-belief psychology to predict and understand.   
     Another class of problem cases, however, ought to be finessed with some appeal to 
normal conditions.  These are cases where, for example, an agent desires B and comes to 
know that doing A will bring about B, but is instantly decapitated by a ninja and never 
has the time to even try to act.  If cases like this are taken as counterexamples to claims 
that desires have some kind of robust connection to motivation, it will be hard to make 
any interesting general statements at all about the causal properties of our mental states.  
Laws of economics, for instance, are not rejected just because they would make false 
predictions in cases where comets unexpectedly crash into the Earth and kill everyone.  
We instead regard the comet scenarios as abnormal and outside the scope of the laws.  So 
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the claims about the properties of desire which have been presented above, and which 
will be advanced in this chapter, should all be understood as restricted to some hard-to-
characterize set of situations in which psychological explanations are the ones we seek.   
 
Hume, Passions, and Reason 
     The first theory I will consider is that of David Hume himself.  Hume takes his 
opponents to be philosophers who talk of the struggle between passions8 and reason, 
“give the preference to reason, and assert that men are only virtuous so far as they 
conform to its dictates” (2:3:2).  He opposes them by arguing that “reason alone can 
never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion 
in the direction of the will.”   
     Elijah Millgram lays out two of Hume’s arguments for this conclusion in “Was Hume 
a Humean?”  Hume’s first argument proceeds by examining the ways in which reason 
can operate, and discovering that none of them will be sufficient to motivate action.  
Hume contends that “the understanding exerts itself after two different ways, as it judges 
from demonstration or probability; as it regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or 
those relations of objects, of which experience only gives us information.”  This 
distinction between the ways that the “understanding exerts itself” is the distinction 
between a priori (demonstrative) and a posteriori (probabilistic) judgments.  Since these 
two ways in which reason operates are equivalent to two different ways of arriving at 
                                                
8 Like most Hume interpreters, I will regard the terms “passion” and “desire” as equivalent.  Context 
suggests an interpretation on which “reason” refers a faculty that is in charge of dealing with cognitive, 
belief-like states.   
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beliefs, it is appropriate to regard Hume as attacking rationalist theories according to 
which beliefs, without desires, are capable of generating motivation.  A priori reasoning 
alone cannot cause action – in fact, its removal from the particular objects of our actions 
makes it insufficient to motivate action.  Hume argues that “As its proper province is the 
world of ideas, and as the will always places us in that of realities, demonstration and 
volition seem, upon that account, to be totally remov’d, from each other.”  A priori 
reasoning can only affect action “as it directs our judgment concerning causes and 
effects” – that is, in virtue of its effects on probabilistic reasoning.   
     While Hume gives an account of how probabilistic reasoning can affect action, he 
holds that reasoning of this kind, by itself, is similarly insufficient for motivation.  
According to his picture, probabilistic reasoning must interact with desire to motivate 
action.  First, when an object may cause us pain or pleasure, this causes us to feel desire 
or aversion towards it.  The motivational emotion, “rests not here, but making us cast our 
view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by 
the relation of cause and effect.”  In making us think of the causes of the objects of our 
desire and allowing our motivational energies to focus on them, probabilistic reasoning 
does its entire work.  We then pursue the causes of whatever it is that we desire.  Hume 
points out that “the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it.”  Our 
passions provide the impulses to action, and without them, the causal connections 
supplied by probabilistic reasoning would have no effect on action.  So probabilistic 
reasoning has no motivational force of its own.   
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     Hume concludes that since reason only operates in two ways, and neither of these is 
sufficient to cause action without the aid of the passions, reason is incapable of causing 
action by itself.  Unfortunately, this argument is unlikely to convince anyone who 
believes that reason can give rise to motivations.  The first premise – that the only two 
forms of reasoning are probabilistic and demonstrative – is too strong.  Anti-Humeans 
may deny this premise, arguing that there is a third form of reasoning – practical 
reasoning.   
     Fortunately, Hume has a second argument for the conclusion that reason cannot 
motivate action.  According to this second argument, which Hume presents more quickly, 
passions are “original existences” that do not represent the world as beliefs do, and which 
imply “no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions”.  Since mental states can 
only be true or false if they aim at correctly representing the world, passions cannot be 
true or false in the way that beliefs are true or false.  And since “Reason is the discovery 
of truth or falsehood,” there is no way for reason to produce or generate passions.  Since 
passions do not have the properties of truth and falsehood, and since reason can only 
affect our mental states by affecting our attitudes as to the truth-values of propositions, 
reason cannot generate or eliminate passions.   
     This argument is better than the preceding one, in that it suggests a unifying 
explanation of why reason would be limited to the dual functions of making 
demonstrative and probabilistic judgments, and could not oppose desire in motivating 
action.  Demonstrative and probabilistic judgments concern themselves with beliefs, 
which represent the world and are evaluable in terms of truth and falsehood, so reason 
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can affect them.  Desires do not represent the world and are not evaluable in terms of 
truth and falsehood, so reason cannot affect them.  But there are a few avenues of escape 
for Hume’s opponent.   
     One possibility is to defend the view that desire represents states of the world – 
perhaps, that it aims at the good, and that reason can affect desires in virtue of their 
representing states of the world as good.  The view that desire represents states of the 
world, however, is hard to square with the way that desires can conflict with one another 
when we have mixed feelings about something.  I can consistently have a desire to go to 
dinner with my girlfriend’s parents (I would like to meet them) and have a desire not to 
go to dinner with them (the idea makes me nervous).  Merely reflecting on my desires in 
such a situation will not be sufficient to make one of them go away.  On the other hand, I 
cannot consistently believe that it is good to go to dinner with her parents, and that it is 
not good to go to dinner with them.  It is difficult to believe something like this in the 
first place, and if one has somehow fallen into believing a contradiction, reflecting on 
one’s beliefs is often an effective way of eliminating one of the beliefs and resolving it.  
Contradictions in representative mental states are hard to maintain – after all, the world 
does not contain contradictions, and these states represent the world.  Since we can have 
stable contradictions in desire, desires cannot be representative mental states.   
     A second response to Hume’s argument, probably more effective, is that reason can 
affect mental states other than those capable of truth and falsity.  A version of this 
response is implicit in the instrumentalist position, according to which reason can take 
our desires and beliefs into view and determine whether we have a desire-belief pair that 
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would make an action rational.  Anti-Humeans who deny DODI will face some 
challenges in trying to account for the kinds of belief-caused desire-formation distinctive 
of rationalism along these lines, however.  It is easy to see how one belief can bring 
another belief into existence via rational processes – if one of the propositions an agent 
believes implies another proposition that is not yet believed, rational processes may 
generate a belief in the second proposition.  If the truth of the first proposition implies the 
truth of the second proposition, and if rational belief is responsive to evidence of truth, a 
rational agent would form a belief in the second proposition.  Along similar lines, a belief 
might eliminate another belief that it contradicted.  But if Hume is right that desire has no 
representative quality, it is hard to see how a process like this could generate or eliminate 
desires.  Why would a mental state that does not represent the world, and thus is not 
responsive to evidence of truth or falsity, be affected in the same way that beliefs affect 
other beliefs?   
     Pointing out that these anti-Humeans face some explanatory challenges, however, is 
not yet a decisive objection against their view.  There may be ways to handle these 
challenges.  For example, one might argue that beliefs in some propositions – for 
example, the proposition that by doing some action one will fulfill an obligation, that 
some state of affairs is valuable, or that doing something is in one’s interests – are 
sufficient to generate a desire.  Or one might invoke reasons as primitive properties, and 
say that believing propositions that bear reasons is causally sufficient for the generation 
of a new desire.  If there is no general and informative way of characterizing the 
propositions that have motivational force or that bear reasons, the theory will be lacking 
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in simplicity.  But perhaps this is just the way that motivational propositions or reasons 
are.  Sometimes reality is not simple, and complexity in reality often demands inelegance 
in theory.   
     While Hume’s argument raises difficulties for rationalist theories according to which 
beliefs can generate desires through a process of reasoning, there is a more direct way to 
determine whether it is a necessary truth that this kind of desire-creation is impossible.  
We can try to imagine counterfactual scenarios in which an agent comes to have a new 
motivational mental state that has all of desire’s causal outputs, and in which the 
generation of this new motivational state is caused by a process of reasoning, all the 
premises of which are beliefs.  If it turns out that no such mental state could count as a 
desire, or that it is conceptually impossible for a motivational state to be produced by 
beliefs through a process of reasoning, DODI is a necessary truth.  However, if there are 
possible states of affairs where beliefs generate new desires through a process of 
reasoning, DODI will not be a necessary truth – though it may still hold true in the actual 
world.   
     Without further ado, I shall test DODI by presenting the example of the Angels: 
The Angels:  When Angels are born, they come into the world with no desires at 
all.  Whenever they form a new motivational mental state, it is because they have 
formed the belief that it would be right to engage in some future action.  There is 
a systematic and unfailing psychological process in them by which the belief that 
it will be right to perform a particular future action brings about a motivation to 
perform that action.  Other than this systematic tendency to form new 
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motivational states, they have none of the mental processes that one might regard 
as suggestive of an antecedent desire to engage in right actions.  For example, 
when vividly imagining counterfactual situations where they act rightly, they feel 
no pleasure, and when vividly imagining situations where they fail to act rightly, 
they feel no displeasure.  But once they come to believe that it will be right to 
perform some particular future action, their new motivation to perform that action 
has all the associated features of desire.   
The question is: Are the Angels’ new motivational mental states, which they form after 
believing that it is right to do something, instances of desire?  There are many different 
things one might say in response to this example.  I will consider three of them, the last of 
which strikes me as the intuitive response.   
     First, one might say that the example is impossible, since it stipulates at the beginning 
that Angels do not have desires but then implies that they do.  According to this response, 
the Angels’ new motivational states intuitively count as desires, and it is a necessary truth 
that a desire cannot be created through a process of reasoning unless an antecedent desire 
exists.  So we must attribute to them an antecedent desire to perform right actions.  This 
response does not seem right to me, however, because the Angels were antecedently 
incapable of engaging in particular mental processes that are necessary for one to have a 
desire to do the right thing.  The thought of doing particular counterfactual right actions 
did not please them, and the thought of failing to do so did not displease them.  
(Arguments for a necessary connection between desire, imagination of counterfactual 
desired states, and pleasure will be given in the section on Michael Smith and 
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phenomenological theories.)  Since the Angels lacked something that is necessary for 
desire in the beginning, their early mental states cannot count as desires.   
     Second, one might say that the example is coherent, and that the Angels’ new 
motivational states do not count as desires.  Someone who has this intuition most likely 
accepts the necessity of DODI, regards the Angels as not having desires before they 
engage in their reasoning, and thus regards the Angels’ new motivational states as not 
being desires.  As this is merely an intuition test, there is no arguing if someone 
genuinely has this intuition.  But I will say that what draws me away from this position is 
the fact that the new mental state has the rich set of features typical of desire.  Both in 
terms of motivation and in terms of the experiences an agent has while imagining 
counterfactual states of affairs, the new mental state has the features typical of desire.  
While the circumstances of its generation are unusual, the significance of this fact pales 
in comparison to the significance of its connections to pleasure and action.   
     The view that seems right to me, then, is that the example is coherent and the new 
motivational state is in fact a desire.  Without having any antecedent desires, the Angels 
are capable of generating new desires through a process of reasoning.  This would show 
that DODI, however true it may be in the actual world, is not a necessary truth.  It is not 
part of the concept of desire that desires can only be generated by processes of reasoning 
if antecedent desires come into the picture. 
     In the previous chapter, I stated that I would be defending the contingent truth of the 
Humean theory, not its necessary truth.  Now I hope it is clear why I take this position.  
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Since DODI is at best a contingent truth, the Humean theory can only be contingently 
true.   
 
Hume, Calm Passions, and Vivid Imagination 
     I have already considered one of Hume’s claims about the nature of our desires – that 
they do not represent the world as being a certain way, and that they are thus incapable of 
truth or falsity.  I will now go over one of Hume’s major contributions to desire-based 
explanations of the phenomenology of deliberation – his account of calm passions.   
     In the same section where he presents the two arguments that reason cannot have any 
motivational force independent of desire, Hume introduces a distinction between calm 
and violent passions.  While passions of both kinds are capable of motivating action in 
the same way, there is a phenomenological difference between them.  The calm passions, 
“tho’ they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by 
their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation.”  Violent passions, on the other 
hand, are experienced more robustly.  Hume remarks that “When I am immediately 
threatened with any grievous ill, my fears, apprehensions, and aversions rise to a great 
height, and produce a sensible emotion.”  In establishing this distinction between calm 
and violent passions, however, Hume does not mean to assert that each of our passions is 
fixed in its calmness or violence – by varying “the situation of the object,” we can 
“change the calm and violent passions into each other.”  To change a calm passion into a 
violent one, one needs to bring the object of the passion closer to the agent.  As Hume 
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says, “The same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, 
produces only a calm one.”   
     Hume writes that calm passions can become more violent if their objects are imagined 
more vividly.  As examples in support of a connection between vividness of imagination 
and the violence of passion, Hume cites the greater violence of passions for recently 
tasted pleasures and the motivational power of rhetoric that causes its audience to vividly 
imagine the objects of passion.  He also offers a historical example from ancient Athens.  
Themistocles conceived a plan to give Athens naval supremacy by launching a secret 
mission to burn the ships of all the other Greek kingdoms, which were gathered in a 
nearby port.  Since other kingdoms would learn of the plan if he expressed it openly, he 
merely told the Athenians that he had a secret plan that would benefit them greatly.  They 
had him explain the plan to Aristides alone, whose judgment they completely trusted.  
Aristides reported back to the Athenians that the plan would be greatly advantageous to 
Athens, but terribly unjust.  Upon hearing this, the Athenians unanimously voted against 
the plan.  Hume rejects the view of a historian who claims that this shows the great 
intensity of the Athenians’ desire for justice.  As Hume points out, the Athenians were 
only able to conceive of the plan in the general terms of justice and advantage.  The 
notion of advantage, being a very general idea, is not conducive to vivid imagining.  Had 
the Athenians been presented with the possibility of naval supremacy, which allows for 
more vivid imagining, more violent passions in support of Themistocles’ plan would 
have been incited, and they might well have decided otherwise.   
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     It is not hard to see how a connection between the vividness with which an object is 
imagined and the violence of the passion involved would explain a connection between 
the nearness of a passion’s object and the violence of the passion.  If nearer objects tend 
to be imagined more vividly – as is plausible – nearer objects would incite more violent 
passions.  Indeed, this is the explanation Hume offers: 
There is an easy reason, why every thing contiguous to us, either in space or time, 
shou’d be conceiv’d with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other 
object, in its influence on the imagination. Ourself is intimately present to us, and 
whatever is related to self must partake of that quality.  But where an object is so 
far remov’d as to have lost the advantage of this relation… its idea becomes still 
fainter and more obscure (2:2:7).   
 
Hume’s associationist psychology is evident in this passage.  The vividness with which 
we imagine something is explained, at least in part, by the closeness with which we 
associate it with something (in this case, the self) that is immediately present to us.   
     We can encapsulate Hume’s discussion of the calm and violent passions in a single 
property of desire, as follows: 
Intensification By Vivid Images: When an agent is presented with vivid images 
she associates with a state of affairs she desires, either in imagination or by her 
senses, that will strengthen the desire’s causal powers.  The desire’s phenomenal 
effects increase sharply, and its motivational powers increase substantially as 
well. 
Phenomenal and motivational effects are the two kind of effects that Hume has discussed 
– the “sensible emotion” that the desire has, and its ability to influence our actions as the 
Athenians were influenced.   
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     Certainly, the overall effect of vivid images can be otherwise than this formulation 
suggests.  If I desire to get married, and then see a couple in an unhappy marriage or 
vividly imagine myself in such a situation, perhaps I will be less disposed to pursue 
marriage.  But in this case, what is really affecting my motivational tendencies is the 
vivid image of marital strife, which may intensify any number of my aversions.  
Cases in which accurate vivid images give an agent new information that weakens her 
desires – perhaps, seeing someone eat a strange fruit that I had desired, and then 
vomit – similarly are not counterexamples to the principle listed above.  Whatever 
intensification of my desire may have arisen from initially seeing the fruit is 
overwhelmed by the intensification of my aversion to vomiting and my new belief in 
the bad consequences of eating the fruit.  The claim that vivid images intensify desire 
should be understood not as an all-things-considered claim about their overall effects, 
but as a claim about immediate functional outputs that may be overwhelmed.   
     On Hume’s view, an increase in the violence of a passion does not bode the same way 
for its phenomenal and motivational effects.  He says that “Tis evident passions influence 
not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper” 
(2.3.4) and describes how the force of custom can create strong but calm passions.  A 
violent passion, then, is one with particularly powerful phenomenal effects, while the 
strength of a passion is demonstrated in its behavioral effects.  This is why I have drawn 
from Hume’s discussion of how vivid imagination increases the violence of a passion the 
conclusion that the phenomenal effects increase more sharply than the motivational 
effects.  
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     With his distinction between calm and violent passions, Hume is able to explain the 
same phenomena explained by philosophers who ascribe motivational force to reason and 
claim that it opposes passion in the direction of the will.  Hume argues that what these 
philosophers call the operations of reason in guiding the will are really calm passions at 
work.  As calm passions “cause no disorder in the temper,” their “tranquillity leads us 
into a mistake concerning them, and causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our 
intellectual faculties” (2.2.7).  While it is true that we are sometimes motivated by mental 
states that do not cause the same “disorder in the temper” as violent passions, this can be 
explained better by the category of calm passions than by a motivationally efficacious 
faculty of reason.  The explanation involving calm passions is simpler than the 
explanation involving a faculty of reason that stands in opposition to desire, as it invokes 
only one kind of entity where the reason-based explanation invokes two.  Anti-Humeans 
cannot claim here that Hume has invoked two different kinds of entities simply because 
both violent and calm passions have entered into the explanation.  As Hume shows in his 
discussion of how violent and calm passions can be converted into each other by making 
their objects more or less vivid to the imagination, his explanation only involves a single 
kind of mental state.  Passions are at bottom the same with respect to their capacities to 
be calm or violent, though the situations of their objects differ, causing agents with 
passions for differently situated things to feel differently.   
 
Nietzsche, Direction of Attention, and the Standpoint of Reflection 
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     The contributions of Friedrich Nietzsche to Humean views about how we deliberate 
have gone largely unnoticed.  But much like Hume, Nietzsche tried to construct desire-
based accounts of complex deliberative phenomena.  In Daybreak, he lists six ways in 
which we can combat a vehement drive9 that is tormenting us.  We can avoid 
opportunities for its gratification, gratify it only on a certain schedule, overindulge it until 
we become sick of it, mentally associate it with something painful, squander our energy 
on something else, or depress our entire constitution to weaken it.  But whichever method 
we choose, Nietzsche claims that  
in this entire procedure our intellect is only the blind instrument of another drive 
which is a rival of the drive whose vehemence is tormenting us: whether it be the 
drive to restfulness, or the fear of disgrace and other evil consequences, or love.  
While ‘we’ believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom 
it is one drive which is complaining about another; that is to say: for us to become 
aware that we are suffering from the vehemence or a drive presupposes the 
existence of another equally vehement or even more vehement drive, and that a 
struggle is in prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides.  (109) 
 
In such a situation, we do reflect on the drive whose vehemence is tormenting us, but we 
do not typically reflect on the more vehement drive that directs our deliberation.  The 
intellect is, as Nietzsche says, a “blind instrument” of the drive that controls it.  As Philip 
Pettit and Michael Smith have argued in “Backgrounding Desire,” the desire that 
motivates our actions often sits in the background of deliberation, and it need not itself 
                                                
9 Nietzsche uses “Trieb,” which is usually translated as “drive,” sometimes translated as “instinct,” and less 
often as “desire.”  The term differs from “desire” in having the suggestion of being innate and primitive, as 
“instinct” is.  It suggests a motivational force within the agent that would operate even in the absence of 
outside stimuli to produce it, like hunger or the sex drive.  None of my claims will turn upon the precise 
meaning of the term – the ability of our motivational states to direct our attention towards things we 
associate with our goals is what I am trying to point out.  I thank Kathleen Higgins and Irene Price for help 
on this linguistic point.   
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occupy the foreground and be focused on in deliberation.  The kinds of cases Nietzsche 
discusses provide examples in support of this view.   
     When one tries to fit the Nietzschean framework outlined above to the 
phenomenology of deliberation, one notices that the desire that directs deliberation and 
drives us towards our conclusions has substantial power to determine how we focus our 
attention.  While directing attention is sometimes taken to be a more intellectual process 
than such rough operations as motivating action and causing pleasure, Nietzsche holds 
that desire has this kind of power over the intellect.  Someone who desires to combat the 
vehemence of (for example) his sexual lust will focus his attention on things he 
associates, either positively or negatively, with the object of this second-order desire – for 
instance, his lust, past moments when he gave in to his lust, the future state of affairs in 
which he hopes that his lust will be controlled, and methods for controlling it.  While 
other desires can be objects on which we reflect, the desire from the standpoint of which 
we reflect has the power to direct our attention.  It causes us to pay attention to the object 
of desire and things we associate with it.  As Hume put it, desire “casts our view on every 
side” of its object when we engage in practical deliberation (2.3.2).   
     The phenomenon of desire directing one’s attention is familiar from cases far simpler 
than the one Nietzsche describes.  Consider a simple case where only one desire is in play 
– perhaps, a case where a hungry person walks into his kitchen and sees a coconut cream 
pie sitting on the table.  His attention will focus on the pie, and not the pattern of the 
linoleum or the hum of the refrigerator.  Aspects of the pie that satisfy his gustatory 
desires will be the most central objects of his attention – perhaps, the toasted coconut 
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flakes and the creaminess of the cream.  The way that one desire focuses our attention on 
our other desires in the more complex cases of internal conflict is nothing more than an 
extension of this simple phenomenon.   
     One effect of Nietzsche’s move in the dialectic between Humeans and their opponents 
is much like the effect of Hume’s discussion of calm passions.  Anti-Humeans might 
regard the activities that one engages in when one combats an intense desire as the 
outputs of a motivational state other than desire.  After all, the desire that is the object of 
reflection feels different from the desire from the standpoint of which we reflect.  Since 
the object of reflection is clearly a desire, and it feels different from the desire that 
occupies the standpoint of reflection, anti-Humeans might argue that we should regard 
the latter as a mental state other than desire.  Nietzsche claims that despite the different 
roles of the two mental states within our phenomenology, both are in fact desires.  On 
Nietzsche’s view, it is the greater strength of one desire that causes it to seize the 
standpoint of reflection and hold it against the other.   
     The picture Nietzsche offers us is one on which complex processes of practical 
deliberation can be undertaken – as I have said – from the standpoint of a desire.  
Desiring that D – whether D is that one eat a piece of pie, that one not give in to one’s 
sexual lust, or that one’s suffering not be meaningless – causes the direction of attention 
towards D and towards things that are associated with it.  Contemporary neuroscientists 
like Antonio Damasio have (though in terms quite different from Nietzsche) defended the 
view that desire has the power to direct the attention of agents in practical deliberation.  
Damasio hypothesizes that “a somatic state, negative or positive, caused by the 
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appearance of a given representation, operates not only as a marker for the value of what 
is represented, but also as a booster for continued working memory and attention” (198).  
Somatic markers of value have the motivational and hedonic effects that desires are often 
regarded as having, and Damasio here embraces the view that they cause us to attend to 
things they mark as opposed to things which remain unmarked.   
     We can summarize the views of Nietzsche and Damasio regarding desire and the 
direction of attention as follows: 
The Attention-Direction Aspect:  Desiring that D will make an agent more 
likely to focus her attention on things she associates with D than things she does 
not associate with D.   
Instead of making a strong claim that desire is necessary or sufficient to determine how 
the agent directs her attention, it is better to make the weak claim that it increases the 
focus on its objects.  There are many other psychological causes of attention-direction.  
Sudden movements or sounds can attract one’s attention, and by an intentional action one 
can direct one’s attention to something that does not itself figure significantly in one’s 
desires.  One may desire to eat some food more than one desires anything one associates 
with a loud noise, but still be distracted by the loud noise and momentarily not focus 
attention on the food.  “Things” is to be read broadly to include such things as 
counterfactual possibilities – desire can cause an agent to focus her attention on desirable 
or undesirable states of affairs as well as physical objects in her environment.  
     Is it a necessary truth about desire that it directs attention?  As cases of flashing lights 
and loud noises show, directing one’s attention towards certain things is not sufficient for 
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having desires for those things.  The question of necessity is harder.  The relevant 
counterfactual situations are very difficult (at least for me) to get any imaginative grip on.  
What would it be like to be a creature that did not direct its attention towards the things it 
associated with its desires?  In particular, how would this interact with desire’s capacity 
to cause pleasure?  Many of our everyday experiences of pleasure and displeasure arise 
from the natural way we direct our attention towards possible or actual states of affairs 
that we associate with our strong desires.  One thing that contributes to the vividness of 
an imaginative or sensory representation of some state of affairs for us is the intensity 
with which we direct our attention towards it.  The more I am absorbed in thought about 
some past success, the more pleasure I feel.  Since more vivid imaginative and sensory 
experiences of the states of affairs that we desire create more intense hedonic 
experiences, it is hard to get a grip on what our inner lives would be like if desire did not 
direct attention.   
     Insofar as this is conceivable, though, it does not seem that the ability to direct 
attention is necessary for desire.  We can test our intuitions with the following case:   
The Absent-Minded.  While the Absent-Minded are sometimes capable of 
directing their attention towards states they are motivated to bring about, the 
systematic and automatic connection between motivation and attention-direction 
that exists in humans is absent in them.  When something causes them to fully 
focus on states of affairs that they are motivated to bring about, their experiences 
are the same as ours.  But in general, they move about and engage in actions while 
their attention focuses on unrelated matters.   
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I name them the Absent-Minded because imagining extreme absent-mindedness seems to 
be the easiest way to get a grip on what agents who did not direct their attention towards 
things associated with desired states of affairs would be like.  When I think about how 
they feel in these cases, it seems to me that the Absent-Minded are desirers, despite their 
lack of humanlike attention-direction in other cases.   
 
Davidson’s Pro-Attitudes and the Objects of Desire 
     According to Donald Davidson, an agent’s having a reason for action consists in 
having a pair of mental states – a “pro attitude towards actions of a certain kind”, and 
“believing that his action is of that kind” (685).  On Davidson’s view, “the primary 
reason for an action is its cause” (686).  Davidson never suggests that his view about the 
mental states causally responsible for action applies to a narrower set of creatures than 
the set of all agents, so it is best to interpret him as making a conceptual point about the 
nature of action, and not merely as identifying the pair of mental states that happen to 
cause actions in human beings.  But as the claim that all possible actions must be caused 
by desire-belief pairs implies that all human actions are caused by desire-belief pairs, 
Davidson’s position implies a position on the issue that I am concerned with.   
     Davidson does not go into great detail in describing pro-attitudes, which comprise a 
very broad class of motivational dispositions.  His brief remarks give good reason to 
think that pro-attitudes are mental states that can fit under some reading of the term 
“desire”, and which are much like Hume’s “passions.”  Under the heading of pro-
attitudes are included “desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a great variety of moral 
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views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, and public and 
private goals and values in so far as these can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent 
directed toward actions of a certain kind” (686).  While there is debate about the mental 
states underlying moral views, aesthetic principles, and some of the other states Davidson 
describes, the first four states are clear examples of mental states that seem like Humean 
desires.  Davidson positions himself more firmly in the Humean camp when he says that 
“It is not unnatural, in fact, to treat wanting as a genus including all pro-attitudes as 
species” (688).    
     However, “pro attitudes must not be taken for convictions, however temporary, that 
every action of a certain kind ought to be performed, is worth performing, or is, all things 
considered, desirable” (686).  A conviction is a belief of whose truth one is convinced, 
and anti-Humeans might want to say that convictions whose content ties them to action in 
this way can cause actions without the presence of any desire.  If Davidson claimed that 
pro-attitudes were convictions that actions of a certain kind are worth performing, he 
would have to accept that a pair of beliefs alone – such a conviction, and the belief that 
the possible action before us is of that kind – could motivate action.  Then he would 
importantly disagree with Humeans about motivation, who say that desires are necessary 
if humans are to be motivated to act.   
     In two places I have cited above, Davidson claims that pro-attitudes are directed not 
towards states of affairs or ordinary physical objects, but towards “actions of a certain 
kind”.  This makes it easy to characterize the kind of belief that is involved in the desire-
belief pair – it is a belief that the action to be performed is of that kind.  As he says,  
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R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the description d only if 
R consists of a pro attitude of the agent toward actions with a certain property, and a 
belief of the agent that A, under the description d, has that property.  (687)   
     Insofar as we want desires to explain motivation, this works well – a pro-attitude 
towards actions of some kind is enough to explain how we are motivated to act.  But if 
pro-attitudes necessarily make some reference to action, it will be difficult to identify 
pro-attitudes with desires.  While the content of a Davidsonian pro-attitude necessarily 
involves an action for the agent to perform, the content of a desire need not involve 
action.  Sports fans strongly desire the success of their favorite teams, but it hard to see 
how performing any actions fits into the content of this desire.  This desire is certainly 
capable of motivating action – football fans often expend much energy in making noisy 
disturbances when an opposing team has the ball, and do so with the intention of 
disrupting the other team – but it is not clear why we should specify its content in a way 
that makes reference to action.  Even more commonly than this desire causes action, it 
causes experiences of delight, disappointment, anxiety, and relief as games and seasons 
unfold.  These are quite simply explained if one takes the contents of desires to be states 
of affairs that need not involve action.  If we regard the agent’s attitude as focusing on the 
state of affairs where his team wins the game or the championship, and not on any action 
that he might perform, we can neatly explain many aspects of these emotions.  Events 
that increase the perceived likelihood of states of affairs that the agent desires are 
accompanied by pleasant emotions like delight and relief, while events that decrease the 
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perceived likelihood of these states of affairs are accompanied by unpleasant emotions 
like disappointment and anxiety.   
     If desires are for states of affairs that do not necessarily involve action, Davidson’s 
characterization of the kinds of beliefs that interact with them to cause action will not be 
right.  Beliefs that a particular action is of a particular type do not interact with desires for 
states of affairs in the right way.  The beliefs involved need to be means-ends beliefs 
according to which an agent can bring about a particular state of affairs by engaging in a 
particular action.  If desires are for a broad range of states of affairs, this will be the best 
way to explain the performance of an action by its inclusion in the mental contents of the 
agent.   
     I have argued that the focus on action that Davidson attributes to pro-attitudes is not a 
necessary part of the content of desires, wantings, and other mental states.  Should we say 
here that Davidson has mischaracterized pro-attitudes, or that his category of pro-
attitudes is different from the category of desires?  Davidson does intend the category of 
pro-attitudes to include a long list of mental states beginning with desires and wantings.  
However, the proviso at the end of his list – that these mental states are to be considered 
pro-attitudes “in so far as these can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent directed toward 
actions of a certain kind” – leaves open the possibility that Davidson might not regard the 
majority of our desires as pro-attitudes.  Perhaps the only desires that count as pro-
attitudes are the ones that make reference to action, a category including many of our 
instrumental desires, which are derived from other desires and means-end beliefs.  Even 
if he thinks that wanting is a genus of which all pro-attitudes are species, he might not 
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think that it is a genus of which only pro-attitudes are species.  If this is the correct way to 
read Davidson, he avoids the criticism that his view mischaracterizes the content of 
desire.  However, he has then given overly complex explanation where a simpler one 
could be offered.  Davidson will explain many actions with reference to a desire, a 
means-end belief, a resulting pro-attitude towards a kind of action, and a further belief 
that an action is of that kind.  On the account that I have offered, a desire and a means-
end belief do all the explanatory work in these cases.   
     There is a third contender for the focus of desire – while we often speak of people 
desiring particular states of affairs like the Texas Longhorns winning the national 
championship, it is also common to speak of people desiring various physical objects.10  
We say of Jenny that she wants chocolate, wants a diamond necklace, wants a goldfish, 
and wants Orlando Bloom.  These are concrete objects and not states of affairs.  Why 
should we translate our talk of desiring these objects to talk of desiring particular states of 
affairs?  These cases may even seem more basic than the cases in which we desire states 
of affairs – after all, desires for food, sex, and simple possessions, often thought of as 
particularly basic cases, often are described as desires for objects.  But there are good 
reasons to translate this object-talk into states-of-affairs talk.  If we stay with object-talk, 
we will fail to understand exactly what Jenny will try to obtain and be pleased by.  Jenny 
will try to eat chocolate, wear a diamond necklace, keep a goldfish in her aquarium, and 
make love to Orlando Bloom.  She will not try to wear chocolate, eat a diamond 
                                                
10 In “Against Propositionalism”, Michelle Montague considers the position that desires are for things of 
this kind, and not for states of affairs or anything similarly propositional.   
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necklace, make love to a goldfish, or keep Orlando Bloom in her aquarium.  Thoughts of 
the former states of affairs will please her; thoughts of the latter will not.  If we want 
desire to do useful work in explaining and predicting the behavior of agents, we will have 
to regard object-talk merely as a convenient shorthand for states-of-affairs talk.  It leaves 
out the essential differences between the ways we wish to interact with the objects, while 
states-of-affairs talk specifies this clearly.  (Part of why object-talk seems so natural to us 
may have to do with the way desire directs attention.  If Orlando Bloom enters Jenny’s 
environment, her desire will cause her to focus her attention on him and not other objects 
in the area, since he is the thing that is most powerfully associated with her desires.  
However, when she plans future courses of action, her mind will be directed more 
towards possible states of affairs where she makes love to Orlando Bloom than 
possibilities where she keeps him in her aquarium.)   
     The following formulation, then, seems to characterize the motivational aspect of 
desire, with the content of the desire being the state of affairs that the agent is trying to 
bring about.   
The Motivational Aspect: If an agent occurrently desires D, and she occurrently 
believes that she can bring about D by doing A, she will have a motivational 
tendency to do A.  Her motivational tendency to do A will increase with the 
strengths of the desire and the belief.  If at any time there is some action that she 
has the greatest motivational tendency to do, she will initiate that action.   
The technical term “motivational tendency” is brought in here to deal with cases 
where agents have desire-belief pairs that point them towards options inconsistent 
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with each other.  In such cases, agents are motivated to both kinds of behavior, but 
only one source of motivation results in action.  I am not using this term in a way that 
will neatly explain feelings of motivation that individuals experience, and I am not 
claiming that our use of the ordinary word “motivation” tracks the product of desire 
and belief.  Both our feelings of motivation and the ordinary use of “motivation” 
depend on factors beyond the ones in the above formulation.  Even if I strongly desire 
to eat, and believe that by killing my friend and eating him I could satisfy my hunger, 
I will not feel any motivation, even an overridden feeling of motivation, to kill and 
eat my friend.  And I would not ordinarily be described as motivated to kill and eat 
my friend.  Predictions about the phenomenology of motivation cannot be directly 
read off of the magnitude of the agent’s motivational tendency, in the sense I use 
“motivation tendency” here.  “Motivational tendency” just refers to a tendency to act, 
which is a function of desire and belief.   
 
Strawson and the Connection to Pleasure 
     In Mental Reality, Galen Strawson argues against “neobehaviorism,” claiming that 
one can understand mental states without understanding how they are related to behavior.  
Strawson does not hold that desires have no necessary connections to behavior, however: 
Any desire has the following property: it is necessarily true that there are beliefs 
with which the desire can combine in such a way as to give rise to, or constitute, a 
disposition to act or behave in some way.  This is a conceptual truth, true even of 
desires to change the past and desires for logically impossible things.  But if I am 
rightly sure that I could never do anything about satisfying any of my desires 
about the weather, or lack any conception of the possibility of doing anything to 
satisfy my desires, then I am not now disposed to act or behave in any way simply 
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on account of the fact that I have certain desires. This is especially clear if I am 
also constitutionally incapable of any sort of action or behavior. (276-277) 
 
Strawson’s view, then, is that having a desire does not entail having a disposition to act.  
However, that one has a desire entails a counterfactual about how one would be disposed 
to act in circumstances where one had a particular sort of means-end belief.  (For 
Strawson, the truth of such a counterfactual is not sufficient for the existence of a 
disposition.)  Strawson claims that it is possible to have the concept of desire without 
knowing about the connection to motivation.  While he still holds that there are necessary 
conceptual connections between desire and motivation, he argues that creatures which 
lack dispositions to act, in his sense of “disposition”, can still have desires.   
     Why not say that having a desire entails having a disposition to act, and that the 
activation conditions for this disposition include having proper means-end beliefs and the 
ability to act?  The activation conditions for a disposition can be complex, and perhaps 
they include everything that would be necessary for us to regard a desire as a disposition 
to act.  Part of what drives Strawson away from this position is a general worry about 
dispositions.  As he says, “everything is set to act or behave in certain ways should 
certain conditions be fulfilled. The table in front of me is set to go for a walk, for 
example, should certain conditions be fulfilled (a radical rearrangement of its subatomic 
particles).  You just have to put enough into the set of conditions” (268).  Strawson is 
worried that if we regard desires as dispositions to act, things that intuitively do not have 
desires will be regarded as having desires, since many of these things can be dramatically 
modified so as to generate an agent.   
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     The solution to this problem is just to specify the activating conditions clearly and 
narrowly enough so that not everything will be regarded as having a disposition to act.  
Giving something means-end beliefs is a reasonable activating condition for desire.  
Rearranging its subatomic particles so that it becomes a person is not.  Furthermore, one 
can prevent the ascription of desires to furniture by stipulating that only agents can have 
desires.   
     One example that Strawson offers to argue that dispositions to act are not necessary 
for desire involves a group of non-actual creatures called the Weather Watchers.  The 
Weather Watchers have sensations, thoughts, emotions, beliefs, and desires.  They are 
pleased when their desires are satisfied and disappointed when they are not.  However, 
their desires have no power to move them to action, as they are not capable of behavior, 
and even lack behavioral dispositions.  They are rooted to the ground, motionless, and 
pass their time observing the weather and other natural phenomena.  Some of the 
phenomena they witness delight them, some frustrate them, and some make them wistful.  
Strawson’s claim is that these creatures are metaphysically possible, and that their lack of 
motivational dispositions does not make it impossible for them to have desires.   
     Strawson does not directly say anything about what would happen if the Weather 
Watchers could somehow be given means-end beliefs according to which they could 
bring about some desired state of affairs by performing an action.  (Such a means-end 
belief would be false, since they are totally unable to act.)  But since he thinks that “it is 
necessarily true that there are beliefs with which the desire can combine in such a way as 
to give rise to, or constitute, a disposition to act or behave in some way,” it seems that he 
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would say that Weather Watchers would be disposed to act if they acquired these means-
end beliefs.  As long as this is the case, it seems right that the Weather Watchers are 
possible.  Even if they do not act, they would act if they were modified in the right way, 
and they have the emotions that go along with desire.  So despite their lack of any 
disposition to move, it does not seem impossible for them to be desiring beings.   
     Strawson’s second example concerns creatures that are capable of behavior, but 
incapable of any sort of affective experience or emotion.  He names these creatures the 
Aldebaranians, and describes them as follows:  
Consider a race of creatures—the Aldebaranians—that have beliefs, sensations, 
thoughts, and so on. They are not capable of any affect states at all, but they are 
capable of entering into states—call them 'M states'—given which, and given that 
they believe what they believe, they are regularly caused to move in certain ways, 
and so regularly engage in what looks like purposive behavior. M states, then, 
may be defined as motivating states that are functionally very similar to states that 
we normally think of as desire states. They are functionally similar in respect of 
the way in which they interact with a being's informational states to cause it to 
move in apparently goal-directed ways. Roughly speaking, specific M states, in 
combination with specific informational states, lead to specific movements. (281) 
 
Strawson later says that “the Aldebaranians are in fact experiencing beings, though they 
lack any affect dispositions” (282).  The question is whether the Aldebaranians’ M states 
are, in fact, desires.  Strawson seems to think that they are, though he never advances a 
firm opinion on the case.  He claims that people’s intuitions differ on the question of 
whether the M states are desires.   
     Strawson comes to the conclusion that understanding the connection between desire 
and affective experience is essential to having the concept of desire, while one can have 
the concept of desire without even having the concept of motivation or action.  He 
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imagines a Weather Watcher philosopher who lacks the concept of action, but has 
concepts of all the affective states tied to desire.  He believes that this Weather Watcher 
philosopher could still possess the same concept of desire that we do.  It seems, however, 
that Strawson thinks an Aldebaranian philosopher could not have the concept of desire.  
In Strawson’s view 
the primary linkage of the notion of desire to a notion other than itself is not to the 
notion of action or behavior but rather to the notion of being pleased or happy or 
contented should something come about (or at least to the notion of ceasing to be 
unhappy or discontented should it come about) and to the distinct but correlative 
notion of being unhappy or discontented or disappointed should it not come 
about.  (280) 
 
Strawson does not clearly explain what a “primary linkage” is, and, it is hard to know 
exactly what he means.  He seems to be claiming that the causal connection between 
desires and affective states is somehow more essential to our concept of desire than the 
causal connection linking desire to action or behavior.  He also seems to hold that both 
are metaphysically necessary, which is puzzling, as metaphysical necessity does not seem 
to come in degrees.  Perhaps even the necessary connection that Strawson accepts – that 
desire is necessarily able to combine with belief to cause a disposition to act – is being 
presented as less significant than the causal connection to affective states.   
     To make the examples of the Weather Watchers and the Aldebaranians more effective 
in getting at the issues Strawson is talking about, we should say a little more about the 
cases.  So I will clarify one counterfactual feature of the Weather Watchers case, and set 
up the Aldebaranians case in a similar way.  Suppose it is true of the Weather Watchers 
that if they could somehow be brought to the false belief that they could satisfy their 
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desires through action, they would try to engage in action.  And suppose it is true of the 
Aldebaranians that their lack of affect is due to the combination of a lack of imagination 
and unchangingly true gut-level beliefs about the future.  They lack affect only because 
they do not have the imaginative capacity to allow for pleasant daydreams and moments 
of horror at imagined future calamities, and because they lack the changing beliefs that 
are necessary for delight at unexpected satisfactions and disappointment at unexpected 
failures.  But if they could be given the capacity for imagination, or induced to have 
changing beliefs about the future, they could have the same affective experiences that 
humans do in these cases.  Now there is intuitively no problem with saying that both 
creatures have desires, since the relevant counterfactuals obtain in each case.  Just as 
Weather Watchers are not disposed to act due to their lack of means-end beliefs, in 
Strawson’s narrow sense of disposition, Aldebaranians are not disposed to have affective 
experiences due to their lack of imagination and belief-change.  But at least in the way 
Strawson uses “disposition,” claims about the necessity of dispositions to act or feel 
emotions are stronger than claims about some necessary counterfactual tie to action or 
emotion, and the latter claims hold while the former do not.   
    As for whether philosophers of their kind who lacked certain important concepts – 
action for the Weather Watcher, and affect for the Aldebaranian – could share our 
concept of desire, it seems to me that both cases are on the same footing.  They could 
successfully refer to desire, just as people successfully referred to water even before 
anybody knew about H2O.  By use of a reference-fixing description, Weather Watchers, 
Aldebaranians, and humans all could refer to the same psychological property, even if 
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they had different beliefs about that property.  (This does not presuppose that “desire” has 
the same sort of natural-kind semantics as “water” does.  Number terms are usually not 
taken to have the same semantics as “water”, but one could use reference-fixing 
descriptions to pick out numbers too.)  Weather Watchers and Aldebaranians could not 
successfully give a conceptual analysis of desire, but the ability to give a successful 
analysis is not necessary for concept possession.   
     What if we had set up the cases the other way?  What if even the addition of an 
appropriate means-end belief could not move the Weather Watchers to action, and neither 
imagination of alternative possibilities nor changing beliefs about the objects of their M 
states could cause the Aldebaranians to feel any hedonic emotions?  In this case, it seems 
to me that the Weather Watchers would be impossible (since they are stipulated to have 
desires, but they cannot be motivated even if the appropriate means-end beliefs are 
somehow forced into their heads).  Similarly, since the Aldebaranians are incapable of 
any affective states even when the appropriate counterfactuals hold, it seems to me that 
their motivational states are not actually desires, but some other kind of mental state.  
Weather Watcher and Aldebaranian philosophers would then be referring to something 
different than we do, and than each other do, when they consider the mental states of their 
kind.   
 
Smith’s Objections to Phenomenological Theories and his Dispositional Account 
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     In The Moral Problem, Michael Smith presents some objections to phenomenological 
theories of desire.  The particular phenomenological view that he devotes the most time 
to is the “strong phenomenological conception” of desire.   
Strong Phenomenological Conception (SPC):  “Desires are, like sensations, 
simply and essentially states that have a certain phenomenological content.”  
(105) 
Smith thinks that some of his objections to strong phenomenological conception will 
apply to varieties of the weaker phenomenological conception as well.   
Weaker Phenomenological Conception (WPC):  “Desires are like sensations in 
that they have phenomenological content essentially, but differ from sensations in 
that they have propositional content as well.”  (108) 
The conception of desire that I will defend in this chapter will not be a version of SPC.  
But depending on what it means to “have phenomenological content essentially,” it may 
count as a version of WPC.  If having phenomenological content essentially means that 
the mental state itself is essentially constituted in part by some phenomenological state, 
then I will not be defending a version of WPC.  But if having phenomenological content 
essentially means that the mental state necessarily can produce a certain phenomenology, 
under some activating condition, then my view is a variety of WPC.  In what follows, I 
will interpret Smith as meaning the latter thing, and arguing against views where some 
phenomenological states are necessarily connected to desire.  Every argument he presents 
that would apply to phenomenological conceptions under the former reading applies to 
them simply because they are phenomenological conceptions under the latter reading.  So 
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even if I am misreading his conclusions, I will be addressing the key parts of his 
arguments.   
     I will now consider Smith’s objections to both SPC and WPC.  While there is no 
reason to reject the intuitions that underlie some of his arguments, these intuitions can be 
accommodated by a theory according to which it is necessary for a mental state’s being a 
desire that it generate particular phenomenological effects under particular activating 
conditions.   
     Smith’s first argument against the strong phenomenological conception involves 
agents with unconscious desires.  He begins this argument by claiming that “it is 
plausible to hold that a subject is in pain if and only if she believes that she is in pain,” 
and holding this to be an instance of the more general thesis that “a subject is in a state 
with a certain phenomenological content if and only if she believes herself to be in a state 
with that content.”  If this general claim about the epistemology of phenomenological 
content is true and the strong phenomenological conception is correct, “it is plausible to 
hold that a subject desires to φ if and only if she believes that she desires to φ” (105).   
     The general thesis about phenomenology is not as plausible as Smith thinks – it is a 
familiar phenomenon from ordinary experience that the content of our phenomenological 
states often outstrips our beliefs about our phenomenological states.  Looking out the 
window as a car passes by, I may have an experience of blackness because of the car’s 
black tires, but form no belief that I am seeing black, because I am not paying any 
particular attention to the tires.  In the specific case of pain, agents who are focused on 
things other than their pain (people in life-or-death situations and athletes engrossed in 
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intense competition, for example) may not form beliefs about their pain, because their 
attention is trained on other things.  In all of these cases, it is likely that the people 
involved would form beliefs about being in pain if these beliefs became relevant enough 
to their situation to warrant the focusing of attention on states of the world that often 
precedes belief-formation.  But there is no reason to ascribe beliefs about their sensations 
to them antecedently.  Similarly, even if having a desire is nothing more than having a 
particular phenomenological content, there is no reason to think that all those who desire 
that P will believe that they desire that P.   
     Smith follows the aforementioned discussion of the phenomenology of reflection with 
the following example, in which an agent acts out of an unconscious desire: 
Suppose each day on his way to work John buys a newspaper at a certain 
newspaper stand.  However, he has to go out of his way to do so, and for no 
apparently good reason.  The newspaper he buys is on sale at other newspaper 
stands on his direct route to work, there is no difference in the price or condition 
of the newspapers bought at the two stands, and so on.  There is, however, the 
following difference.  Behind the counter of the stand where John buys his 
newspaper, there are mirrors so placed that anyone who buys a newspaper there 
cannot help but look at himself.  Let’s suppose, however, that if it were suggested 
to John that the reason he buys his newspaper at that stand is that he wants to look 
at his own reflection, he would vehemently deny it.  And it wouldn’t seem to John 
as if he were concealing anything in doing so.  However, finally, let’s suppose 
that if the mirrors were removed from the stand, his preference for that stand 
would disappear.  (106) 
 
Smith takes this to be a case where John desires to see his own reflection, but does not 
believe that he desires to see his own reflection.  As I have just argued, this should not in 
itself be a problem for SPC.  Cases where agents have particular phenomenological 
contents, but lack beliefs that they have those contents, are common enough.  
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     What would be a problem for SPC (and WPC, for that matter) is if John’s desire to see 
his own reflection never had any phenomenological effects.  And it is not clear, in the 
above example, that John’s desire would be this ineffectual.  It is plausible that in the 
situation where the mirrors were removed from the stand, John would look where the 
mirrors used to be, fail to see his reflection, and suddenly feel a twinge of dissatisfaction 
that he could not correctly explain.  Perhaps he would explain his dissatisfaction in some 
other way, or perhaps he would not even think about it enough to come up with an 
explanation at all.  If this is how things would actually go, SPC can handle Smith’s 
proposed counterexample, and if it is plausible that this is how things would go, Smith’s 
counterexample should not persuade us to abandon phenomenological theories of desire.   
     Now I will move on to Smith’s second argument against SPC: 
Let’s suppose we grant that desires are like sensations in that they essentially have 
phenomenological content.  Even so, it must be agreed that they differ from 
sensations in that they have, in addition, propositional content (Platts, 1981: 74-
7).  Ascriptions of desires, unlike ascriptions of sensations, may be given in the 
form ‘A desires that p’, where ‘p’ is a sentence.  Thus, whereas A’s desire to φ 
may be ascribed to A in the form ‘A desires that she φs’, A’s pain cannot be 
ascribed to A in the form ‘A pains that p’.   
 
Smith here assumes that sensations lack propositional content.  This is not an 
uncontroversial claim.  Philosophers like Michael Tye have held that sensations do in fact 
have propositional content.  On a view like Tye’s, the visual sensation of blue has the 
propositional content that there is a blue object in front of one, and the sensation of pain 
has the propositional content that I have sustained some sort of bodily damage.   
     Could Smith describe the contrast between sensations and desires in a way that is 
compatible with sensations having propositional content?  Perhaps he could say that 
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sensations and desires differ in that the propositional content of sensations, if they have 
any, is limited to their phenomenal content, while desires have a propositional content 
that goes beyond their phenomenal content.  He could say that this difference is reflected 
in the difference between the way we talk about pains and the way we talk about desires, 
with that-clauses introducing the propositional content of desires while no that-clauses 
can introduce the propositional content of pains.  (While people are sometimes pained 
that P, this is not generally true of pains.  I can be pained that my friend misunderstood 
my motives, but the “pained that” locution is not applicable to purely physical pains that 
are not associated with any propositional attitudes – for instance, the pain of being stung 
by a bee.)  If it seems strange that some propositional contents cannot be introduced by 
that-clauses while others can, that is really a problem for Tye and not for Smith.   
     In fact, there is an important difference between pains and desires that underlies the 
way we talk about them.  For a mental state to be a desire, it is essential that it be able to 
cause action in combination with a suitable means-end belief.  This distinguishes desires 
from pains and other mental states whose essential nature is limited to their 
phenomenological content, and which need not cause action.  The propositional content 
of a desire explains what kinds of actions it will cause, and without such a content it 
would be impossible to explain the causation of action.  An agent who desires that D will 
do A when she realizes that she can bring about D by doing A.  This is why it is 
significant that we talk about a desire that D, while not talking about a pain that P.  
Smith, then, is right to reject SPC.  On a strong phenomenological conception, desires 
lack a kind of content that is essential to their nature as mental states that cause action.   
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     Smith then tries to parlay this objection to SPC into an objection to WPC.  He charges 
that versions of WPC “in no way contribute to our understanding of what a desire as a 
state with propositional content is, for they cannot explain how it is that desires have 
propositional content” (108).  Supplementing Smith’s argument with the above 
reflections about the ability to cause action being essential for desire, we can develop out 
of this remark a good argument against versions of WPC where phenomenological 
content alone is essential to desire, and propositional content is merely a nonessential 
characteristic of actual desires.  While such theories might be able to account for the 
propositional content of actual desires (since it is contingently true on these theories that 
desires have propositional content), they will not be able to account for the necessity of 
propositional content for desires.  Since the motivational feature is essential to desire, and 
propositional content is necessary to account for the motivational feature, these versions 
of WPC must be rejected.   
     But there is a version of WPC that is not touched by this part of Smith’s objection.  In 
this version, both propositional content and counterfactual connections to 
phenomenological content are essential for desire.  The view that was suggested at the 
end of the discussion of Strawson and the Weather Watchers, on which both connections 
to action and connections to pleasure are necessary for desire, is such a species of WPC.  
So Smith offers a series of counterexamples against the necessity of phenomenological 
content: 
Consider, for instance, what we should ordinarily think of as a long-term desire: 
say, a father’s desire that his children do well.  A father may actually feel the 
prick of this desire from time to time, in moments of reflection on their 
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vulnerability, say.  But such occasions are not the norm.  Yet we certainly 
wouldn’t ordinarily think that he loses this desire during those periods when he 
lacks such feelings.  Or consider more mundane cases in which, as we would 
ordinarily say, I desire to write something down and so write it down.  As Stroud 
points out, in such cases ‘it is difficult to believe that I am overcome with 
emotion… I am certainly not aware of any emotion or passion impelling me to 
act’ ; rather ‘they seem to me the very model of cool, dispassionate action’ 
(Stroud, 1977, 163)”  (109) 
 
How should a phenomenological theorist respond to these counterexamples?  Certainly, 
having a desire at some time does not by itself require that one have any particular 
experiences at that time.  But this does not defeat all phenomenological theories.  Perhaps 
desires necessarily cause experiences, but only under particular circumstances.  This 
would be much like the way that they only cause action when activated by an appropriate 
means-end belief.   
     The distinction between occurrent and latent desires provides one part of the 
explanation of why we do not always feel our desires.  Even our strongest desires do not 
register in our experience at times when we are focusing our attention on unrelated 
things.  At any given time, most of our desires are latent, and for a desire to affect our 
experience, something must happen to make it occurrent.  For instance, we may have to 
direct our attention towards something we associate with the object of desire.  But this 
distinction cannot do all of the work.  Sometimes, even as we engage in action motivated 
by a desire, we have no emotions or other internal experiences connected with it.  Smith’s 
example of writing something down seems to be such a case.  Since the desire is 
occurrent in this case and succeeds in motivating action, we will need more than the 
latent/occurrent distinction to defend WPC.   
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     A good phenomenological theory, then, would not make having any particular 
experience a necessary condition even of having an occurrent desire, by itself.  Instead, it 
might say that an agent with a desire must have particular experiences when some 
activating condition is present.  This is true to the phenomenology of desire.  Our desires 
do not always impact our phenomenological states, but they can do so under particular 
conditions.  One important feature of desire is the systematic way that desires cause us to 
feel pleasure and displeasure as we have belief changes and sensory or imaginative 
representations dealing with the desired states of affairs.   
The Hedonic Aspect:  If an agent occurrently desires D, increases in the 
subjective probability of D or vivid sensory or imaginative representations of D 
will cause her pleasure roughly proportional to the strength of the desire and the 
change in subjective probability or the vividness of the representation.  Decreases 
in the subjective probability of D or vivid sensory or imaginative representations 
of situations incompatible with D will likewise cause displeasure. 
I characterize the hedonic aspect only in terms of rough proportionality because some 
creatures’ levels of pleasure might not increase continuously, but in slight and discrete 
levels.  This is not a reason to say that these creatures lack desires.  Whether or not 
humans have desires should not turn on the question of whether their desires increase in 
strength discretely or continuously.  My formulation also leaves room for the possibility 
that agents with very weak desires might not feel any pleasure upon imagining their 
satisfaction.   
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     A phenomenological conception incorporating this hedonic feature would deal quite 
well with the examples Smith presents.  In the case of the father, Smith brings up one 
particular phenomenological effect of desire – the way the father would feel “the prick of 
this desire” as he reflects on his children’s vulnerability.  If reflecting on his children’s 
vulnerability involves having an imaginative representation of the bad things that could 
happen to them, the account suggested above would be able to explain why desire has 
phenomenological effects in this situation, but not in other situations.  And while there 
usually is no substantial pleasure or displeasure in the act of writing down a trivial note, 
there is often some mild frustration in trying to jot down a note and suddenly discovering 
that your only pen is out of ink.  When this happens, one’s subjective probability of 
satisfaction declines sharply in a moment, and one feels the attendant displeasure of 
frustration.   
     So far, I have dealt with potential counterexamples to the hedonic aspect that are 
located in the actual world.  But if the hedonic aspect is essential to desire, it has to 
manifest itself in all possible cases.  To test for whether the hedonic aspect is necessary, 
we should consider a case where agents have all other components of desire, but lack the 
hedonic aspect, and see if we intuitively regard them as desirers: 
The Neutrals:  The Neutrals are intelligent creatures who are exactly like us, 
except that their motivational states have no connections to pleasure or 
displeasure, even under conditions of belief-change or vivid imagination.  Like a 
human, a Neutral would move quickly towards his baby if he saw that the baby 
was about to crawl into a busy street.  But while a human father might have an 
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unpleasant experience of fear just as he began to move, a Neutral would not.  
Though the Neutral’s attention would be intensely focused on the baby as he 
began to move and he would have the same visual and auditory experiences that 
we do, he would feel nothing unpleasant at all.  Even if, in the future, he imagined 
what could have happened if he had not seen the child in time, he would not feel 
the unpleasantness of horror in imagining.  To an observer, Neutrals are 
indistinguishable from normal human beings.  When you do things to one of them 
that would make a person laugh or cry, they show the outward behaviors of 
laughter and crying.  But they do not feel the pleasure of laughter or the 
displeasure of sadness that we usually do when crying.  
This case is similar to Strawson’s case of the Aldebaranians, since experiences of 
pleasure and displeasure play a significant role in making our affective mental states what 
they are.  Having offered this example to many people, both philosophers and 
nonphilosophers, I would have to say that intuitions on the matter of whether the Neutrals 
have desires differ quite widely, much as Strawson says that intuitions about whether the 
Aldebaranians have desires differ widely.  Many respondents were conflicted on the 
issue.   
     I often would ask another question about the case of the Neutrals: do any of their 
movements count as actions?  Without exception, people said that the Neutrals were 
engaging in action, and no one seemed conflicted on the issue.  The difference in the 
intensity of the responses – certainty that the Neutrals are acting, but lack of consensus 
about whether they have desires – suggests that there is something more to the concept of 
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desire than the motivational aspect.  If it were a conceptual truth that the ability to cause 
action was necessary and sufficient for a mental state to be a desire, one would expect 
intuitions about whether the Neutrals act and whether they have desires to go together.  
The fact that these intuitions do not go together suggests that there is more to the concept 
of desire than the motivational aspect, and that the Humean theory is not a necessary 
truth.   
     A phenomenological conception incorporating the hedonic aspect would also address 
one of Smith’s concerns in this section – developing a plausible epistemology of the 
propositional content of desire.  One way to figure out what we desire is to imagine 
various counterfactual situations and see how they please us.  Seeing how we feel as new 
information affects the subjective probabilities of various potentially desirable events is 
also a way of determining what we desire.  We are fallible as we do this – we can be 
misled, among other things, by ill-supported prior beliefs about what we desire, and by 
wishful thinking about what we want and do not want to desire.  Either of these factors 
may cause us to attend badly to our experiences, and ignore or misinterpret the data that 
our internal impressions give us.   
 
Smith’s Dispositional Account 
     I will now consider Smith’s own account of the essential features of desire.  Smith 
presents a dispositional account on which the essential property of desire is its direction 
of fit.  He cashes out “direction of fit” as follows: “a belief that p tends to go out of 
existence in the presence of a perception with the content that not p, whereas a desire that 
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p tends to endure, disposing the subject in that state to bring it about that p” (115).  I will 
set aside the question of whether his characterization of belief is correct, and consider 
whether he has correctly characterized the essential properties of desire.  Is it necessary 
for a mental state’s being a desire that p, that it tend to endure in the presence of a 
perception that not p?  And is this sufficient for a mental state’s being a desire that p?  I 
will explore this question via two thought experiments. First, one that will address the 
necessity of Smith’s tendency claim, involving the Fainthearted; and second, one that will 
address sufficiency, involving the Imaginers.   
The Fainthearted: Much like us, the Fainthearted have motivational states 
directed at many possible states of affairs, which cause them to act when paired 
with appropriate means-end beliefs.  These motivational states are just like our 
desires in terms of their functional characterization, with one exception: As soon 
as they have a perception that not-p, their motivations to bring about p vanish 
with the same swiftness that our beliefs that p vanish in the face of perceptions 
that not-p.  This inhibits their action in many cases where we might act.  They still 
sometimes act, since their past perceptions may not give them any idea whether p 
or not-p, but they are unable to act after perceiving that not-p.  And before 
perceiving that not-p, they do all the things that we would expect of someone who 
desired that p – for example, directing their attention towards things they 
associate with p and feeling pleased when they vividly imagine that p.   
It seems obvious to me that the Fainthearted have desires.  It is not essential for a mental 
state’s being a desire that it stay in existence even in the presence of a perception that 
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not-p, or any other perception.  While Smith’s dispositional account may be successful in 
distinguishing between beliefs and desires, that seems to be because it picks up on a 
plausible candidate for being an essential property of belief – responsiveness to evidence 
– that does not correspond to any essential property of desire.  Since the Fainthearted 
have desires, the ability to stay in existence when the agent perceives that not-p is not 
necessary for a mental state to be a desire.   
     Now I will consider whether Smith’s dispositional account presents us with a 
sufficient condition for a mental state being a desire.   
The Imaginers:  The Imaginers spend much of their time imagining situations, 
both actual and counterfactual.  Whenever it happens that they are imagining 
some situation, and they suddenly perceive that that situation does not obtain, they 
continue imagining that situation for a long time.  But whenever they perceive 
that a situation they are imagining does obtain, they cease to imagine it.  They 
differ from us in that they never engage in action, no matter what means-end 
beliefs they form.  They also never have pleasure or displeasure of any kind.   
Clearly, the Imaginers’ imaginative mental states do not count as desires.  But if the 
dispositional account had correctly provided a sufficient condition for a mental state’s 
being a desire, the persistence of these mental states when one perceives the opposite of 
their contents would mark them as instances of desire.  (I doubt that the view that 
persistence under the perception that not-p is sufficient for a desire that p should really be 
attributed to Smith.  It is a deeply implausible position.  But it is not clear that he rejects 
the position, and so it seemed worthwhile to demonstrate that the position is implausible.) 
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     Smith precedes the presentation of his criterion with “Very roughly, and simplifying 
somewhat…” so perhaps there is a less rough and less simplified version of his criterion 
that would escape the objections that have been offered here (115).  But it is hard to see 
how the criterion could be fruitfully modified.  What is essential to desire, it would seem, 
is how it moves us and how it makes us feel, not its persistence under some set of 
perceptual conditions.  Perhaps the way that Smith sets up the dialectic in section 4.6 is, 
in part, to blame for these problems.  A large part of Smith’s concern in this section is to 
distinguish desires from beliefs, and to eliminate the possibility of ‘besires’ that are both 
desires and beliefs at once.  While his criterion manages to close off this possibility by 
defining desires in a way that makes them necessarily different from beliefs, it does so 
more by pointing to essential features of belief than by picking up on essential features of 
desire.   
     Two concepts that Smith notably does not invoke in his account of desire are pleasure 
and action.  I take it to be one of the morals of the failure of Smith’s account that the 
necessary conditions for desire must include strong functional connection to one or both 
of these.  In the next section I will consider another account of the necessary conditions 
for desire that does not make reference to pleasure and action.   
 
Schroeder’s Reward Theory  
     In Three Faces of Desire, Tim Schroeder presents his Reward Theory of Desire: 
Reward Theory of Desire (RTD): To have an intrinsic (positive) desire that P is 
to use the capacity to perceptually or cognitively represent that P to constitute P 
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as a reward.  To be averse to it being the case that P is to use the capacity to 
perceptually or cognitively represent that P to constitute P as a punishment.  (131) 
 
This view is expressed in an abbreviated fashion later on: “To be a desire is to be a 
representational capacity contributing to a reward or punishment signal” (168).  So what 
is it to constitute something as a reward or as a punishment?  This question is answered 
by the Contingency-based Learning Theory of Reward.   
Contingency-based Learning Theory of Reward (CLT): For an event to be a 
reward for an organism is for representations of that event to tend to contribute to 
the production of a reinforcement signal in the organism, in the sense made clear 
by computational theories of what is called ‘reinforcement learning’ (66).  
 
The basic idea behind reinforcement learning was expressed by Edward Thorndike in 
1911: 
Of several responses made to the same situation, those which are accompanied or 
closely followed by satisfaction to the animal will, other things being equal, be 
more firmly connected with the situation, so that, when it recurs, they will be 
more likely to recur; those which are accompanied or closely followed by 
discomfort to the animal will, other things being equal, have their connections 
with that situation weakened, so that, when it recurs, they will be less likely to 
occur. The greater the satisfaction or discomfort, the greater the strengthening or 
weakening of the bond. (244) 
 
Reinforcement learning, then, is a process by which behavioral and other psychological 
dispositions can be acquired, strengthened, or weakened.  In many cases, these are 
dispositions connected to action.  For example, a laboratory where I once worked had a 
metal doorknob that would often give me a mild shock from static electricity when I 
touched it.  I soon developed a disposition to not touch the doorknob.  It was very hard to 
make myself touch it, except through the fabric of my shirt.  That I could form this 
disposition makes it the case that I had an aversion to being shocked – in the language of 
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RTD, I represented electric shocks as punishments.  In the language of CLT, I received a 
punishment signal whenever I touched the doorknob.  Having a desire to not be shocked 
is simply a matter of having these punishment signals, which changed my behavioral 
dispositions.  A similar thing happens when I acquire the disposition to flick the light 
switch upon entering my room in the dark.  As soon as I do this, I am rewarded with a 
lighted room.  After numerous opportunities for reward, I automatically raise my arm to 
flick the light switch upon entering the room – I have acquired firm mental dispositions 
to turn the lights on.  I may even do this, habitually, if I know that the power is out and 
the lights will not turn on.  That I represent a lighted room in a way that allows for this 
kind of reinforcement learning makes it true that I have a desire for illumination.   
     The learned mental dispositions need not be so directly connected to action.  In 
addition to helping people “learn certain sorts of habits,” the process of reinforcement 
learning can cause “certain sorts of modifications to their sensory capacities” (168).  The 
various patterns of dots that make up Braille letters feel the same to those who have not 
learned the language.  When I pass my finger over the Braille letters in an elevator, it is 
hard for me to get any precise tactile sensation representing the way that the dots are 
arranged.  It strikes me as surprising that anyone can get such a sensation by touching 
them – as one must in order to understand the dots as a word.  Blind people who have 
learned Braille, however, can do so.  This is because correct sensory discrimination has 
been repeatedly rewarded in the process of learning Braille.  The desire to understand a 
particular word was satisfied, and perhaps a teacher praised the blind person.  So the 
mental dispositions required for fine-grained perception of Braille letters were reinforced.   
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     The neuroscience of reinforcement learning involves the brain’s reward center – 
according to Schroeder, the VTA/SNpc – changing neural connection strengths.  The 
neural connections that are involved in realizing particular mental dispositions are 
strengthened when their activation is followed by VTA/SNpc stimulation, which causes 
the VTA/SNpc to release dopamine.   
     While what makes something a reward system is its contribution to reinforcement 
learning, it is contingently true that the human reward system is causally responsible for 
more than this.  Schroeder adduces psychological and neurobiological evidence to 
suggest that “The neural basis for reward is the normal cause of pleasure and an 
important cause of motivation” (37).  Schroeder presents evidence that “Most 
euphorigenic drugs directly or indirectly stimulate the VTA/SNpc” and the effects of this 
stimulation are responsible for pleasure (92).  There are direct neural connections by 
which VTA/SNpc stimulation reaches the PGAC, where (according to Schroeder) 
pleasure is realized.  As for motivation, sufferers of Parkinson disease “lose a very large 
percentage of the dopamine-producing cells in the SNpc,” and this can in extreme cases 
make them completely unable to move (118, Berridge and Robinson 1998; Langston and 
Palfreman 1995).  Destroying the dopamine-releasing cells projecting from the 
VTA/SNpc to the motor prefrontal cortex, the home of immediate prior intention, 
destroys monkeys’ ability to keep a prior intention in mind long enough to execute it after 
a delay (116).   
     Schroeder does not present RTD as an analysis of desire, but as the necessary and 
sufficient condition for an agent’s having a desire.  According to Schroeder, “desire” is a 
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natural kind term, and necessary truths about desires can be discovered a posteriori in 
much the same way that the water/H2O identity was.  RTD expresses a metaphysically 
necessary connection between desire and reward, but not a logically necessary one.  This 
is good, since RTD would be quite implausible as a conceptual analysis of desire.  That 
desires are linked to the strengthening of mental dispositions is, as Schroeder recognizes, 
a “commonsense hunch” (51) that happens to be proven true by empirical evidence, and 
not something essential to the concept of desire.   
     Even as a claim about how desires are necessarily realized, however, RTD is 
unsatisfactory.  The realizer that Schroeder has offered fails to satisfy the descriptive 
component of our concept of desire.  To see this, we should consider the way that 
speakers’ intuitions about natural kind terms will go when they are offered further 
scientific information, and then consult our intuitions about what would count as a desire.  
If “water” really is a natural kind term, speakers who do not yet know that its molecular 
formula is H2O should still conditionally assent when given Putnam’s Twin Earth thought 
experiment.  They should accept that if it turns out that the drinkable stuff in rivers and 
rain has the molecular constitution H2O, and this explains the properties by which we 
recognize it, the XYZ on Twin Earth is not water.  Likewise, speakers who do not yet 
believe that desires are actually realized by connections to reward signals should 
conditionally assent to the proposition that creatures whose mental dispositions are not 
susceptible to reinforcement learning would not have desires, on the condition that the 
mental phenomena we associate with desire are actually explained by the reward signals 
of reinforcement learning.   
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     So we should consider some cases of this kind.  The first case will test whether a 
reward system is necessary for a mental state’s being a desire.  The second case will test 
whether it is sufficient.   
The Unconditionable: Suppose, as Schroeder’s evidence suggests, that there is a 
mental state of representing something as a reward, which has the power to 
change the mental dispositions of actual humans, and which also happens to 
explain motivation and our experiences of pleasure.  Suppose further that there 
are creatures on some other planet who possess motivational dispositions much 
like ours, but lack the capacity for reinforcement learning.  Perhaps these 
creatures – call them the Unconditionable – are born fully formed and able to do 
all the things that we humans require a reward system to learn.  In particular 
cases, their phenomenology and behavior is identical to ours, minus whatever 
immediate phenomenological and behavioral effects necessarily require a reward 
system.  The Unconditionable have a particular conative mental state which plays 
a major role in explaining their behavior.  When they believe that doing A will 
bring about B, and they have this conative state towards B, they do A.  If they fail 
to attain B, they feel the same emotions of disappointment and frustration that we 
do.  But if they succeed, they feel as excited and happy as we would.   
Does their lack of a reinforcement learning system make the conative state that motivates 
their actions not count as a desire?  Ordinary intuition says that the Unconditionable have 
desires.  A reinforcement learning system is not necessary for desire, even if it explains 
actual motivation and pleasure.   
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     A second example will be helpful in considering the claim that a reward system is 
sufficient for desiring.   
The Creatures of Habit:  Assume, as before, that humans have a mental state of 
representing something as a reward, which has the power to change the mental 
dispositions of actual humans, and which also happens to explain motivation and 
our experiences of pleasure.  The Creatures of Habit, whose mental lives are 
largely unlike ours, have the same kinds of reward systems that we do.  They 
regularly engage in habitual, unintentional tics.  They have representational states 
picking out certain states of affairs, and when they happen to tic before one of 
these states is produced, ticcing behavior of that kind is reinforced.  Their reward 
and punishment systems strengthen and weaken neural connections contributing 
to these behaviors and other things, changing their mental dispositions just as our 
reward systems change our mental dispositions.  But when they represent B as a 
reward and believe that they can bring about B by getting A, they never do A 
(unless A coincidentally happens to be a tic that they have learned).  Intentional 
action that is motivated by a combination of belief and some conative state is 
entirely foreign to them.   
Do the Creatures of Habit have desires, in virtue of the fact that they represent certain 
states of affairs as rewards?  Ordinary intuition says no, rejecting the sufficiency claim.  
Creatures can have reward systems that reinforce some kinds of behavior, but still not 
have desires.   
  83 
     It appears that Schroeder’s theory gives counterintuitive results in both cases.  In the 
place where he tries to argue that RTD is consistent with common sense, he seems to be 
unaware that his theory would give the wrong answers about whether certain non-actual 
creatures have desires.  The claim that “To be a desire is to be a representational capacity 
contributing to a certain mathematically describable form of learning” (168), he says, 
does not require us to reject any of our prior convictions about desire, and thus could be 
part of a proper realist account of desire.  This claim, however, requires us to reject prior 
convictions about the possibility of desires in the absence of this system of learning, and 
the insufficiency of this kind of learning for making it the case that a creature has desires.  
While Schroeder accepts early on that “Treating ‘desires’ as a natural kind is not a license 
to drag up any old entity from the back pages of some journal of neuroscience and 
proclaim it a desire,” (9) this is what he seems to have done.   
     Some of the desiderata that brought Schroeder to accept a theory on which reward 
systems are necessary realizers for desires are based on bad arguments.  He rejects the 
“Standard theory of desire,” on which the power to motivate is necessary for desire and 
the “Hedonic theory of desire,” on which some relation to pleasure is necessary for 
desire.  Instead he accepts RTD, on which desire is necessarily connected to reward.  
Schroeder regards it as a virtue that a theory presents desire’s connections to pleasure and 
motivation as contingent (albeit firmly grounded in the psychology of actual humans).  I 
will consider his arguments for preferring theories that make these relations contingent, 
show why these arguments are not good, and then draw two morals from the story.  The 
first moral will be that connections to pleasure and motivation are plausible as necessary 
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conditions for a mental state’s being a desire.  The second moral will be that the 
semantics of “desire” differ significantly from the semantics of “water.”11   
     First I will consider how Schroeder argues that the ability to motivate action is not 
necessary for desire.  He considers the case of an ancient Greek mathematician who 
desires that π be a rational number.  If we understand desires to merely be dispositions to 
make the world match their contents, we will not be able to admit the possibility of 
desires with impossible objects like this one.  Since the desired state is impossible, a 
disposition to have the world match it is impossible.  There is nothing it could be to have 
such a disposition activated.  However, Schroeder claims that the desire attributed to the 
Greek mathematician is a possible desire.  This seems intuitively right – we can imagine 
the mathematician being alternately excited and frustrated as his beliefs about the 
rationality of π change, and it seems right to attribute a desire for π to be rational to him 
on this basis.  Schroeder then considers the formulation ST2 as a way of capturing the 
way that the ability to cause motivation is necessary for desire:  
ST2:  To desire that P is to be so disposed that, if one were to believe that taking 
action A would be an effective method for bringing it about that P, then one 
would take A” (17).   
To turn this into a claim only about necessity, the issue that Schroeder is ostensibly 
dealing with in this section, “is to be so disposed” should be replaced with “requires that 
one be so disposed.”  This successfully responds to the concern about the Greek 
                                                
11 As it turns out, I do not share Putnam’s intuition – there are possible non-H2O substances which I regard 
as water.  But since this is the standard example of a necessary a posteriori identity, I will continue to use 
it.   
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mathematician.  But Schroeder sees another problem with it.  He considers a case where 
someone – I will call him the Noninterferer – desires that a committee decide in his favor 
on some issue without his intervention.  This seems like a perfectly possible thing for 
someone to desire.  However, “because of the very nature of the desire it makes no sense 
to try to act so as to satisfy it” (17).  An action performed to satisfy the desire could have 
no effect but to make its satisfaction impossible.   
     Schroeder seems to regard the possibility of this desire as a problem for the claim that 
motivational efficacy is necessary for desire in the fashion described by ST2.  But it is 
not clear why this should be.  An agent who realized that acting on such a desire was 
fruitless would not act, and an (irrational) agent who believed that he could achieve the 
end by doing something to affect the committee’s judgment would act.  All of this is just 
as ST2 predicts.  So what is going on here?  Schroeder goes on about how it would take a 
fairly drastic level of irrationality for the Noninterferer to act, and he seems to think this 
is a problem for ST2.  But this should not be regarded as a problem – ST2 can be true 
even if some desires have contents that make it impossible for them to be acted on.   
    Interestingly, Schroeder has given an example that could cause trouble for the 
sufficiency of the kind of connection to motivation discussed in ST2.  Cases similar to 
that of the Noninterferer provide arguments against satisfaction of the following 
condition, ST2X, being sufficient for desire:  
ST2X: To desire B, it is sufficient that one do A whenever one believes that one 
can bring about B by doing A.   
  86 
ST2X would license the attribution of the following desire as well to the Noninterferer: 
that the committee act to execute him, without his intervention.  This would trivially 
satisfy the sufficiency condition, since a rational agent will never believe that he can 
bring about the satisfaction of his desire by any action.  So ST2X implies that every agent 
has all sorts of wacky desires whose contents prevent their activation.  However, it is no 
argument against the necessity of motivation under all belief-activated conditions for 
desire.  Given the placement of the example in the text – under the “Motivation not 
essential for desire” section heading and before the “Motivation not sufficient for desire” 
section heading, it appears that Schroeder intends the example to do some work that it is 
not capable of doing.  In any case, he does not offer a successful argument that 
motivation is not essential for desire.   
     Now I will consider the supposedly contingent connection between desire and 
pleasure.  Schroeder offers several arguments that this connection is contingent.  I will 
consider the two that I regard as the most powerful and give reasons for rejecting them.   
     Schroeder’s first argument deals with cases of depression.   
Consider a man who has just had a number of powerfully negative life 
experiences, say, the death of both parents and the loss of a meaningful 
occupation, and who as a result has become depressed.  This man once took great 
pleasure in many things, including his wife’s successes, but now is only slightly 
pleased by these things.  Need we hold that he cares less about his wife now than 
before?  That he has fewer, or weaker desires for her success?  Normally, this is 
not held to be the case.  (31) 
 
Cases of depression are troublesome for many theories of desire.  According to 
Schroeder, we want to say that depressed people still desire the same things that they 
desired when they were not depressed.  (Not all people want to say this – some, though 
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perhaps a minority, find it okay to say of depressed people that they simply do not have 
any desires.  If this is actually the right thing to say, depression is far less effective as a 
counterexample to theories of desire.)  But desire seems to lack its characteristic effects 
in the cases of depressed people.  Not only are their experiences of pleasure dulled, but 
they are less likely to engage in action.  People gripped by depression often sit in one 
place, unhappily, unable even to bring themselves to engage in actions that they believe 
would pull them out of their depression.   
     The distinction between latent and occurrent desires could be used to deal with the 
case of depression.  This distinction is one that any theory of desire will have to make use 
of.  In some sense, I can be said to desire that John Edwards become president, even if I 
am asleep or fully engaged in writing my dissertation.  In these cases, my desire for 
Edwards’ victory is latent, but not occurrent.  I do not feel my desire, and it does nothing 
to direct the course of my thought or behavior. Something has to happen to make the 
desire occurrent – perhaps I glance into my closet, see my blue shirt, and recall that that 
was what I wore when I met John Edwards.  The desire may become occurrent at this 
point, and now it can move me to action – I may put my dissertation aside for a moment, 
consider possible ways to advance Edwards’ candidacy, and start writing a blog post that 
will make Democrats aware of his strong support for abortion rights.  Thoughts of some 
object that I associate with a desired state of affairs can make a desire become occurrent, 
and put me into a position where that desire will affect the direction of my thoughts.  
Perhaps it will lead me along a chain of thoughts that concludes in action. 
  88 
     In the case of depressed people, the path of latent desires into being occurrent, or at 
least occurrent with their usual strength, seems to be blocked.  Thus they are less 
disposed to feel pleasure, think out new ways of accomplishing their goals, or act.  Since 
their desires are still in them, but blocked from becoming occurrent, it is right to say that 
they have those desires, just as it is right to say that a sleeping person has desires for all 
sorts of things.  The hedonic theorist can then pitch his view as an analysis of occurrent 
desire, but not of latent desire.  Since the proposed counterexample involves a case that 
does not actually fall under the hedonic theory of occurrent desire, it does not defeat the 
theory.   
     This distinction between occurrent and latent desire helps to explain some cases where 
forgetful people do not act.  People sometimes fail to act while latently possessing a 
potentially action-inducing desire-belief pair because these mental states do not become 
occurrent at the right time.  The old-fashioned practice of tying a string around your 
finger to remind you to do something is intended to counteract this.  When you see the 
string on your finger later in the day, it will most likely occasion thoughts of whatever 
you were supposed to do, making the relevant mental states occurrent and leading to 
action.   
     Schroeder’s second objection arises from his theory of pleasure.  According to his 
Representational Theory of Hedonic Tone (RTHT2), “To be pleased is (at least) to 
represent a net increase in desire satisfaction relative to expectation; to be displeased is to 
represent a net decrease in desire satisfaction relative to expectation.  Intensity of 
pleasure or displeasure represents degree of change in desire satisfaction relative to 
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expectation” (94).  Schroeder regards this as an improvement over the following theory, 
RTHT1: “To be pleased is (at least) to represent a net increase in desire satisfaction; to be 
displeased is to represent a net decrease in desire satisfaction.  Intensity of pleasure or 
displeasure represents degree of change in desire satisfaction” (90).  RTHT2 has an 
advantage over RTHT1 because it can account for the way that the intensity of pleasure 
or displeasure will vary with the epistemic state of the agent.  If I see my favorite team 
win the game by scoring just as time runs out, I will most likely be much happier than I 
would have been at the moment of victory if they had won by a large margin and the 
outcome was not in doubt.  Unexpected victories are more pleasant than expected ones, 
and RTHT2 accounts for this.   
     Schroeder argues that RTHT2 creates an ontological circularity problem for hedonic 
theories of desire.  RTHT2 is incompatible with hedonic theories because “a 
representation of X is less ontologically basic than X:  if pleasure explains desire, then it 
must be possible to say what desire is without mentioning pleasure, while it will be 
impossible to say what pleasure is without mentioning desire” (105).  Since hedonic 
theories define pleasure in terms of desire, they cannot accept RTHT2 without being 
circular.   
     Of course, this argument will not succeed unless there is good reason to accept 
RTHT2, and there is not.  There are many common experiences of pleasure that cannot 
be regarded as increases in desire satisfaction relative to expectation, and there are many 
common experiences of displeasure that cannot similarly be regarded as decreases in 
desire satisfaction relative to expectation.  On the side of pleasure, consider the 
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experience of eating a delicious dessert which you have ordered many times before at a 
restaurant.  You have no doubt whatsoever that the dessert is coming, and you are as 
certain of receiving it when the waiter takes your order as when the dessert is in your 
mouth.  Yet there is great pleasure in the eating.  Similarly, orgasms and good massages 
that we are certain of experiencing are still very pleasant when they occur.  These cases 
are unlike cases of pleasure induced by drugs and alcohol, where Schroeder could argue 
that we misrepresent the actual state of the world, as drugs can often cause us to do.  It 
would be strange to claim that we are under a sort of hedonic illusion when we enjoy 
desserts, massages, and orgasms. 
     The side of displeasure offers even more powerful cases.  Someone who gets a tattoo 
will feel pain, even though nothing in that moment is reducing her expected desire 
satisfaction.  In fact, she may feel pain while being completely aware that the events of 
the moment promise to satisfy her desire for bodily illustration.  RTHT2 is not a good 
account of what aversion necessarily is, since things we fully expect can often be painful.   
     Schroeder’s response to these concerns seems ad hoc.  He posits two separate systems 
of gut-level expectations, one of which changes very slowly and is located in the 
hypothalamus.  This would allow him to claim that the agents lack hypothalamic gut-
level certainty of getting desserts, orgasms, massages, or tattoos in the cases above.  He 
claims that this system could be used to explain the greater enjoyment of small sensuous 
pleasures by people who are inured to hardship, and the greater sensitivity to small pains 
by people who have lived very easy lives.  Insofar as these phenomena are real, there are 
plenty of explanations for them – from closer direction of attention towards the pain or 
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pleasure by those not accustomed to it, to physiological changes like the callusing of skin 
that make the actual pain less intense.  There are also reasons to wonder whether the 
amount of pleasure and pain felt by the hardened and the comfortable are significantly 
different, or if they are merely reacting differently to the same sensory experiences.  
Perhaps those of us who have lived lives of comfort just make more of a fuss when we 
experience the same amount of pain.   
     There is a final argument that Schroeder uses to defend the reward theory against both 
the standard theory (on which ties to motivation alone are essential to desire) and the 
hedonic theory.   
Because the reward theory places the essence of desire in a phenomenon, reward, 
which most people link only trivially to a desire (nothing really counts as a reward 
unless it is wanted), the reward theory allows desires to be independent of the 
most salient features of desire – motivation, pleasure, felt urges – and so deeply 
explanatory of them.  Both the standard theory and the hedonic theory have a 
measure of this virtue, but both also give up a measure of it by identifying desire 
with some of its most familiar phenomena.  They render trivial certain 
explanations that one might have thought were deeper.  (178) 
 
The plausibility of Schroeder’s claim that reward is trivially tied to desire seems to rest 
on an equivocation.  There is a nontechnical sense of reward in which anything someone 
desires could (perhaps under certain conditions) be regarded as a reward, and here the 
triviality holds.  But Schroeder’s Contingency-Based Learning Theory of reward brings 
in a technical sense in which “reward” picks out those things that trigger reinforcement 
learning.  As the cases of the Unconditionable and the Creatures of Habit make clear, the 
connection between desire and this sense of “reward” is not trivial.   
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     Furthermore, there are connections between behavior and pleasure (on one hand) and 
desire (on the other) which should be trivial.  It is plausible that a mental state’s being a 
desire entails some connections to pleasure, perhaps when imagining what is desired.  It 
is even more plausible that a mental state’s being a desire entails that it can interact with 
beliefs in a particular way to cause motivation.  A hybrid of the standard theory and the 
hedonic theory, on which desires necessarily have the power to motivate action and to 
cause pleasure, would leave trivial what needs to be trivialized here.   
     Entailments need not hold in the opposite direction.  If Schroeder wants it not to be 
trivially true that actions are motivated by desire, or that hedonic sensations are caused by 
desire, accepting such a hybrid theory would not interfere with his goal.  One could hold 
that the ability to cause pleasure and motivation are necessary conditions for desire, and 
also hold that pleasure and motivation can be caused by things other than desire.  Then it 
will not be trivial, merely from the fact that someone acts or feels pleasure, that her action 
or pleasure was caused by a desire.   
     Now I have finished responding to Schroeder’s arguments that neither motivation nor 
pleasure are necessarily tied to desire.  It seems that there is good reason not to think of 
“desire” as a natural kind term whose semantics closely mirror the semantics of “water.”  
Desire’s ability to cause behavior and pleasure are not analogous to the clarity and 
wetness of water, which are merely part of a stereotype that helps us identify it.  In fact, 
being a cause of pleasure and motivation is essential to desire itself.  Far from being 
necessarily constituted by a hidden essence that explains its outward properties, desire 
wears its essence on its sleeve.  Mental states are usually regarded as being multiply 
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realizable while water is not, and if the essence of desire was to cause pleasure and 
motivation under certain circumstances, that would explain why it is right to regard 
desire, but not water, this way.  Desire need not be realized on the chemical level by 
organic macromolecules, on the neurobiological level by neurons, or on the 
psychological level by a reward system.  All it needs to do is cause behavior and pleasure 
under the right circumstances.   
     Throughout this chapter, I have been using intuition tests about counterfactual 
possibilities to get clear about the nature of desire.  Except in the cases of the Creatures of 
Habit and the Unconditionable, which I used to respond to Schroeder’s view, I have not 
made any stipulations about how things are in the actual world.  In setting up the cases 
this way, I have implicitly been assuming that the necessary conditions for a mental 
state’s being a desire can be discovered through conceptual analysis alone.  I have no 
conclusive argument to rule out the possibility that this assumption is false, and that the 
necessary conditions for desire depend in some way on how things are in the actual 
world.  Theories different in their details from Schroeder’s, but which are similar in that 
the necessary conditions for desire are to be discovered a posteriori, will have to have 
their own hearing and face their own versions of the counterexamples I have offered 
above.   
     But the failure of Schroeder’s theory gives us some reason to think that these other 
theories will be unsuccessful.  What better way to build such a theory than to take the 
phenomena that desire is most often taken to explain – motivation and pleasure – and 
identify desire with whatever actually explains these?  In building his account this way, 
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Schroeder mirrors the way that Hillary Putnam discusses the metaphysical necessity of 
the identity between water and H2O – since the chemical structure of water explains its 
outward stereotype, it must be part of the necessary conditions for something being 
water.  The failure of such an attempt makes the entire class of theories on which the 
necessary conditions for desire are to be discovered a posteriori look unpromising.  The 
project of discovering the necessary conditions for desire through a priori reflection, 
then, can be pursued with some degree of confidence.   
 
Schroeder on Positive Desires and Aversions 
     Before I finish with Schroeder, I would like to go over some things he says that are 
interesting and correct about desire.  One of these is his distinction between positive 
desires and aversions.  As he points out, we sometimes are averse to something in a way 
that cannot simply be understood as desiring that the thing not obtain: 
Being averse to something – say, to Adam’s lateness – is not the same thing as 
having a positive desire or appetite for its contrary – say, that Adam be on time.  
A person who positively desires Adam’s timeliness is prone to delight when he is 
unexpectedly on time, while a person who is simply averse to Adam’s lateness 
will more typically be relieved, not delighted, by such events.  Aversion sets one 
up for anxiety or relief; positive desire makes possible joy or disappointment.  
(127) 
 
As Schroeder points out, these two kinds of states differ in the emotions that result when 
they are satisfied or unsatisfied.  (I will use his terminology, on which “desire” picks out 
a class of entities including both positive desire and aversion.)  There are similarities 
between the states that we experience when we get what we desire, and between the 
states that we experience when we fail to do so – relief and joy are both pleasant feelings, 
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while anxiety and disappointment are both unpleasant.  But there are also 
phenomenological differences, as well as externally visible differences.  Anxiety and 
disappointment feel different from each other, as do joy and relief.  The facial 
expressions and changes in body language that accompany these emotions are different 
enough for us to be able to tell which of these states someone is in.  We can summarize 
these facts about desire as follows: 
The Two Flavors:  Agents who desire that D either have positive desires that D, 
or aversions to not-D.  The pleasures and displeasures associated with positive 
desires are delight and disappointment; the pleasures and displeasures associated 
with aversions are relief and anxiety.   
     The distinction between positive desires and aversions may also have some 
ramifications for direction of attention.  While positive desires are more likely to push 
our attention towards states we try to achieve, aversions push our attention towards states 
that we try to avoid.  This creates an interesting parallel with the relation between 
direction of attention and object-talk that was brought up in the discussion of Davidson.  
There I suggested that the reason why ordinary objects like chocolate, necklaces, 
goldfishes, and dashing young men are sometimes described as the “objects of desire” 
was because of the way that attention focuses on them, when they are in a desirer’s 
presence.  Perhaps there is some deep-seated connection between the way that the 
“object” locution works and the way we direct our attention.  I have described the 
attention-direction aspect in terms loose enough to allow for a greater focus on the 
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desirable state in the case of positive desire, and a greater focus on the undesirable state 
in the case of aversion.   
     Schroeder finds psychological and neurobiological differences underlying the 
differences between positive desire and aversion.  On the psychological level, positive 
desire is associated with the reward system, while aversion is associated with the 
punishment system.  On the neurobiological level, the reward system is realized in the 
VTA/SNpc.  Punishment appears to be realized somewhere else, as mild aversive stimuli 
have no effect upon the VTA/SNpc (50).  Schroeder says that research on the location of 
the punishment center is inconclusive, but he argues that the DRN is the place where 
punishment is realized.   
     Schroeder makes another useful general point when he replies to the objection that 
desires should not be taken to continue existing when they are satisfied (137).  Since he 
takes desires to be connections between representational capacities and reward systems, 
and these connections are stable, he holds that desires continue existing when they are 
satisfied.  Certainly, the motivational effects of desire subside when we believe that we 
have got what we want.  But desires still have psychological effects under these 
conditions – when we imagine losing something that we have, we often feel displeasure.  
Schroeder points out that while we do not usually say of even the happiest Harvard 
students that they desire to have gotten into Harvard, we have plenty of other expressions 
picking out associated pro-attitudes that are generally used.  We can say, for instance, 
that these students care about having gotten into Harvard, and that they want to be where 
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they are.  There are also expressions actually using the term “desire” to pick out states of 
affairs that we know to obtain – sometimes, things are exactly as we desire them to be.   
 
The Analysis 
     So which of the features of desire are necessarily part of it, and which are only 
contingently connected with desire?  The arguments for the conclusions I will present 
here are implicit in the many discussions of otherworldly creatures in this chapter.   
     Two of the actual features of desire cited in this chapter – the two flavors and 
intensification by vivid images – have not been tested for necessity.  This is because they 
are not plausible candidates for necessary conditions of desire.  It is hard to see what kind 
of necessary truth could possibly be drawn out of the fact that desire has two flavors.  It 
seems that a creature could have only positive desires, or only aversions, and these states 
would clearly count as desires.  Perhaps there are even other possible flavors of desire, 
where pleasure and displeasure are mixed with other kinds of experiences to create 
emotions that humans do not have.  So the fact that desire has two flavors is only 
contingent.  Intensification by vivid images is also a merely contingent feature of desire – 
there is no reason to think that all possible desirers would have it.   
     Two other features of desire were tested for necessity in this chapter – DODI and the 
attention-direction aspect.  DODI was tested in the example involving the Angels, while 
the attention-direction aspect was tested in the case of the Absent-Minded.  Neither 
feature was an intuitively plausible candidate for being a necessary condition for desire.   
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     Now for the motivational aspect and the hedonic aspect.  If we stipulate into the case 
of the Weather Watchers that giving them the appropriate means-end beliefs would cause 
them to attempt actions, they seem to have desires.  But if the cases are constructed so 
that even the addition of means-end beliefs does not lead to action, they do not seem to 
have desires.  So it seems that the motivational aspect is necessary.  While intuitions 
about the Neutrals are less clear, there is some reason to think that they lack desires 
because their motivational states lack the proper counterfactual conditions to experiences 
of pleasure and displeasure.  If this is right, the hedonic aspect is also necessary.  The 
motivational aspect and the hedonic aspect, then, are the two things that are necessary for 
a mental state’s being a desire.   
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Chapter 3:  Explaining Deliberation 
 
 
 
Introduction 
     In the first chapter, I presented the two theses that make up the Humean theory of 
motivation: 
The Desire-Belief Theory of Action [DBTA]: Desire is necessary for action, and 
no mental states other than a desire and a means-end belief are necessary for 
action.   
Desire Out? Desire In! [DODI]: Desires can be changed as the conclusion of 
reasoning only if a desire is among the premises of the reasoning.     
I argued that even if this formulation of the Humean theory not a conceptually necessary 
truth, its contingent truth would create difficulty for the combination of cognitivism and 
internalism.  If the Humean theory is only true as a matter of nomological necessity – that 
is, if it is merely true within the range of human psychological possibility – anyone who 
holds that human beings can make moral judgments will have to choose between 
cognitivism and internalism.   
     The second chapter further elaborated the Humean theory by clarifying the nature of 
desire.  I laid out six features of desire – its motivational aspect, its hedonic aspect, its 
attention-direction aspect, its two flavors, its capacity for intensification by vivid images, 
and the fact that DODI is true of it.  While only the first two of these aspects are 
conceptually necessary for desire, desire has all six of these aspects throughout the realm 
of human psychological possibility.   
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     In this chapter, I will defend the version of the Humean theory presented in the first 
chapter by relying on the features of desire that were discussed in the second chapter.  
Many opponents of the Humean theory have objected that it is not successful in 
explaining actual features of our deliberation and action.  Many of these objections can 
be answered if we get clear about the nature of desire, and about the role it would play in 
shaping our deliberation in various situations.  Once we understand what desire is 
actually like, and consider how desires would interact with each other and with other 
mental states, it will become clear that Humeans can explain the phenomena that their 
opponents present as problematic.  My aim is to show that explaining what happens in 
even the most complex cases of deliberation requires nothing beyond the resources of the 
Humean theory.   
     First I will go over the methodology that will guide me throughout this chapter, and 
explain why we need to rely on ordinary folk psychology to evaluate the Humean theory.  
Then I will address objections to the Humean theory.  I will start with perhaps the most 
famous opponent of the Humean theory, Immanuel Kant.  Then I will consider a classic 
objection to the Humean theory dealing with the phenomenology of obligation.  Next I 
will look at a proposed counterexample from G.F. Schueler, who holds that a Humean 
theory cannot account for the causal efficacy of deliberation without falling back on a 
trivially weak notion of desire. Then I will turn to a detailed counterexample from 
Stephen Darwall, who joins Thomas Nagel and John McDowell in holding that DODI is 
false.  Thomas Scanlon’s objections dealing with the phenomenology and structure of 
deliberation will follow.  Then I will consider John Searle’s voluntarist account and his 
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criticisms of the Humean theory on the issue of weakness of will. Finally, I will turn to 
the neo-Kantian account of Christine Korsgaard, which grants agents a surprising amount 
of power to determine their motivational states through processes of reasoning.   
 
Methodological Questions 
     The central thesis of this dissertation is not as modally strong as many philosophical 
theses are.  I argue that the Humean theory of motivation is true of human psychology, 
not that it is a conceptual or metaphysical necessity.  Sometimes I make claims about 
conceptual or metaphysical necessities – for example, in the previous chapter, where I 
argued that desire has counterfactual connections to action and pleasure as a matter of 
conceptual necessity.  But my central thesis is that human beings are motivated in the 
way that the Humean theory describes.  If true, this is only a contingent truth.   
     The usual way of establishing contingent truths is through empirical evidence, and the 
usual way of establishing a psychological claim about the nature of motivation is through 
the methods of empirical psychology.  At this point, however, there is insufficient 
evidence from the discipline of psychology to conclusively prove or disprove the 
Humean theory.  As I will explain in discussing Darwall’s proposed counterexample, it is 
a point in favor of the Humean theory that agents faced with some unexpected and 
unfortunate situation typically feel displeased even before they form any plans about how 
to change the situation.  But it is difficult for psychologists to gather data on when agents 
typically experience pleasure and displeasure in the course of making decisions.   
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     In addition to the specific difficulties involved in precisely mapping out the mental 
lives of deliberating agents, there are broader reasons why systematic research of the kind 
that could prove or disprove the Humean theory has not been done.  Major research 
programs in psychology have not emphasized this particular kind of research.  Social 
psychologists have found many interesting results about motivation, but have not built 
these into a systematic and general motivational theory of the sort that the Humean theory 
of motivation is supposed to be.  Cognitive scientists do very systematic work on mental 
processes, but have traditionally focused more on beliefs and how they are formed than 
on desire and motivation.12  And while the old behaviorists worked systematically on 
motivation, their anti-mentalist theoretical commitments caused them not to focus on 
precisely characterizing the aspects of our mental lives where arguments for and against 
the Humean theory can best be grounded.  Behaviorists’ lack of interest in internal, 
unobservable mental processes prevents them from producing the kind of results that 
would prove or disprove DODI, which turns on how our processes of reasoning are to be 
characterized.  While there is reason for hope that cognitive scientists focusing on 
motivation will do the kind of research that would allow us to prove or disprove the 
Humean theory in the future, such research has not yet been done.   
     One might also hope that results from neurobiology could help us prove or disprove 
the Humean theory.  Consider the previously mentioned issue of mapping out when 
agents have experiences of pleasure and displeasure in decision-making.  One might 
think to have agents play games that involve decision-making under various kinds of 
                                                
12 I thank Art Markman for describing this to me.   
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circumstances while undergoing magnetic resonance imaging.  Then we might be able to 
see when the neural seats of pleasure and displeasure are activated, and which other 
mental processes occur.  But research of this kind is not currently possible, because there 
is still substantial disagreement between neuroscientists about where the neural seats of 
pleasure and displeasure are located in the brain.  Leonard Katz writes that while “We are 
now beginning to understand how pleasure is organized in the brain… these are very 
early days yet, so results should be taken only as illustrative of the space of live 
possibilities rather than as indicative of what pleasure is.”13  Katz’s own criticisms of 
Timothy Schroeder testify to the lack of consensus about the neural seat of pleasure.14   
     Given the lack of scientific data, how should we proceed?  Should we withhold belief 
on the issue entirely, accepting neither the Humean theory nor its negation, on grounds 
that psychological claims cannot be justified without support from rigorously collected 
empirical data?  That would be a drastic step.  To hold that we must await rigorous 
scientific confirmation or disconfirmation before accepting any beliefs whatsoever about 
human psychology would be to give up the common-sense folk psychological judgments 
that have always guided us in our interactions with each other.  When we try to determine 
how someone will react to some news or whether they would enjoy a particular activity, 
we make predictive judgments about how their mental states will interact to produce 
emotions and behavior.  To hold that our lack of rigorously collected empirical data 
leaves us unjustified in holding our background conception of human psychology would 
                                                
13 Katz, Leonard.  “Pleasure” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
14“ That pleasure is uniquely situated in the PGAC, rather than instead or equally in other regions showing 
up similarly in brain imaging studies, is not well supported by Schroeder's citation of studies, selected from 
a large literature, showing results for varying cingulate loci and many other correlations besides.” 
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be to deny that we are justified in our most basic predictive judgments about how people 
will respond to situations.   
     Views differ about how we generate these predictive judgments.  According to some 
theorists, we generate the predictions from an explicit theory of mind.  According to other 
theories, we generate the predictions by internally simulating other people’s mental 
processes.  There is also debate about how much of our capacity to make correct 
predictions about human psychology is learned through observation of ourselves and 
others, and how much is innate.  All parties to these debates, however, agree that we are 
able to make fairly reliable predictive judgments about how human beings behave and 
feel.  Setting aside eliminativism about the mental – a radical position that I will not be 
dealing with here – all parties to the debate agree that human beings, given adequate 
information from their ordinary dealings with each other, are capable of making reliable 
(though fallible) judgments about the mental states of others.   
     One might think that the less controversial question of whether we are able to make 
accurate predictions about the mental states of ourselves and others should be treated 
separately from the more controversial question of whether we are equipped to defend a 
well-articulated psychological theory of the sort that I defend here.  But if we have the 
capacity to make a rich and accurate set of predictions about the psychological states that 
people will go into under various conditions, we can use this capacity to develop the 
psychological theory.  Usually, one builds a theory from observations of the phenomena 
that the theory is supposed to describe, but if one has an independent source of reliable 
claims about the phenomena, those can play a role in developing and defending the 
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theory.  Physics researchers operate on this principle when they run computer simulations 
of difficult-to-observe phenomena, and use the outputs of these simulations to guide 
theory-construction.  If our predictive judgments about human psychology are rich and 
accurate, we ought to fit our psychological theories to them.  Of course, actual 
observational data will trump folk-psychological predictive judgments, and if enough 
observational data contradicts these judgments, we will be forced to conclude that these 
judgments are generally unreliable.  But in the absence of such data, and in view of the 
general reliability of our predictions, using our capacity to make accurate folk-
psychological judgments is a fine way to build a psychological theory.   
     This capacity for judging which mental states people will be in under various sorts of 
conditions is presupposed by those who propose counterexamples to the Humean theory 
of motivation.  In many cases, they describe situations and elicit our judgments about 
how agents would feel or act in those situations.  They then argue that the Humean theory 
commits one to conclusions incompatible with our judgments, and that this gives us 
reason to reject it.   
     In responding to the opponents of the Humean theory, I will rely on the same general 
methodological principles that they accept.  When they argue that the Humean theory 
cannot explain how human agents are able to engage in familiar kinds of deliberation and 
action, I will respond by showing that the Humean theory is compatible with – and 
indeed, capable of explaining – the phenomena of deliberation and action described in the 
proposed counterexamples.  In many cases, the very phenomena offered as 
counterexamples to the Humean theory are better explained by the Humean theory than 
  106 
by its competitors.  This gives us reason not only to set aside the anti-Humean objections, 
but to accept the Humean theory.   
     A few of the objections I deal with will present particular anti-Humean views as 
having appealing consequences, or show that Humean views lead to some bad 
consequence.  In these cases I will usually attempt to show that the consequences 
described do not obtain.  In the one case where neurobiological data is brought out in 
defense of an anti-Humean view, I will respond with neurobiological evidence showing 
that the conclusions being drawn from this evidence do not follow.   
     Folk psychology is by no means infallible, and in the surprising event that it is 
radically mistaken, the judgments about human psychology underlying my arguments 
(and, for that matter, the arguments of my anti-Humean opponents) may be in error.  
Perhaps in decades to come, new psychological research will render all the considerations 
advanced here obsolete, and give us a more reliable way of testing the Humean theory.  
But at this early point in the history of psychology, the only way to determine whether 
the Humean theory is contingently true is with reference to our folk-psychological 
judgments.  And so I will proceed by relying on those judgments.   
 
Kant, Freedom, and Deliberation 
     The attempt to show that the Humean theory cannot explain everything about how we 
decide and what we decide in cases of practical deliberation has a long history.  Consider 
this passage from Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, in which Kant argues 
that our experience forces us to believe in freedom, by showing us reason’s power to 
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guide our actions, independently of what we might happen to desire, through the moral 
law: 
Suppose someone asserts of his lustful inclination that, when the desired object 
and the opportunity are present, it is quite irresistible to him; ask him whether, if a 
gallows were erected in front of the house where he finds this opportunity and he 
would be hanged on it immediately after gratifying his lust, he would not then 
control his inclination.  One need not conjecture very long what he would reply.  
But ask him whether, if his prince demanded, on pain of the same immediate 
execution, that he give false testimony against an honorable man whom the prince 
would like to destroy under a plausible pretext, he would consider it possible to 
overcome his love of life, however great it may be.  He would perhaps not venture 
to assert whether he would do it or not, but he must admit without hesitation that 
it would be possible for him.  He judges, therefore, that he can do something 
because he is aware that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him, 
which, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him.  (5:30).   
 
Kant takes this case to be an empirical example, grounded in our experience of the actual 
world, that demonstrates our capacity for freedom.  As he says immediately before 
introducing the example, “one would never have ventured to introduce freedom into 
science had not the moral law, and with it practical reason, come in and forced this 
concept upon us.  But experience also confirms this order of concepts in us” (5:30).  Here 
Kant is not only arguing for the possible falsity of DBTA – he is arguing on a posteriori 
grounds for its actual falsity.  This makes him an opponent of even a contingent version 
of the Humean theory.  While Kant offers many a priori arguments against the Humean 
theory involving what would be required for rational action, this argument is 
distinguished by its dependence on empirical facts that are supposed to show the 
contingent truth of an anti-Humean theory of motivation.   
     If we assign the most plausible strengths to the agent’s desires for the various options, 
a Humean view can easily account for the fact that the agent would quickly decide not to 
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satisfy his lust, but would regard sacrificing his life to prevent the execution of an 
innocent man as “possible for him.”  For most of us, the aversion to being killed today is 
far stronger than the desire to have sex once.  While the aversion to participating in the 
execution of a good man may be weaker than the aversion to being killed today, it is 
much stronger in most of us than the desire for one episode of sex.  We can see this in the 
fact that most people would not participate in the unjust execution of a good man, just to 
have sex once.  So while we easily make the decision to forgo sex when our lives are at 
stake, we are torn between our powerful aversions in the case of the other decision.  Even 
if it is not the desire that eventually will determine our action, our aversion to 
participating in the unjust execution of a good man is strong enough to direct our 
attention towards this possibility for a while before choosing.  It is because this 
possibility is strong enough to hold our attention and prevent us from choosing quickly, 
causing us to deliberate even in when the other choice is our own deaths, that we say that 
averting the man’s execution would be possible for us.   
     Presented with the choice between this Humean explanation where deliberation is 
shaped by the different strengths of our desires, and the Kantian explanation where the 
agent’s freedom plays a role in guiding deliberation, which explanation should we prefer?  
The Humean explanation should be preferred, because of its greater simplicity.  It 
successfully accounts for all of the data without committing us to the sort of freedom that 
the Kantian explanation does.  The agent’s positive desires and aversions are brought in 
by both explanations (the emotions associated with the motivation to not be killed track 
the profile of aversion far better than positive desire, and the Kantian will have to posit 
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aversion in order to deal with them) but the Kantian goes an additional step by bringing 
in freedom.  The Humean theory makes better use of its explanatory resources by getting 
positive desire and aversion to do all the work.   
     Here, and later in this chapter, the ability of desire to direct attention towards the 
object of desire or towards something we associate with the object of desire will do a lot 
of work in dealing with putative counterexamples.  A significant part of the experience of 
deliberating is the experience of having our attention focus on salient aspects of our 
options.  This can manifest itself in a sensory focus on some nearby object, or on the 
contemplation of some possible or actual state of affairs.  In the case of the choice 
between sex and life, the difference in desire strengths causes the decision to go quickly 
enough that we do not spend much time looking at each option.  But in the case of the 
decision between dying and participating in the judicial execution of an innocent man, we 
would spend more time considering the options, which involves focusing our attention on 
aspects of the choices that are salient with respect to our desires.  In this kind of case, 
aversions will probably play a bigger role than positive desires.  Among other things, an 
aversion to unjustly killing people will cause us to reflect with horror on the possibility of 
his execution, and an aversion to acting dishonestly will make us reflect unhappily on the 
prospect of telling a lie.   
 
The Feeling of Obligation 
     A classic objection to the Humean theory of motivation is that it cannot explain the 
way we are motivated when we act out of a feeling of obligation.  This objection to the 
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Humean theory is grounded in a genuine phenomenological datum.  Our feelings of 
obligation differ in significant respects from the other feelings we have when spurred to 
action, and I will lay out two distinctive ways that we can feel when we act out of 
obligation.  But as I will argue, the Humean theory can deliver superior explanations of 
how we feel in both of these cases.  It does so by invoking explanatory resources that 
both Humeans and their opponents will have to admit, while not invoking any mental 
states other than desire that are capable of motivating action.  Thus it offers a simpler and 
better explanation of the feeling of obligation than anti-Humean theories do, giving us 
reason to accept it.   
     Some opponents of the Humean theory have claimed that this feeling of obligation 
arises intrinsically from some kind of truth-evaluable mental state – for example, the 
belief that particular moral facts obtain, or the judgment that a particular maxim could be 
a universal law for all rational beings.  Since desire is not truth-evaluable, this claim 
stands in contradiction to the Humean theory.  Immanuel Kant, with his distinction 
between the autonomy of the will when it is in accordance with duty and heteronomy of 
the will when it is driven by desire, is the most famous representative of this strand of the 
anti-Humean tradition.   
     This talk about the “feeling of obligation” is not intended to suggest that there is some 
psychological state that is sufficient for the existence of an obligation.  Neither does it 
imply that the existence of an obligation is sufficient for the existence of this state.  An 
irresponsible person may be under an obligation, and still not experience the feeling of 
obligation.  Similarly, someone may mistakenly believe that she is under an obligation, 
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and experience the feeling of obligation even though no obligation is present.  And in 
many cases, genuine obligations are successfully discharged by people who do not have 
this feeling at all.  I am using the term “feeling of obligation” to pick out a particular 
experience or group of experiences that many anti-Humeans rightly regard as feeling 
different from many of our ordinary experiences of desire, and which commonly arise in 
cases where we act out of obligation.   
     Why would anyone think that the motivational force that drives us when we have the 
feeling of obligation springs from a place other than desire?  Among the reasons for 
holding this position is that the feeling of obligation is phenomenologically different from 
our most common feelings of desire.  Given the uniqueness of the feeling of obligation, it 
may not seem plausible that a reduction of motivation under the feeling of obligation to 
motivation by desire is possible. 
     The view that there are important phenomenological differences between desire-
driven action and action done out of a feeling of obligation was expressed by some 
writers on ethics in the earlier part of the 20th century.  According to W. R. Sorley, 
something about the feeling of obligation is irreducible to our experiences of desire: “In 
all moral experience there is something which can not be simply identified with pleasure 
or with desire, but contains a differentiating factor which makes it moral and not merely 
pleasant or desired” (64).  In “The Consciousness of Moral Obligation,” J.G. Schurman 
defended the irreducibility of obligation and tied it to a cognitivist and internalist position 
about motivation: 
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Confining ourselves, then, to the feeling of moral obligation alone, I think it must 
be said that this feeling is not susceptible of resolution into smaller elements, 
whether it be surveyed in its earliest or in its later state of development.  It is an 
experience perfectly simple and unanalyzable, like the thought of being, clear to 
all who are conscious of it, but incommunicable to any one in whom that 
consciousness is wanting.  Though in its nature the sense of moral obligation is an 
ultimate feeling, it is yet possible to designate the condition of its emergence in 
consciousness.  That condition is the recognition of a moral law, ideal, or end of 
life.  We are so constituted that what we recognize as right for us to do, that we 
feel we ought to do.  (643) 
 
Schurman continues by saying that “Moral obligation is the soul’s response to 
acknowledged rectitude.”  According to Schurman, the experience of moral obligation is 
a sui generis feeling that follows the recognition of some kind of moral fact, and which is 
capable of motivating action.   
     One part of what Schurman and Sorley say cannot be denied – there is a more or less 
distinctive set of feelings we have in many cases of obligation that are not present in 
many clear cases where we are motivated by desire.  Imagine that you have promised 
your students that you will grade and return their papers by tomorrow, and that you are a 
responsible person who takes these promises seriously.  Just as you sit down to begin a 
long night of grading, friends of yours come by and announce a spur-of-the-moment plan 
to go to a party where many of your other friends will be present.  Your emotions as you 
consider the prospect of keeping your promise and grading will be different than your 
emotions as you consider the prospect of going to the party.  If you end up grading rather 
than going to the party, you may express these differences by describing your choice in 
terms that do not fit well with the Humean theory – “I’m doing what I have to do, not 
what I want to do.”   
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     These terms – “want to” and “have to” – are exactly the terms in which John Searle 
puts his objection to Davidson’s inclusion of regarding something as “dutiful” or 
“obligatory” in the category of pro-attitudes (169).  Searle attacks Davidson, and 
Humeans generally, for blurring “the distinction between things you want to do and 
things you have to do whether you want to or not.”  Searle continues:  “It is one thing to 
want or desire something, quite something else to regard it as ‘obligatory’ or as a 
‘commitment’ that you have to do regardless of your desires” (170).   
     It is not sufficient for Humeans to deal with the issue of obligation merely by positing 
desires to fulfill obligations – perhaps in the above case, a desire to keep promises which 
is stronger than the desire to go to the party.  While this would successfully explain the 
agent’s behavior in the case where she decides to keep her promise and grade the papers, 
it would fail to explain the phenomenology of decision-making.  As Schurman and Sorley 
say, the feeling of obligation is phenomenologically different from the feeling of the 
desire that motivates her to go to the party.  Simply positing another desire can explain 
her behavior, but more needs to be done to explain how the process of making the 
decision feels.   
     What exactly are the phenomenological differences between the feelings that arise 
from the two motivational forces in this example?  At present the case is somewhat 
underdescribed, and I will consider two different ways it could go.  Either way, the 
experiences associated with the two different motivational forces in the case are different 
from each other.   
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     In the first case that I will consider, the grader seriously considers each of the choices 
before her, and weighs whether to go to the party or keep her promise.  As she does this, 
she will feel different emotions in considering the options before her.  On the positive 
side, going to the party will seem exciting, while the possibility of handing a full set of 
graded papers back in the morning will generate more muted satisfactions.  On the 
negative side, missing the party and grading will seem boring and dreary, while facing 
upset students in the morning without papers to hand back will incite anxiety and seem 
dreadful.  I will call this the case of the Tempted Grader.   
     In the second case, the grader is focused on what she has to do, and does not seriously 
weigh the possibility of going to the party and leaving her promise unfulfilled.  She will 
feel some disappointment at not being able to go to the party, but she will not seriously 
consider leaving the papers ungraded.  While the desire to go to the party pulls at her, 
grading the papers will seem to have a kind of necessity, and she will not have the 
experience of weighing one desire against the other.  The feeling generated by the 
motivational force that causes her to stay in her office and grade the papers will be less 
intense than the feeling generated by the motivational force that pulls her towards the 
party.  But despite its lesser emotional vehemence, the former force will determine the 
course of her reflection and her decision.  This is the case of the Unwavering Grader.   
     Now I will respond to this objection by showing how a Humean theory, using the 
picture of desire that I offered before, can explain the feeling of obligation.  As I will 
explain, the different emotions in the case of the Tempted Grader are neatly explained by 
the fact that desire has two flavors.  Several different processes are involved in explaining 
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the case of the Unwavering Grader, but they mostly come down to the effects of vivid 
images on our desires.  We may lack vivid sensory or imaginative representations that we 
associate with failure to fulfill our obligations, or we may consider ourselves reliable 
moral agents and thus regard violating our obligations as too remote a possibility to 
vividly imagine.  The feeling of constraint that can accompany obligation, moreover, is 
not unique to obligation, but is present in other cases of desire.  With an understanding of 
these factors in hand, Humeans can explain the feeling of obligation.   
     The motivational state that causes our actions when we act out of a feeling of 
obligation is not a positive desire to satisfy our obligations, but an aversion to not 
satisfying them.  As discussed previously, desire comes in two flavors with different 
emotional profiles.  This explains the emotions characteristically associated with the 
feeling of obligation.  When we discover that we may not be able to satisfy some 
obligation we have, we feel anxious rather than disappointed.  And if we are freed from 
an obligation that would be hard to satisfy, we usually feel relieved.  While the emotions 
associated with positive desire are delight in cases of expected or imagined satisfaction 
and disappointment in cases of expected or imagined failure, the emotions associated 
with aversion are relief when we expect or imagine avoiding the object of aversion and 
anxiety when we expect or imagine failing to avoid it.  Part of the experience of 
obligation can thus be explained by regarding the motivational force underlying the 
feeling of obligation as an aversion to not satisfying obligations rather than as a positive 
desire to satisfy them.   
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     And this is how the case of the Tempted Grader can be best explained.  The different 
feelings associated with each of the options before her – the excitement of thinking about 
the party versus the duller satisfaction when she thinks about being able to hand back 
graded papers, the disappointment when she thinks of missing the party versus the 
anxiety when she thinks of breaking a promise – are accounted for by a view that grounds 
the different emotions in desires of different flavors.   
     Opponents of the Humean theory might claim, in response, that their account of the 
phenomena in the case of the Tempted Grader provides as good an explanation as my 
version of the Humean view does.  They might invoke two different states with 
motivational power – a positive desire to go to the party, and a belief that it is right to 
keep the promise and grade the papers, which generates the feeling of obligation as it 
motivates the action, either directly or by generating a desire through some DODI-
denying process of practical reasoning. Humeans also have two states with motivational 
power – a positive desire to go to the party, and an aversion to leaving one’s obligations 
unfulfilled.  Both of us explain all the phenomenological data.  So what reason is there to 
prefer the Humean explanation?   
     The important thing to see here is that any plausible anti-Humean view will be 
committed to the existence of both aversion and positive desire as motivational forces.  
There are simple cases of emotions occurring before we act where positing a positive 
desire or positing a belief that it is right to perform some action will each fail to deliver 
good explanations.  Consider a case where someone realizes on the way home that he 
does not have his wallet, and decides to walk back to the bar where he thinks he left it.  
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The experience of having this realization is not typically one of disappointment, but one 
of anxiety and worry, so a positive desire to regain the wallet will not explain his 
emotions.  This is not a case where believing a moral principle is explaining his emotions 
or his decision.  And while one might think of explaining the motivation and 
phenomenology by appealing to beliefs in principles of prudence, one would still have to 
explain why prudence creates this particular phenomenology in this situation.  In other 
cases (for example, the case of an investor who thinks she can buy some land that will 
rise rapidly in value, and subsequently learns that the land will not be sold after all) 
prudential motivation can have the phenomenology of excitement and disappointment 
that is characteristic of positive desire.  So merely appealing to prudential motivation will 
not explain the particular emotions in this case.   
     An aversion to losing his possessions, however, will nicely explain the motivation and 
the phenomenology.  It is hard to see what better explanation could be offered here, and 
in the absence of such an explanation I will take the anti-Humean to be committed, just as 
the Humean is, to the existence of aversion as a motivational force.  In using the 
phenomenology of aversion as part of a reduction of the feeling of obligation, the 
Humean uses conceptual resources that are already on the table.  Both sides need 
aversion in order to deal with cases like that of the lost wallet.  Rather than invoking a 
new primitive motivational force, the Humean builds a simpler theory by using a 
motivational force that both sides must allow.   
     This methodological point will be relevant to the explanations that I offer throughout 
this chapter.  In the course of explaining some feature of how we deliberate, I will often 
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invoke explanatory resources that an anti-Humean explanation of that particular feature 
of deliberation will not invoke for that particular purpose, such as the two flavors of 
desire or the way desire can be intensified by vivid images.  But these explanatory 
resources will be ones that the anti-Humean cannot, in the end, do without.  Denying that 
aversions exist or that desires can be intensified by vivid images would leave the anti-
Humean with no way of explaining why some of our desires generate different emotions 
than others, or why desires for things which we see before us are more violent than 
desires for more distant things.  The beauty of the Humean theory is that it explains 
complex cases using explanatory resources that both sides accept.  Using only these 
resources, it fits into a simpler total explanatory picture.   
     Now I move to the case of the Unwavering Grader.  One interesting feature of many 
(though not all) cases when we act from a feeling of obligation is that we are not moved 
by what Hume would call a “violent passion.”  Even in many cases when we act to fulfill 
our obligations, and particularly when we satisfy our obligations by refraining from 
action, the desire that determines our action is less intensely felt – one might say that it 
“creates less disorder in the temper” – than the desire that fails to cause action.  The case 
of the Unwavering Grader is a case of this kind.  How can a Humean explain this?   
     As Hume himself pointed out, passions become more violent when we have more 
vivid imaginative or sensory representations of things that we associate with their objects.  
There are two reasons why sensory and imaginative representations that go along with 
obligation, and generate the feeling of obligation, would be less vivid than the 
representations that go along with ordinary desire.  First, the concepts that fit into the 
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contents of our desires when we are motivated by the feeling of obligation are often quite 
abstract – for example, the concept of morality and the concept of obligation.  We do not 
have many close associations between concepts at this level of abstraction and things that 
we can have vivid imaginative or sensory representations of.  Second, people who 
reliably fulfill their obligations often have confidence in their abilities to do so, and this 
makes them less likely to consider and imagine states of affairs in which the object of 
their aversion is realized and they fail to fulfill their obligations.   
     The things that we have aversions to when we experience the feeling of obligation are 
often fairly abstract.  A conscientious person, for example, may have an aversion to doing 
things that are morally wrong.  This aversion can affect whether and how he acts by 
combining with a means-end belief that by engaging in some action or by refraining from 
action, he would be doing something wrong.  (The means in this case could be a 
constitutive means, and not a causal means.)  There may not be many sensory images 
which he closely associates with morally wrong action in the same way that we associate 
food very closely with the content of our desire when we are hungry.   
     The objects of our aversion in cases where we experience the feeling of obligation are 
not always this abstract, of course.  And in cases where we actually have vivid 
representations of the object of aversion, the feeling of obligation sheds its typical 
calmness and becomes unusually violent.  An aversion to letting others suffer may grow 
violent after one sees images of suffering children.  Thoughts of disappointed students 
make the aversion to not grading more violent.  And while an aversion to marital 
infidelity may be a calm passion for a man who is far away from his wife, it can become 
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more violent when he has some sensory experience connected with her – perhaps, when 
he is talking with her on the phone and hearing her voice, or when he looks into her eyes.  
However calm the aversion to breaking promises may be when we are away from the 
person to whom we have made a particular promise, it will usually become more violent 
when we are looking into the promisee’s eyes.  In these cases, the passion moving us to 
action gains violence because of the vivid sensory representations that we experience.   
     The effect of vivid representations is also relevant in the cases of agents who know 
themselves to be reliable in fulfilling their obligations.  These agents usually do not pause 
to think about possible states of affairs where their obligations go unfulfilled.  Common 
processes that cause people to focus their attention on possible states of affairs related to 
their desires do not operate in their case, and this prevents them from considering these 
possibilities in much detail.  Since they know themselves to be reliable in fulfilling their 
obligations, they are confident, come what may, that they will be able to fulfill the 
particular obligation that they are at the time motivated to fulfill.  Possible states of 
affairs where they fail to fulfill their obligations seem remote to them, and these 
possibilities are not imagined vividly.  In the absence of vivid representations of the 
states that they are averse to, their passions remain calm.   
     An example that does not deal with obligation may be helpful in explaining how this 
works.  Suppose you were to present me with a choice where one of the options was very 
bad, and selecting the other option was an easy choice.  For example, suppose you 
offered to give my family $100 in exchange for my jumping out of a fourth-story 
window.  I would not seriously consider jumping out, and I would reject your offer 
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without seriously thinking about how it would be to fall to my death.  Given the terms of 
the choice, the possibility of jumping out of the window would remain very remote, and I 
would not think about it enough to start vividly imagining the feeling of falling and the 
horrible impact of my body against the ground.  So my desire to avoid an early death 
would decide my behavior while remaining calm.  This is how the experience of 
decision-making often is for people who are used to fulfilling their obligations.  They 
have confidence that they will go forward and do the right thing, so it is not a usual part 
of decision-making for them to look into the abyss and imagine how it would be if they 
failed to fulfill their obligations.  Since they do not entertain vivid imaginative 
representations of failure, their passions remain calm.   
     Contrast the case where I decide against jumping out the window, without seriously 
considering it, with a case in which I have to seriously consider jumping out the window.  
Perhaps some billionaire with strange and gruesome preferences appeals to my utilitarian 
sensibilities by offering to make a $100 million contribution to Doctors Without Borders, 
conditional on my jumping out the window to my death.  Knowing that my self-sacrifice 
would save thousands of lives, I must pause to seriously consider the options.  As I 
consider jumping out the window, the vivid imaginative experiences of falling to my 
death increase the violence of my aversion to dying.  This parallels the way that the 
feeling of obligation goes for people who are wavering between fulfilling their 
obligations and not fulfilling them, and for whom the possibility of defaulting on their 
obligations must be seriously considered.  In cases where one cannot be confident in 
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one’s ability to satisfy one’s obligations, one seriously imagines defaulting, and the 
aversion that underlies the feeling of obligation can become violent.   
     If some version of the “ought implies can” principle is true, this may also help 
responsible agents maintain their confidence in their ability to do as they ought.  While 
circumstances beyond their control can tear the objects of agents’ other desires away 
from them, the truth of “ought implies can” would prevent circumstances beyond an 
agent’s control from bringing about the situation that these responsible agents are averse 
to – the situation in which they fail to do as they ought.  If, due to circumstances beyond 
their control, it becomes impossible for them to do something that they otherwise ought 
to have done, it will no longer be the case that they ought to do it.  The situation that they 
are averse to – the situation where they fail to do as they ought – will not have come 
about, since it is no longer the case that they ought to do the action.  The only way they 
can end up in the situation to which they are averse is if they have the satisfaction of their 
obligations within their power, and still fail.  Then “can” will obtain, and “ought” will 
too.  But if they know themselves to be responsible agents, this situation will seem 
unlikely and remote, and it will not trouble them.   
     The last consideration that I want to bring up in explaining the feeling of obligation 
has to do with the way that it feels to pass up the object of one of your desires in order to 
satisfy a stronger desire that has been involved in the formation of a prior intention.  
Suppose I have paid a lot of money for a plane ticket to go visit some friends in another 
state, and my plane leaves on Thursday.  If I subsequently learn of an exciting party on 
Friday, I will not seriously consider missing the flight to go to the party.  I will feel that 
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the party is something I am unable to attend, even though I want to.  I will be 
disappointed about missing the party, but I will have no experience of weighing the 
options.  Rather, I will feel as though the situation constrains me, preventing me from 
getting something good that remains beyond my grasp.   
     While the case of missing the party to catch my flight is not a case of obligation, it 
feels the same way, in one important respect, as motivation from the feeling of obligation 
does.  The feeling of being constrained and unable to get something you want is not 
unique to cases where the feeling of obligation is present.  Rather, it appears in many 
different cases of desire.  In this way, my experience as I am disappointed at missing the 
party because I have to catch my flight is like that of the Unwavering Grader as she 
misses her party because she has to finish her grading.   
     I will now return to her case.  In making her decision, the Unwavering Grader was 
faced with two choices which felt different to her.  The emotions connected with grading 
were less intense than the emotions connected with the party.  The cause of the difference 
in the intensity of these emotions is the difference in the violence of the passions that 
drive her towards these two things.  And the cause of this difference in violence of 
passion is the difference in the vividness of the images that pass through her mind as she 
deliberates about the options.  Since the concept of obligation does not lend itself to vivid 
imagining, and since the possibility of failure will seem remote if she knows herself to be 
reliable in fulfilling her obligations, she will not have particularly vivid mental 
representations of failure to fulfill her obligations.  And since she has a prior commitment 
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to grading, backed up by powerful desires, she will not unlock this commitment to weigh 
going to the party against grading the papers.   
     I regard the considerations I have laid out as presenting a good reductive explanation 
of the feeling of obligation, in two of its common forms.  The feelings associated with 
obligation have been reduced to the feelings associated with ordinary desires.  The 
availability of this reductive explanation, which accounts for all the phenomenological 
data using a simple ontology of motivational states, gives us some reason to accept the 
Humean theory of motivation, and to reject claims that some motivational force other 
than desire operates on us when we experience the feeling of obligation.  Instead of being 
a problematic case for the Humean theory, the case of obligation shows that Humeans 
can deliver detailed and illuminating explanations of the phenomenology of decision-
making. 
 
Schueler and Deliberation 
     In Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action, G.F. Schueler 
distinguishes between two senses of desire.  He takes the ordinary use of the term 
“desire” to be ambiguous between them.  Scheuler argues that the first of these senses, 
which resembles my account of desire, is unable to explain what happens in cases where 
agents deliberate about what to do.  I will argue that desire in this sense is able to provide 
good explanations of deliberative actions.   
     The first sense of desire that Scheuler considers is that of “desires proper,” which 
include “such things as cravings, urges, wishes, hopes, yens, and the like, as well as some 
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motivated desires, but not such things as moral or political beliefs that could appear in 
practical deliberation as arguing against the dictates of one’s urgings, cravings, or 
wishes” (35).  “Motivated desires” here is a term from Thomas Nagel that picks out 
desires arrived at after deliberation.  The second sense of “desire” is that of “pro 
attitudes,” which includes motivational forces of all kinds.15  If a moral belief could 
directly motivate action, it would be a pro attitude but not a desire proper.   
     While Schueler does not attempt a precise characterization of desires proper, it seems 
that desires proper are closer to desires as I defined them in the previous chapter than pro-
attitudes are.  The notion of desire that I have been working with does not merely involve 
connections to motivation, as is the case with Schueler’s pro attitudes.  Desire, on my 
view, also involves necessary connections to pleasure, and connections to lots of other 
psychological states which hold throughout the space of human psychological possibility.  
So when Schueler claims that “if we stick with desires proper, then the desire/belief 
model of agents’ reasoning… is not true,” I take him to be rejecting the Humean theory 
as I have laid it out (48).   
     In the final chapter of Desire, Schueler considers two models of how actions might be 
motivated.  He calls the first the “blind-forces model.”  On this model, what the agent 
does “is simply the outcome of the causal interaction of his or her desires with the 
‘information states’ in his or her brain” (171).  Schueler contrasts the blind-forces model 
with the “deliberative model”, on which “the agent weighs up the various considerations 
                                                
15 Schueler does not claim that Davidson was using the term “pro attitude” in the same way he does.  He 
seems to regard the matter as an open question (48).   
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that seem to him or her to count for and against performing the various actions available 
and then performs the action that seems to have the most to recommend it, at least in the 
optimum case where there is no failure of rationality” (173).  On this model, the 
considerations favoring or opposing an action are not limited to ones that figure in the 
contents of an agent’s desires proper.  If desire is understood as desire proper, the 
deliberative model is inconsistent with DBTA.   
     Schueler holds that the blind-forces model will succeed in explaining actions that we 
perform without deliberation, while the deliberative model will (unsurprisingly) succeed 
in explaining actions where we deliberate.  However, he does not see how either model 
can explain all cases of action.  The deliberative model will fail in cases of impulsive 
action where the agent does not deliberate.  The blind-forces model, if it incorporates 
only desires proper16, will fail in cases of deliberative action.  This causes him to wonder, 
at the very end of his book, “what if, as I am suggesting, neither of these two models 
turns out to be plausibly eliminable in favor of the other?” (196).   
     Schueler would probably characterize my Humean view as a version of the blind 
forces model.  Since I include psychological states like imagination (which might be 
characterized as non-informational) among those that can causally interact with desire to 
determine how an agent eventually acts, there might be some questions about whether my 
view falls under his exact definition of the model.  But I am happy enough to be regarded 
                                                
16 The blind forces model, it seems, could account for all actions if paired with the pro attitude view of 
desire.  I am happy enough to follow Schueler in considering his preferred pairing of the blind forces model 
with the desires proper view, however, since that is the general outline of the theory I have proposed.   
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as a blind-forces theorist, and to argue that my view will succeed in dealing with cases of 
deliberation.   
     Schueler’s concern about the inability of the blind-forces model to explain 
deliberation arises from difficulties that previous blind-forces models have faced in doing 
so.  The blind-forces model that he focuses on the most is that of Fred Dretske. While 
Dretske’s account is like mine in making desire-belief pairs causally necessary for action, 
it also tries to build in a story about the causal genesis of desire, and in doing so it brings 
in several complexities that my account avoids.  On Dretske’s picture, desires produce 
particular movements when the agent believes that she is in the same circumstances 
under which those movements produced a reward for her in the past.  Thus, past rewards 
play an important role in the development of desire.   
     Dretske acknowledges that his view does not give a satisfactory explanation of 
deliberation.  He considers a case in which a hungry jackal sees a tiger eating an antelope.  
The jackal desires to eat the antelope, but also fears getting close to the tiger.  So the 
jackal may decide to wait at a safe distance until the tiger eats its fill and wanders away.  
This is not the course of action demanded by either of its desires, though it may be the 
path to the greatest aggregate desire-satisfaction.  Dretske says that “How this novel third 
result is synthesized out of control structures already available is, at the biological level, a 
complete mystery” (Dretske 141).  As Schueler notes, the problem here is not really at 
the “biological level” (Schueler 141).   Rather, “The mystery is how we are supposed to 
extend the theory he gives for, and explains in terms of, cases of a single motive (the 
practical-syllogism case) to cases of multiple motives.”  If desires are tied to the 
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performance of movements when the agent believes that conditions obtain under which 
those movements have previously led to reward, how can we explain an agent’s decision, 
formed through deliberation, to engage in novel movements?   
     Different explanations may be appropriate for jackals and humans, and some people 
may not want to attribute any sort of deliberative processes to the jackal in the above 
case.  But humans certainly deliberate in this way, and a theory of motivation must 
explain how this is possible.  The Humean theory I have offered is able to use the 
attention-direction feature to explain how an agent’s deliberations here might start.  An 
agent’s desires have the ability to direct her attention towards a possible state of affairs 
that she associates with their object, and in a situation like this both of her desires might 
combine to direct her attention towards the possible state of affairs in which she avoids 
the tiger by waiting nearby and gets the food by seizing it once the tiger leaves.  The 
formation of an occurrent means-end belief about how to jointly satisfy her desires thus 
naturally accompanies the attention-direction.  The agent becomes motivated to wait 
nearby until the tiger leaves, and then feast on the antelope.  Since my account only 
brings in the agent’s movements insofar as they figure in the antecedent of the means-end 
belief (unlike Dretske’s, which attaches a fixed set of movements to each desire) I am 
able to account for novel movements while Dretske cannot.   
     Schueler also considers the view of Alvin Goldman, which he regards as an “unhappy 
hybrid that tries unsuccessfully to combine elements of both the blind-forces model and 
the deliberative model” (174).  On Goldman’s view, actions are caused by the agent’s 
beliefs about which actions are likely to satisfy the most of her desires (Goldman 74).  It 
  129 
appears similar to the blind forces model in that the concept of desire is essential for the 
explanation of action.  However, it is not the case that actual desires are necessary.  An 
agent could, for example, falsely believe that she desired something when she had no 
desires at all, and thus act without desire.  Such an agent not actually be motivated by 
desire. Since the mental state that actually motivates action is a belief and not a desire, 
Goldman’s model is not a blind forces model, and also not a Humean model.  
     To argue that neither of the two models is sufficient to explain all action, Schueler 
presents two examples, both of which involve him eating chocolate from a candy jar.  In 
the first case, he eats it impulsively.  In the second case, he deliberates about whether he 
should eat it or not, decides that there are no good reasons not to, and eats it.  He argues 
that in the two cases, the actions are explained by different psychological states.  In the 
first, a desire for chocolate and a means-end belief that he can eat the chocolate by taking 
it out of the jar, unwrapping it, and putting it in his mouth explains the action.  In the 
second, the role of the desire and the means-end belief is occupied by a judgment.  As 
one possible form that the judgment may take, Schueler offers this:  
[J] I judge that I want to eat some chocolates.  (178) 
Since impulsive action involves desires while deliberative action involves judgments, 
Schueler argues, neither the blind-forces model nor the deliberative model will be 
able to deal with all cases of action.   
     Schueler first considers the response, from the blind-forces theorist, that the 
causation of action in the deliberative case is just the same as the causation of action 
in the nondeliberative case.  He rejects this response because it leaves J out, denying 
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the judgment any genuine explanatory power.  If the desire and the belief explained 
the deliberative action in just the same way as they explained the impulsive action, “it 
would simply be false that I acted on the basis of my deliberation” (180).  
Deliberation, on this view, “would be simply a kind of epiphenomenon” (180).  While 
Schueler accepts that some cases of rationalization may be like this, he does not want 
to say that all cases of deliberation go this way.   
     Schueler then considers the response that J plays a genuine explanatory role in some 
kind of desire-belief causation.  But he claims that this would require widening the 
spectrum of desires to include all pro-attitudes.  After all, J (and the other claims that 
Schueler considers to replace the desire-belief pair in the deliberative case) can be made 
by an agent who does not have any desire proper for chocolate, or even by an agent who 
has no desires proper at all.  Such claims would be false if made by such an agent, but 
they still could be made – for example, if the agent introspected badly about which 
desires he had.  J is not a plausible candidate for being a desire proper.  So if J can be 
considered a genuine cause of action, Schueler says, desires proper will not explain all 
actions.   
     I will now take a closer look at Schueler’s example, and try to present a Humean 
account that employs only desires proper and gives J genuine explanatory power.  In 
Schueler’s example, he notices the candy jar, his craving for chocolate awakens, and then 
the following happens: 
It occurs to me that there are some reasons for me not to eat any chocolates, 
reasons to weigh against my desire to eat some.  For one thing, I have already had 
several chocolates today, and I believe that chocolates are both fattening and bad 
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for the teeth.  Then too other members of my family have been complaining that I 
eat a disproportionate share of the candy in our household and that I should leave 
more for them.   
     I decide, however, that none of these reasons is really all that telling when 
weighed against my craving for more chocolates.  My teeth are fine, and I get 
enough exercise that gaining weight is not a problem.  And since there are plenty 
of chocolates in the jar and I plan to take only a few, I will be leaving a lot for 
others.  So I stop, open the jar, take out a couple of chocolates and start to eat 
them, replace the lid on the jar, and proceed on my way (175).   
 
I will now offer a Humean story that explains what happened here, and makes it fit with a 
desire-belief model of action that involves only desires proper.   
     The example begins with the agent (we can call him George) having his desire to eat 
chocolate brought to the forefront of his mind by the sight of something directly relevant 
to its object – chocolate.  This combines with his simple means-end belief about how to 
eat the chocolate, and he finds himself motivated to eat it.  But before George can act on 
this motivation, the idea of eating the chocolate makes another of his previously latent 
desires occurrent – his prudential desire for his own desire-satisfaction.  He associates 
eating chocolate with things like being fat and suffering tooth decay, which he desires not 
to happen.  His aversion to disharmony in the home comes to the fore as well, as the 
thought of decreasing the chocolate supply makes him worry about irking his chocolate-
loving family members.  With these desires occurrent, he casts his attention on every side 
of their objects (as Hume would say).  As he considers things related to the possibility of 
a strife-causing chocolate shortage, he notes that there are actually enough leftover 
chocolates to avert disharmony.  Once he sees this, he sees nothing relevant to his 
aversion to family strife around him, so that aversion fades back to being latent.  
Similarly, as he attends to the possibility of tooth decay and weight gain, he notes that 
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because of his present condition, eating more chocolate is unlikely to bring these negative 
consequences upon him.   
     But perhaps, before his desire for his own desire-satisfaction fades away into latency, 
it causes George to direct his attention toward something else related to its object.  He 
notes that he wants to eat some chocolates.  In doing this, he makes judgment J, judging 
that he wants to eat some chocolates.17  J, together with the facts of his situation, implies 
the truth of a means-end belief – the belief that by reaching into a jar and eating the 
chocolate, he will be able to satisfy a desire.  His prudential desire for desire-satisfaction 
and his belief that he can satisfy a desire by reaching into the jar and eating the desired 
chocolate come together, causing him to reach into the jar and eat the chocolate.   
     In my explanation of the example, the only motivational states involved were desires 
proper.  J played an important explanatory role, as it led to the formation of a crucial 
means-end belief.  So it is possible for a blind-forces theorist to explain deliberation 
using only desires proper, and without depriving deliberation of its explanatory power.   
 
Darwall and Desires Formed through Deliberation 
     In Impartial Reason, Stephen Darwall presents a vividly illustrated case in which he 
claims that an agent forms a new desire through reasoning that does not have another 
                                                
17 Personally, I do not think I would make the judgment J if I were in George’s shoes.  My desire for my 
own desire-satisfaction would fade quickly along with my aversion to family strife, and I would eat the 
chocolate simply out of a desire for the taste of chocolate (much as in Schueler’s nondeliberative case) 
rather than out of a desire for my own desire-satisfaction.  If most people would not have J in such a case, 
this is not to the discredit of the Humean theory, but rather to the discredit of Schueler’s commentary on his 
example, since it is his commentary that forced J upon us.  Other cases that do not involve chocolate may, 
however, involve a judgment like J.   
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desire as a premise.  Such a case would be a counterexample to DODI, and to the 
Humean theory.  But as I will argue, the Humean theory can offer us as good an 
explanation of all the features of the case as Darwall’s view can, while relying on a 
simpler ontology of motivational states.  Rather than being a counterexample to the 
Humean theory, Darwall’s case demonstrates the superiority of the Humean theory over 
competing explanations. 
     Early in Impartial Reason, Darwall attacks the “DBR Thesis” (DBR stands for 
“Desire-Based Reasons”).  According to this thesis, all of an agent’s reasons “‘have their 
source in’ that agent’s desires” (Darwall 27, quoting Gilbert Harman).  Darwall says that 
previous discussions of this thesis have left it unclear what it means for reasons to have a 
source in the agent’s desires, though he offers several clarifications of what this could 
mean.  I will consider an objection that he presents to a form of the DBR thesis that I 
accept, and examine this objection to see how my Humean view would fare against it.   
    Version III of the DBR Thesis runs as follows: 
[III] Something is a reason to act only if it evidences the act to promote something 
the agent desires.   
“Reason to act” can have a motivational reading, on which a reason to act is something 
that explains action (as opposed to something that justifies action).  Then III is implied by 
the Humean theory, and counterexamples to III will be counterexamples to the Humean 
theory of motivation.   
     Darwall objects to III, and to the Humean theory.  He opposes views on which “the 
agent’s current desires function as a filter that determine which considerations can move 
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him and which cannot.”  He supports a view on which someone can be “moved by 
awareness of some consideration, without that being explained by a prior desire” (39).  
While he suggests that a new desire may be attributable to the agent after deliberation has 
concluded, he does not think that an antecedent desire is necessary for deliberative 
processes to go forward.   
     Many other prominent rationalists have expressed views like the one that Darwall 
expresses here – that pre-existing desires are not necessary for the formation of a new 
desire through reasoning.  In The Possibility of Altruism, Thomas Nagel attacks the view 
that “all motivation has desire at its source” (27).  While Nagel accepts that “all 
motivation implies the presence of desire” (32), he thinks that we often come to have 
desires through processes of reasoning that do not include desire as a premise.  In these 
cases, our actions are not motivated by any desire, but by the reasons that drove our 
deliberation and caused us to act.  While attributions of a desire to an agent follow 
trivially from the fact that she was motivated, this desire does not play any substantial 
role in explaining the action or the decision to act, and no other desire need be invoked to 
explain the action or the decision.  In Nagel’s words, “That I have the appropriate desire 
simply follows from the fact that these considerations motivate me… But nothing follows 
about the role of the desire as a condition contributing to the motivational efficacy of 
those considerations” (15).  New desires, then, can come into existence through processes 
of reasoning that do not have desire as a premise.  All that has to happen is that the 
processes of reasoning must motivate an agent. 
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     John McDowell, who cites Nagel in “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical 
Imperatives?” shares this view.  According to McDowell, if an agent acts to promote his 
future happiness, we credit him with a desire for his future happiness.  However, 
the commitment to ascribe such a desire is simply consequential on our taking 
him to act as he does for the reason we cite; the desire does not function as an 
independent extra component in a full specification of his reason, hitherto omitted 
by an understandable ellipsis of the obvious, but strictly necessary in order to 
show how it is that reason can motivate him.  Properly understood, the belief does 
that on its own. (15)     
 
Like Nagel, McDowell denies DODI.  On his view, all that is necessary to explain 
motivation is a belief.  All action necessarily involves desire, but sometimes an agent has 
a desire only in virtue of the fact that she reasoned her way from having a belief to being 
motivated to act.   
     As a defender of a merely contingent version of the Humean theory of motivation, I 
am willing to concede to all these philosophers that the psychology of motivation which 
they describe is within the realm of conceptual possibility.  We can imagine creatures that 
are motivated in the way that they describe.  I presented such an example in the second 
chapter – the example of the Angels.  But human beings are not Angels.  In order to make 
it plausible that the Humean theory misdescribes the psychology of human motivation, 
these rationalists would do well to offer examples in which psychologically normal 
human agents form new desires in a way inconsistent with the Humean theory.  Their 
examples would have to involve nothing beyond the kinds of processes that we recognize 
from ordinary human psychology.   
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     I have chosen to focus on Darwall because he goes the farthest in trying to present 
such an example.  His example runs as follows: 
Roberta grows up comfortably in a small town.  The newspapers she reads, what 
she sees on television, what she learns in school, and what she hears in 
conversation with family and friends present her with a congenial view of the 
world and her place in it.  She is aware in a vague way that there is poverty and 
suffering somewhere, but sees no relation between it and her own life.  On going 
to a university she sees a film that vividly presents the plight of textile workers in 
the Southern United States: the high incidence of brown lung, low wages, and 
long history of employers undermining attempts of workers to organize a union, 
both violently and through other extralegal means.  Roberta is shocked and 
dismayed by the suffering she sees.  After the film there is a discussion of what 
the students might to do help alleviate the situation.  It is suggested that they 
might actively work in promoting a boycott of the goods of one company that has 
been particularly flagrant in its illegal attempts to destroy the union.  She decides 
to donate a few hours a week to distributing leaflets at local stores.   
 
This is a richly illustrated example.  Darwall has fleshed it out in detail so as to make 
Roberta’s story and her mental life fit well with our folk understanding of how people 
think and feel.  I quote it at length because many of its parts will be useful in developing 
the Humean response to Darwall’s objection.   
     According to Darwall, Roberta’s decision to join the boycott does not require 
explanation by the presence of a pre-existing desire to relieve suffering.  She simply has 
achieved a vivid awareness of the unfortunate situation of the textile workers, and this 
awareness will motivate her to act.  Darwall allows that awareness of the workers’ 
situation may cause her to form a new desire which she then acts on, but even after 
allowing this, he comes out as an opponent of the Humean theory as I have framed it.  He 
says of Roberta, “whatever desire she does have after the film seems itself to be the result 
of her becoming aware, in a particularly vivid way, of considerations that motivate her 
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desire and that she takes as reasons for her decision: the unjustifiable suffering of the 
workers” (40).  Since he sees Roberta’s process of desire-formation as driven by her 
accepting particular considerations as reasons, and denies that desires stand at the 
beginning of her reasoning, he will be claiming that new desires can be generated by 
processes of reasoning that do not have desires as premises.  Then he will – like Nagel 
and McDowell – be denying DODI, and opposing the Humean theory.   
     But even as Darwall describes the example, there is some reason to think that Roberta 
came to the film with a desire that people not suffer, and that her desire to help the 
workers was formed through the instrumental processes accepted by Humeans.  Consider 
the shock and dismay that Darwall describes her feeling when she watched the film.  
Desire, as I have argued in the previous chapter, has a hedonic aspect – when people are 
presented with vivid images of states of affairs that they are averse to, or when their 
subjective probability of desire-satisfaction decreases, they feel displeasure.  The hedonic 
aspect of desire is manifested in both of these ways as Roberta watches the film.  Darwall 
describes the vivid way that the film presents the suffering of the textile workers.  And 
given how comfortable Roberta’s previous upbringing was, and how sheltered she was 
from the suffering in the world, she is likely to have had an unrealistic view of how 
happy other people were.  Someone who desires that others not suffer will feel shock and 
dismay upon discovering that there is more suffering in the world than she thought.  
Roberta’s emotions are evidence of an antecedent desire.   
     Darwall does not address the way that Roberta’s shock and dismay serve as evidence 
for the presence of an antecedent desire.  It is hard to see how he could do so.  These 
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emotional responses are typical among people who have suddenly realized that some 
undesirable situation obtains, and who are about to instrumentally form a new desire to 
address it.  What cause of shock and dismay, other than a pre-existing desire combined 
with a sudden realization that a deeply undesirable situation obtains, can Darwall invoke?  
The hedonic aspect of desire neatly accounts for the fact that we are subject to these 
emotions.   
     It might be argued here, on Darwall’s behalf, that a belief that others are being 
mistreated could generate the sentiments and motivation in this case, and that such an 
explanation is as simple as the Humean explanation.  And if we were to look at the case 
of Roberta without thinking about the broader ontology of motivational states that 
Humeans and anti-Humeans are committed to, this view might be convincing.  But when 
we consider the motivational states that Humeans and anti-Humeans are committed to, 
we can see how the Humean explanation of Roberta’s case allows us to develop a simpler 
overall picture.  While Humeans can plausibly claim to be extending a simple model of 
action that covers all the other cases, no similar claim can plausibly be made on the anti-
Humeans’ behalf.   
     Consider the cases of hunger, thirst, and sexual lust.  Anti-Humeans generally concede 
that the motivational states arising in these cases are best understood as desires.  It is hard 
to see how they could do otherwise, considering things like the ways in which these states 
are produced and the inability of theoretical reasoning to affect them.  So both the 
Humean and the anti-Humean ontologies of motivational states will include desire.  
Against this background, an explanation of Roberta’s deliberation and action in which 
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desire is the only motivational state will be simpler than one that includes motivational 
states not attested elsewhere.  As we come to Roberta’s case (and the other cases 
discussed in this chapter), we have no similarly uncontroversial cases of the motivational 
forces that anti-Humeans invoke.  Cases like Darwall’s and the others discussed in this 
chapter are supposed to do the work for the anti-Humean that hunger, thirst, and lust do 
for the Humean.  So if the Humean can explain these cases in terms of desire while 
capturing all the phenomena that the anti-Humean does, the Humean theory will have 
demonstrated its greater theoretical economy, and thus its superiority.   
     Darwall has some arguments against the view that Roberta formed her new desire in a 
way consistent with DODI, starting from an antecedent desire for others not to suffer. His 
first argument against the view that Roberta had an antecedent desire begins by 
imagining what he regards as the way that she would instrumentally form a new desire 
out of an antecedent desire to avoid suffering.  He then argues that Roberta need not have 
formed her desire in this way, and that it is more plausible to say that Roberta could form 
her new desire otherwise.  He describes the way that she would generate her new desire 
instrumentally as follows: “she had some such general desire as the desire to relieve 
suffering prior to seeing the film, saw this as an opportunity, and formed the desire to 
relieve this suffering, as part of an Aristotelian practical syllogism” (40).  As Darwall 
says, “this need not be what happened.”   
     Upon reading Darwall’s example, one certainly does not imagine Roberta seeing an 
“opportunity” to satisfy a previously held desire in the plight of the textile workers.  If the 
Humean theory claimed that she regarded the workers’ misfortunes as an opportunity, 
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with the positive attitude that connotes, that would be a serious strike against it.  But that 
is not how the Humean theory that I have constructed would treat it.  Part of the trouble 
here may involve a version of Davidson’s mistake in “Actions, Reasons, Causes” – 
regarding the action, and not the state of affairs it produces, as the object of desire.  
Typically, people acting to relieve suffering desire that others not suffer.  They will be 
satisfied whether or not the suffering is relieved by their own actions, as long as it is 
relieved.  The desire to relieve suffering through one’s actions – a desire that would cause 
one to see the suffering of others as an opportunity, much as someone with a desire to eat 
pizza sees the presence of a pizza as an opportunity – is usually not such a large 
motivational force.18  We can see this in how people concerned about the suffering of 
others are generally quite satisfied to see some third party intercede and alleviate the 
suffering.  Roberta’s case seems like a normal one in this regard, and this has 
implications for how she would feel on discovering that other people were suffering.  The 
new information that people are suffering reduces the subjective probability of desire-
satisfaction rather than increasing it, and this produces unpleasant emotions like shock 
and dismay rather than excitement at the presence of an opportunity.  She desires that 
others not suffer, and that is why she is unhappy at the sight of their suffering rather than 
pleased by an opportunity to engage in an action that she desires to perform.   
     Darwall criticizes the Humean interpretation of Roberta’s desire-formation in another 
way as well.  He says that a desire “includes dispositions to think about its object, to 
                                                
18 Perhaps Darwall merely meant a desire that others not suffer, or more specifically an aversion to others’ 
suffering, when talking about a “desire to relieve suffering”.  And perhaps he did not intend “opportunity” 
to have the positive connotations that it does.  Since the point is worth making, I will go with his actual use 
of the words, and apologize for possibly being uncharitable.   
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inquire into whether there are conditions that enable its realization” (40).  Darwall is right 
to say that desire can make agents think about its object.  This is actually a feature that I 
have built into my account of desire – desire causes us to direct our attention towards 
things we associate with the object, starting with the object itself.  The “inquiring” that 
Darwall talks about can be reduced to a combination of attention-direction towards things 
we associate with the objects of desire and interested thoughts about how to attain these 
objects if our attention happens to settle on a means to our end.  But Darwall intends to 
develop an objection to Humean views including mine out of this.  The objection is 
simple, and goes as follows: if this sort of thought and inquiry is a necessary condition 
for desire, why is thought and inquiry about how to relieve suffering so absent from 
Roberta’s mental life before seeing the film?   
     Here it is important to look at the conditions of Roberta’s upbringing.  Her 
environment, Darwall says, offers her “a congenial view of the world and her place in it” 
(39).  Stimuli that would activate a latent pre-existing desire that others not suffer, then, 
are largely absent from Roberta’s early environment.  Furthermore, it does not seem that 
she is presented with any vivid images of suffering or any reliable plan for how she could 
act to avert it – “She is aware in a vague way that there is poverty and suffering 
somewhere, but sees no relation between it and her life” (39).  In the absence of these 
factors, nothing brings her desire that others not suffer to the forefront of her mind.   
     A parallel to Roberta’s situation may be useful here.  Like most people, I have a 
strong desire that my mother not come to harm.  But this desire does not usually motivate 
me to inquire into means for promoting its realization, and most days pass without my 
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thinking about whether my mother has come to harm or what I could do to prevent 
anything bad from happening to her.  I know that she lives in a safe place, she is healthy, 
and she does not take unnecessary risks, so I believe that the possibility of her coming to 
harm is quite low.  Furthermore, I am not usually presented with vivid images of my 
mother being harmed.  In this, I am like Roberta before she saw the documentary.  While 
my desire (in this case, my aversion to my mother being harmed) is strong, it remains 
latent because there is nothing to activate it.  If something were to change – if I were to 
learn that my mother was in danger, or even if I had a bad dream in which she came to 
harm – my desire would be activated, and it would drive my thoughts.   
     Part of the point of Darwall’s example is that “a person’s motivational capacities, in 
the broadest sense, are not constituted simply by his desires but also by capacities of 
imagination, sensitivity, and so on” (39).  I have argued above that Roberta’s sensitivity 
to suffering is best understood as being at least partially constituted by a pre-existing 
desire that others not suffer.  And I accept that imaginative capacities and other things 
beyond desire play a role in determining how people are motivated.  Desires are 
temporarily strengthened by vivid sensory or imaginative representations of their objects, 
and both belief and desire are necessary for motivation.   
     While imagination, like belief, has a role to play in motivation, it cannot generate new 
motivations without the assistance of pre-existing desires.  In fact, if someone had had a 
completely different set of desires, the same set of sensory and imaginative experiences 
might affect him in exactly the opposite way.  Consider a man – we might call him 
Pinkerton – who lacks Roberta’s desire that others not suffer, and has a little bit of sadism 
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in him as well.  His dislike of working-class people manifests itself in a strong aversion 
to their advancement, and in a desire to see the humiliation and defeat of those who stand 
up against the prevailing economic order.  Watching the movie, he might very well 
despise the textile workers and come to support the brutal and repressive tactics of 
management.  Rather than promoting the boycott, he might inquire after summer 
employment in the South as one of management’s anti-union goons.  This would not be 
because of any failure to appreciate the situation of the textile workers – he may see it in 
his mind just as vividly, and understand the descriptive features of the situation just as 
well as Roberta does.  But the things he perceives will motivate him in a radically 
different way than they motivate Roberta, since his desires are dramatically different 
from hers.19   
     After spending so long on Darwall’s example, it is time to make some general remarks 
about how a counterexample to the Humean theory of motivation would have to go.  It is 
entirely compatible with the Humean theory that an agent who never previously felt the 
effects of some desire can be moved to action by forming a new belief.  To develop a 
counterexample to the Humean theory, one must offer evidence that desires were not 
present in advance.  Darwall attempts to do this, but does not succeed because the 
situation he describes is set up so as not to trigger any of the activating conditions under 
which the desire would have its characteristic effects.  So the fact that Roberta’s desire 
                                                
19 I use the example of Pinkerton to argue against a particular anti-Humean view on 
which motivation can be generated by processes of reasoning that begin with no desires, 
but with the imagination.  Anti-Humeans who agree with me that imagination cannot play 
such a role in motivation are entitled to replace desire in the above example with 
whatever mental states they regard as motivationally efficacious.   
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does not display any effects is not a clear sign of its absence.  To develop a 
counterexample to the Humean theory, one would have to show the desire’s antecedent 
absence by producing a case in which the activating conditions were achieved, but no 
effects were seen.   
     Such cases, I maintain, are not conceptually impossible.  I presented such a case in the 
previous chapter – the case of the Angels.  They did not display the characteristic effects 
of desire before they engaged in reasoning that brought them to new desires.  When, prior 
to reasoning, they imagined counterfactual states of affairs in which they performed a 
particular right action, they felt no pleasure.  It was only after reasoning their way to a 
new desire to perform some right action that imagining counterfactual states of affairs in 
which they do such an action would give them pleasure.  If humans are like this, then the 
Humean theory of motivation will not accurately describe their behavior.  My contention, 
as a defender of the contingent Humean theory, is that examples like those of the Angels 
are located outside the realm of human psychological possibility.   
 
Scanlon, Desire, and Deliberation 
     In the first chapter of What We Owe To Each Other, Thomas Scanlon offers a new 
account of desire, and two criticisms of the Humean theory – first, that it cannot explain 
cases in which people act despite “having no desire” to do something, and second, that it 
cannot adequately explain the structure of deliberation in cases in which agents “bracket” 
some of their options.  My response in the first case will be familiar from the discussion 
of obligation – agents who act despite reporting “no desire” to do something are merely 
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reporting a lack of positive desire, and are motivated by aversion.  In cases of bracketing, 
deliberation is actually structured by an antecedent higher-order desire.  In both of these 
cases, the pleasure and displeasure that agents feel in the course of deliberation are best 
explained by the Humean theory.   
     Scanlon offers an account of “desire in the directed-attention sense.  A person has a 
desire in the directed-attention sense that P if the thought of P keeps occurring to him in a 
favorable light, that is to say, if the person’s attention is directed insistently toward 
considerations that present themselves as counting in favor of P” (39).  This account has 
several things in common with mine.  Most obviously, Scanlon regards desire as capable 
of directing an agent’s attention, while my view posits an attention-direction aspect of 
desire.  One might also regard my hedonic aspect of desire as a way of cashing out how 
things an agent desires appear to her in a “favorable light.”  Scanlon, of course, cashes 
out “favorable light” in different terms.  But since I hold that desire can focus an agent’s 
attention on things strongly associated with the object of desire, the particular things that 
count in favor of it will certainly be among the things that attract the agent’s attention.   
     Scanlon and I differ in that he does not regard desires as the motivational forces 
driving all actions.  While he accepts that some urge to act is involved in all cases of 
motivation, he does not think that desire in the directed-attention sense is always 
involved.  On his view, “it is not the case that whenever a person is moved to act he or 
she has a desire in this sense: we often do things that we ‘have no desire to do’ in the 
ordinary sense, and ‘desire in the directed-attention sense’ tracks the ordinary notion in 
this respect.”  In making this claim, Scanlon goes further than Darwall, Nagel, and 
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McDowell, who accepted DBTA while denying DODI.  Of course, there is plenty of 
substantive agreement between all of these opponents of the Humean theory.  The 
difference is only that Scanlon’s stronger notion of desire prevents him from seeing a 
desire in every case of motivation.  Much like Schueler when he talks about “desires 
proper”, Scanlon can be regarded as rejecting DBTA.   
     On Scanlon’s own view, motivation is explained not by desire-belief pairs, but by the 
fact that an agent takes particular things to constitute reasons for action.  Even in cases 
when an agent has a desire and acts accordingly, “what supplies the motive for this action 
is the agent’s perception of some consideration as a reason, not some additional element 
of ‘desire’” (40-41).   
     Scanlon offers a case in which someone acts despite having “no desire to do” 
something – a case where “one must tell a friend some unwelcome news” (39).  In this 
case, he says, the characteristic features of desire in the directed-attention sense are 
missing.  It is not hard to see the phenomena that he is pointing to.  When one has to tell a 
friend some bad news, the thought of doing so does not keep occurring to one in a 
favorable light.  One is displeased at the prospect of having to bear the bad news, and 
one’s attention focuses more on how upset the friend will be rather than on the positive 
aspects of his knowing the truth. 
     To deal with this case, we need to note that the predominant motivational factors in 
the case are not positive desires, but aversions.  While positive desires direct an agent’s 
attention towards things associated with what she wants, aversions direct an agent’s 
desire toward things associated with the object of aversion – in other words, what she 
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does not want.  The motivational forces in play in Scanlon’s case are most likely a pair of 
conflicting aversions.  The agent may have an aversion to her friend being in the dark 
about the bad news (though depending on the case, it may be an aversion to bad 
consequences befalling the friend because he acts without knowledge of the bad news), 
and also an aversion to the friend’s being unhappy.  After the agent decides that she is 
going tell her friend, she focuses on the unpleasant duty before her, and the negative 
aspects of what she has to do loom large in her mind.   
     This is generally what it is like when we are faced with two options that we are averse 
to, and we have to choose the lesser evil.  Acting, in these cases, is unpleasant, as things 
we associate with the object of our aversions are often close at hand when we act, and 
inflame the violence of the aversive passion.  To overcome the unpleasantness that they 
feel in these cases, people sometimes choose to focus their attention on their freedom 
from the even worse consequences that they have chosen to avoid, and draw some relief 
from that.  This does not occur in the automatic way that desire causes attention to focus 
on things associated with its objects, but as an intentional decision of the agent to look on 
the bright side. 
     If this is a sort of case that the Humean theory gets right, why do people often say in 
these cases that they have no desire to do the thing in question, or that they are doing 
what they do not want to do?  The answer lies in the fact that “desire” and “want” are 
often used only to refer to what I have been calling “positive desire”.  I have departed 
from this use of “desire” in including aversions among the category of desires.  Positive 
desire and aversion have enough in common that it makes sense to bring them both under 
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one term for the purposes of constructing a theory that explains action.  They have many 
similar psychological effects which I discussed in the previous chapter, from their ability 
to motivate action, to their connections to pleasure and displeasure, to the fact that they 
can be intensified by vivid images that are associated with their objects.  There are, 
however, slight differences in the emotions associated with them and in the particular 
way that they direct our attention.  Positive desires direct our attention more towards the 
states of affairs that we act to obtain, while aversions direct our attention more towards 
the states of affairs that we act to avoid.   
     While the hedonic aspect of desire allows the Humean theory to neatly explain the 
unpleasantness of telling a friend some unwelcome news in terms of the vivid 
representations of a friend’s unhappiness, it is hard to see how Scanlon’s theory can do so 
in a similarly economical way.  Why would seeing a reason to act and acting on it be 
unpleasant?  Cases like this, then, are more fully explained by the Humean theory than by 
anti-Humean views like Scanlon’s.   
     Now I will turn to a second criticism Scanlon makes of Humean views.  Noting that 
desires are normally understood as having particular weights and focusing on particular 
objects, he says that the Humean view casts rational decision-making as “a matter of 
balancing the strengths of competing desires.  If we take desires, along with beliefs, as 
the basic element of practical thinking, then this idea of balancing competing desires will 
seem to be the general form of decision-making” (50).  Scanlon later says that “reasons 
for belief do not have the simple structure that the desire model of practical reasoning 
describes: they do not simply count for a certain belief with a certain weight, and 
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deciding what to believe is not in general simply a matter of balancing such weights” and 
that “reasons for action, intention, and other attitudes exhibit a similarly complex 
structure” (52).  This adds up to an objection to the Humean view.  Scanlon claims that 
Humeans are committed to regarding the weighing of competing desires against one 
another as the process by which rational decisions are made, and that this is not always 
the process by which we make rational decisions about action.   
     Scanlon gives an example of a kind of decision in which more complex structures than 
the weighing of competing desires are involved.  He points out that many decisions 
“involve bracketing the reason-giving force of some of your own interests which might 
otherwise be quite relevant and legitimate reasons for acting in one way rather than 
another” (52).  Scanlon does not see how a Humean theory can explain our ability to do 
this.  A decision in which we bracket some of our reasons is a decision in which we do 
not weigh all of them.  If the Humean theory is committed to presenting every rational 
decision as one in which we weigh all our desires for the options against each other and 
choose the option that is preferred by a preponderance of our desires, it will not be able to 
explain the fact that we sometimes engage in this sort of bracketing.   
     I agree with Scanlon that rational decision-making is not always just a matter of 
balancing the weights of all of our desires.  Certainly, this is not how our experiences 
present the experience of decision-making – we sometimes feel that we are able to 
intentionally exclude some interest of ours from the weighing.  What I want to show is 
that the Humean theory is not actually committed to regarding the weighing of all our 
desires as being the whole story about rational decision-making, and that it can explain 
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why we often make decisions in a way where we do not weigh all the available options.  
So I will deal with an example of bracketing that Scanlon raises and show how the 
Humean theory can deal with it.   
     This brings me to Scanlon’s example.20  It involves the chair of a philosophy 
department who has strong personal interests at stake in some decision he is making.  He 
may put those interests aside in his deliberation and make his decision based on what is 
good for his department.  This chair does not weigh his personal interests against the 
interests of the department every time he makes a decision.  A model that attributed this 
kind of weighing to him might explain his behavior reasonably well, but it would not be 
accurate to the phenomenology.  He does not have the experience of weighing, but rather 
the experience of working towards a goal while he passes by attractive considerations 
towards which he will not turn.  He will notice when he is making a decision that 
contradicts his personal interests, and he will probably feel chagrined about this.  But he 
is committed to making his decision in the best interests of the department, and he might 
never seriously think about whether to make decisions based on his personal interests and 
against the department’s interests. 
     How would the Humean theory explain how the chair makes his decision?  The story 
should begin with the chair’s antecedent desires about how his decision is to be 
conducted.  Perhaps he forms a desire to act only in the best interests of his department.  
                                                
20 Scanlon actually spends more time developing a different example of bracketing.  In this example, he 
decides whether or not he should play to win in a tennis match.  Playing to win would involve bracketing 
considerations about his opponent’s unhappiness at losing.  I do not deal with that example, however, 
because it seems to me that when the agent decides “that it might be all right either to play to win or not to 
do so” nothing actually gets bracketed.  I do not understand why Scanlon chose to run the example that 
way.   
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There are several ways in which this desire could be formed, and many of them follow 
the familiar Humean pattern in which belief-desire combinations generate instrumental 
desires.  His desire may be formed by a process of considering how he generally ought to 
make decisions, feeling the weights of his initial desires, and being motivated to act in the 
department’s interests by the preponderance of these.  If an aversion to selfish behavior 
by those in power and his desire to be a good chair are the strongest, these desires will 
drive the formation of the desire that structures his decision.  (In an example of how 
imaginative representations of a state of affairs can increase the violence of a desire, the 
fact that he is thinking of decision procedures and not the personal benefits of selfish 
action will help keep his selfish desires from becoming violent, while his desire for 
above-board decision-making may become more violent.)  Or, when he first considers the 
question of how he should make his decision, his aversion to selfish behavior by people 
in official capacities may be strong enough that he goes right to forming his desire 
without seriously weighing the possibility of making his decision in some other way.  
Either way, it is not necessary for his antecedent desire to specifically include the 
decision before him in its content, or to be formed with this decision in mind.  It could be 
that he long ago formed a desire to make official decisions, or generally to act, in some 
way that suggests that he should consider only his department’s interests when making 
this decision.   
     Having formed this desire and having the capacity for introspection, the chair will be 
aware that he wants to act only in the best interests of the department.  And if his desire is 
sufficiently firm, it will be rational for him to believe that he is going to act in the best 
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interests of his department, at least when he is acting in an official capacity.  We usually 
form beliefs like these about our future actions when we form sufficiently strong desires 
to act in particular ways, on matters that are within our control.   
     If the chair comes to his decision with a firm antecedent desire to act only in the best 
interests of the department, and with the belief that he will act in the best interests of his 
department, he will be able to bracket some of the considerations when he makes his 
decision.  Desiring to act only in his department’s best interests, he initially focuses on 
the aspects of the decision that relate to the department’s interests.  But at some point 
during the decision-making process, he notices that some other thing that he personally 
desires is at stake.  This interest may attract his attention, as the things we desire often do.  
But rather than weighing it with everything else, he will regard its object as being 
unavailable to him.  This is why conscientious people often say of certain immoral or 
inappropriate actions that they “couldn’t do something like that.”  It is not that they are 
physically incapable of performing these actions – they just feel that their desires about 
how their decisions should go make these actions impossible for them.  In this sense, 
deciding on the basis of personal considerations is something that the chair just cannot 
do.  While things we have some desire for sometimes look impossible to us because we 
know that physical barriers prevent us from attaining them, we may also know that our 
motivational architecture will not allow us to pursue them.   
     Scanlon anticipates a Humean response that is like mine.  According to this response, 
it is the agent’s second-order desires that are responsible for the way that bracketing goes.  
On my explanation, bracketing is driven by the agent’s second-order volitions – his 
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desires that a particular desire or set of desires be effective in moving him to action.  
(Acting in the best interests of his department, as I have been understanding it, is acting 
in a way that is motivated by the desire for his department to do well, so the desire to act 
in the best interests of his department is a second-order volition.)  Scanlon objects that 
second-order desires lack the authority to structure deliberation: 
But if second-order desires are really desires, then there is the question of how 
their second-order character, if it is just a difference in the objects of these desires, 
can give them the kind of authority that is involved when one reason supports the 
judgment that another putative reason is in fact irrelevant.  My desire to be a 
person who does not let considerations of personal interest influence his decisions 
as department chair conflicts in the practical sense with my desire, in this case, to 
do what will make my life easier.  I cannot act in a way that will satisfy both of 
these desires at once.  But they are just two desires that conflict with each other.  
The introduction of second-order desires therefore does not do justice to our sense 
that there is a deeper conflict, expressed in the judgment that the reason 
represented by the latter desire is not relevant. 
 
Scanlon’s point here is familiar from Gary Watson’s response to Harry Frankfurt’s 
account of free will.  Why should we suppose that a desire’s being higher-order gives it 
any sort of authority over lower-order desires?   
     It is not clear, however, why the issue of bracketing needs to be cast as a matter of 
authority.  As I have presented the issue, higher-order volitions generate the phenomenon 
of bracketing because of their content, their power, and our introspective awareness of 
their power.  They have no greater authority than lower-order volitions, and they do not 
need any greater authority to structure deliberation.  Perhaps Scanlon would want to 
buttress his point by putting the issue of bracketing in terms of which considerations the 
agent is permitted to weigh in his decision-making.  The language of permission, 
certainly, suggests that an authority is involved to grant the permission.  And the 
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displeasure we feel with ourselves when we think about acting on a bracketed-off 
consideration (for example, the way that the chair would feel if he imagined acting 
selfishly) might be taken as a sign of the acknowledged impermissibility of acting in this 
way.   
     But the Humean account that I have presented can explain all of this in terms that do 
not involve authority.  When we consider acting on a bracketed-off consideration, we are 
thinking about acting so that the antecedent desire that structured our bracketing is not 
satisfied.  These thoughts are often unpleasant, as the previous chapter’s discussion of the 
hedonic aspect of desire would suggest.  And if the antecedent desire is a second-order 
volition whose object involves our own actions, our unhappiness will be unhappiness 
with ourselves.   
     The way that the Humean theory deals with the case of bracketing supports the point 
that Nietzsche makes in Daybreak 109 – strong higher-order desires are often capable of 
structuring deliberation, and authority has nothing to do with it.  More generally, it is a 
case that shows us the explanatory power of the Humean theory.  The way bracketed-off 
options look to us – both in their seeming inaccessibility, and in the displeasure we feel 
when we imagine being the unsavory characters who could pursue them – are continuous 
with the way that our desires shape our thoughts in simpler cases.  Bracketed-off options 
look like things we desire that we know we cannot get.  Thoughts of being bad enough to 
pursue them cause displeasure, as thoughts of situations we are averse to generally do.  It 
is deep continuities like these between the simple and complex cases of deliberation that 
  155 
make clear the driving role of desire in the complex cases, and give us reason to accept 
the Humean theory of motivation.   
 
Searle, Freedom of the Will, and “The Gap” 
     One of John Searle’s major contentions in Rationality in Action is that belief-desire 
pairs are not causally sufficient for a large number of our actions – in particular, our 
rational actions.  According to Searle, “the cases of actions for which the antecedent 
beliefs and desires really are causally sufficient, far from being models of rationality, are 
in fact bizarre and typically irrational cases” (12).  He tries to support this claim with 
neuroscientific evidence and by claiming that we cannot regard ourselves as genuine 
agents if we are only moved by belief-desire pairs.  I will defend the Humean theory by 
showing that his neuroscientific evidence does not support the conclusion that he thinks it 
does, and a proper understanding of the self will reveal belief-desire pairs to be sufficient 
for genuine agency.   
      As an example of action caused by the agent’s belief-desire pairs, Searle offers the 
case of the heroin addict whose overpowering urge to take his drug compels him to do so 
even as he judges that he should not.  By contrast,  
In the normal case of rational action, we have to presuppose that the antecedent 
set of beliefs and desires is not causally sufficient to determine the action.  This is 
a presupposition of the process of deliberation and is absolutely indispensable for 
the application of rationality.  We presuppose that there is a gap between the 
“causes” of the action in the form of beliefs and desires and the “effect” in the 
form of the action.  This gap has a traditional name.  It is called “the freedom of 
the will” (13).     
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According to Searle, the vast majority of actions are caused not only by the agent’s pre-
existing beliefs and desires, but also by free will.  That the agent wills one action or 
another is not causally determined by facts about the agent’s antecedent psychological 
states.  On Searle’s view, antecedent facts about the agent’s psychology are not sufficient 
to determine the way in which her free will is exercised.   
     According to Searle, we have experiences of freedom of the will in the phenomenon 
of the “gap”.   
The gap can be given two equivalent descriptions, one forward-looking, one 
backward.  Forward: the gap is that feature of our conscious decision-making and 
acting where we sense alternative future decisions and actions as causally open to 
us.  Backward: the gap is that feature of conscious decision-making and acting 
whereby the reasons preceding the decisions and the actions are not experienced 
by the agent as setting causally sufficient conditions for the decisions and actions.  
(62) 
 
I will use Searle’s terminology for the experience that he refers to in using the phrase “the 
gap.”  In doing this, I should not be regarded as agreeing that the representational content 
of this experience is exactly as Searle characterizes it.  While the “Forward” description 
seems like an apt description of some part of our experience of action, there is reason to 
doubt whether the “Backward” description correctly characterizes the content of the 
experience. 
     It is important to note that the “Forward” and “Backward” descriptions of the 
representational content of our experiences of the gap are not equivalent to each other.  
On its most natural reading, the Forward description is consistent with the possibility that 
the agent’s future decisions and actions are causally determined by the agent’s beliefs and 
desires, and that the agent is reducible at least in part to these psychological states.  Then, 
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even though our beliefs and desires causally determine our actions, our actions might be 
“causally open to us” in a way that a compatibilist account of free will would support.  If 
we desired otherwise, we could do otherwise, and the causal determination of our actions 
by our pre-existing beliefs and desires would not prevent our futures from being 
“causally open to us,” at least if the last two words of the phrase “causally open to us” are 
taken seriously.  The Backward description, however, excludes this compatibilist 
possibility.  It contains the stipulation that the agent’s antecedent psychological states 
cannot constitute causally sufficient conditions.   
     To help us see what the gap is, Searle describes an experiment conducted by Wilder 
Penfield, in which Penfield stimulated the motor cortexes of his patients with a 
microelectrode and caused them to make various bodily movements.  When asked, the 
patients denied that the bodily movements counted as their actions, saying “I did not do 
that, you did it” (64).  Searle says that “the patient’s experience, for example, of having 
his arm raised by Penfield’s stimulation of the brain is quite different from his experience 
of voluntarily raising his arm” (64).  In the cases where Penfield stimulates the patient, 
the patient observes his arm moving, while in the normal case, the patient makes the 
movement happen.  It is at least some part of the difference between the two cases that in 
the normal cases, the patient does not regard the motions as causally open to him.  No 
matter what he wishes, they will occur anyway.   
     If this example is merely meant to help us get clear on the component of our 
phenomenology that Searle is calling “the gap”, there is no reason to quarrel with it.  But 
it seems that Searle wants the example to do another kind of work as well.  He concludes 
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the paragraph where he describes Penfield’s experiment with a description of what 
happens in the normal case when someone raises his arm.  “First, I cause the bodily 
movement by trying to raise my arm.  The trying is sufficient to cause the arm to move; 
but second, the reasons for the action are not sufficient causes to force the trying” (64).  
Searle is trying to use the causal sufficiency of motor cortex stimulation for motion that is 
not action in the Penfield case to argue for the causal insufficiency of our antecedent 
psychological states for action in the normal case.   
     Penfield’s experiment, however, does not show or in any way suggest that this is how 
the normal case goes.  Motor cortex stimulation is not the sort of thing that gives agents 
new reasons to act.  This is true even on a Humean theory where motivating reasons are 
constituted by the agent’s desires and beliefs.  Stimulating an agent’s motor cortex would 
not cause her to desire or believe anything new.  So if motions caused by motor cortex 
stimulation are not regarded as actions by the people who make them, that has no bearing 
on the truth of the Humean theory of motivation.     
     Tim Schroeder’s work on the neuroscience of desire bears this out.21  The VTA/SNPC, 
where Schroeder says that desire is realized, is neurobiologically far upstream from the 
motor cortex.  While the route by which desire causes action goes through the motor 
cortex, one cannot give the agent a new desire by doing things to the motor cortex, just as 
one cannot give the agent a new desire by doing things to the spinal cord.  Stimulation of 
the motor cortex will not have many of the effects that desire necessarily or actually does 
                                                
21 Three Faces of Desire (2004) and “Moral Responsibility and Tourette Syndrome,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, July 2005. 
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– for example, it will not generate the counterfactual connections to pleasure that are 
necessary for desire, or the direction of attention that is contingently part of it.  All it will 
do is cause motion.  So Searle should not claim that the subjects in Penfield’s experiment 
acted because of their beliefs and desires, and that only volition was missing.  (From 
what Searle writes, it is not clear whether he intends to make this claim or not.  While he 
does not explicitly endorse this claim, his argument from the Penfield experiment to the 
insufficiency of desires and beliefs for action depends on it.)  Penfield’s experiment does 
not involve any of the agent’s beliefs or desires, and thus is no more interesting in the 
debate between Searle and the Humeans than a case where the experimenter grabs the 
patient’s arm and lifts it.  Neither party to the debate would consider that a case of action, 
and neither party is committed to saying that Penfield’s experiments involve action 
either.   
     Searle considers the position that our experiences of the gap are illusory, and that our 
antecedent psychological states are sufficient causes of action despite the fact that it 
seems to us, when we act, as if multiple alternative possibilities are open to us.  Against 
this position, he claims that “we have to presuppose that there really is a gap, that the 
phenomenology corresponds to a reality, whenever we engage in choosing and deciding, 
and we cannot give up choosing and deciding” (71).  According to Searle, there is a 
“practical inconsistency” in holding both of the following theses: 
1. I am now trying to make up my mind whom to vote for in the next election.   
 
2. I take the existing psychological causes operating on me now to be causally 
sufficient to determine whom I am going to vote for.   
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The idea is that sincere belief in (2) would make the effort in (1) unnecessary.  Searle 
thinks that someone who genuinely believed (2) would, rather than acting, sit back and let 
the existing psychological causes move him.   
     One only sees a “practical inconsistency” between (1) and (2) if one has an antecedent 
commitment to Searle’s view that the agent is irreducible to his psychological states.  If 
one assumes that the agent is separate from the psychological causes of his actions, it 
looks curious that the agent is trying to accomplish something that is already going to be 
accomplished no matter what by his psychological states.  There may be something 
irrational about acting to bring about some state of affairs that you know will occur 
whether you act or not.  If the agent is distinguished from his psychological states, and 
only the operations of the former are regarded as actions, that is how actively deciding 
how to vote in this situation will look.   
     But a Humean picture on which the agent is reducible to his psychological states 
makes this problem fall away.  Consider what would actually happen with an agent who 
decided to just sit back and let his psychological states move him.  At some point, when it 
came time to act, his beliefs and desires would take over, and he would make his 
decision.  If the Humeans are right about how beliefs and desires contribute to action, this 
would be an action like any other, caused by beliefs and desires as actions always are.  
Perhaps an hour before the polls closed, he would be reminded of the election by the 
television news and realize that time was running out.  His desire to vote for the better 
candidate would become occurrent, and the possibility of missing the election entirely 
might make him feel anxious about the fact that he had not yet voted.  His desire to vote 
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for the better candidate would cause him to direct his attention to things relevant to its 
object, like the candidates’ policy positions.  Scrutinizing these policy positions, he 
would come to realizations about which candidate he agreed with on more issues.  Seeing 
this, he would know who to vote for, and form an intention to vote for that person.   
     At some point in this process, his belief in (2) would cease to be occurrent, because he 
would be busy thinking about how to vote in the election.  But there is no reason to think 
he would cease to have the belief in dispositional form at any point during the process, 
accept anything that contradicted it, or find himself acting to bring about a situation that 
will come about whether he acts or not.  For him to choose and act is simply for his 
psychological states to operate in their usual choice-driving and action-causing way.   
     Some of Searle’s arguments against Humean accounts of the nature of the self are 
independent of his view that our experiences of the gap correctly represent our free will.  
These arguments deal in large part with the semantics of action-explanations.  Since these 
arguments do not have anything to do with the nature of desire, the particular 
psychological states that cause action, or the phenomenology of deliberation, I will not 
consider them here.   
     Searle does, however, seem to think that our experiences of the gap provide us with 
sufficient reason to accept non-Humean accounts of the self.  As he says in a fully 
italicized sentence, “The intelligibility of our operation in the gap requires an irreducible 
notion of the self” (74).  It is this claim that I have argued against.  While we do have 
experiences of the gap according to the Forward description – experiences where our 
future decisions seem causally open to us – explaining these experiences and the 
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decisions that we eventually make does not require an irreducible notion of the self, or 
even require the agent to accept one.  Neither do our experiences support any claims 
about the causal insufficiency of our antecedent psychological states for action.   
 
Searle on Akrasia 
     Searle argues that Humean theories, and all theories on which an agent’s 
psychological states are sufficient to explain action, will have difficulty in explaining 
how an agent can be susceptible to akrasia.  In cases of akrasia, an agent’s judgment 
about what to do differs from how she acts, even at the moment of action.  I will argue 
that Searle’s account of akrasia is unsuccessful, and that a Humean account invoking the 
violence of desires stimulated by vivid sensory or imaginative representations will be 
provide a better explanation.   
     In cases of akrasia, an agent’s judgment about what to do differs from how she acts, 
even at the moment of action.  Searle focuses on criticizing Davidson’s account of 
weakness of will, which he regards as part of “a long tradition in philosophy according to 
which in the case of rational action, if the psychological antecedents of the act are all in 
order, that is, if they are the right kind of desires, intentions, value judgments, etc., then 
the act must necessarily follow.  According to some authors it is even an analytic truth 
that the act will follow” (220).  This is the same class of views he was criticizing in his 
discussion of the gap, and Humean theories fall within the scope of his criticism.   
     The problem Searle finds with these views is that in tying judgment and action too 
tightly to their psychological antecedents, they make it impossible to see how judgment 
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and action can come apart.  On Searle’s own view, the mental states that lead an agent to 
form an intention (which he takes to be the mental state of judgment in a case of akrasia) 
are not causally sufficient for rational action.  There is “a gap, a certain amount of slack 
between the process of deliberation and the formation of an intention, and there is another 
gap between the intention and the actual undertaking” (231).  These gaps are the places 
where the agent’s free will comes in and determines what the agent will intend, or what 
the agent will do.   
     Searle offers a description of “one way in which akrasia typically arises”: 
As a result of deliberation we form an intention.  But since at all times we have an 
indefinite range of choices available to us, when the moment comes to act on the 
intention several of the other choices may be attractive, or motivated on other 
grounds.  For many of the actions that we do for a reason, there are reasons for 
not doing that action but doing something else instead.  Sometimes we act on 
those reasons and not on our original intention.  The solution to the problem of 
akrasia is as simple as that: we almost never have just one choice open to us.  
Regardless of a particular resolve, other options continue to be attractive. (233-
234)   
 
Searle’s solution to the problem of akrasia is to posit a gap between intention and action 
in which the agent’s free will determines whether she acts.  According to Searle, an 
antecedent psychological state of intending is not sufficient to determine whether the 
agent will act, since agents sometimes act against their intentions as an act of free will.  
We have an experience of the gap in forming intentions, and an experience of the gap in 
determining whether to act on our intentions.  These experiences of the gap mark points 
at which our free will is active – first in the formation of our intentions, and then in our 
decisions to act on our intentions.  It is the latter gap that allows us to contradict our 
intentions in akratic action.   
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     But if there is a problem that this account solves, it is not the problem of akrasia.  The 
problem is not merely that we sometimes fail to act on our original intentions because 
other choices look attractive to us.  The problem is about the unusual psychological 
processes that are implicated in this failure.  We hold fast to our original judgments about 
what sort of action to perform, affirming them even as we do something else.  What 
needs to be explained in explaining akrasia is that our judgments about what to do – 
which so often run in the same direction as our actions – are somehow overridden 
without being revised.  Searle’s view fails to explain why akrasia differs at all from 
normal cases in which an agent changes her mind at the last moment and decides to do 
something she did not plan to do before.   
       The description of the heroin addict who compulsively takes his drug, which Searle 
presents early in his book and which I referenced in the previous section, suggests an 
alternative way in which he could deal with akrasia.  Searle regards the case of the heroin 
addict as an unusual one in which the addict’s psychological states are causally sufficient 
for the performance of the action.  If Searle had made his account of akrasia generally 
look like this, with the motivational force of the agent’s psychological states 
overwhelming the force of the agent’s will, he would have an explanation of why akrasia 
is different from changing your mind at the last moment.  The psychological states would 
control the agent’s behavior, while free will would control the agent’s judgment.  If the 
phenomenology of will-driven action was distinguished from the phenomenology of 
having one’s action determined by antecedent psychological states, the experience of 
akratic action could be explained.  There would still be a question of why the akratic 
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agent’s will failed in this case while it succeeds in others, and the account would be less 
simple than Humean views are because it invoked the additional motivational force of 
free volition, but the view would address the problem.  The actual position of Searle’s 
seventh chapter, by contrast, does not even address the real problem of akrasia.   
     Having shown that Searle’s proposed solution will not deal with akrasia, I will now 
offer a Humean solution.  In doing this, I will rely mainly on facts about desire that I 
presented in the previous chapter.  I hope to show that the issue of akrasia is not a 
weakness for the Humean theory, but a strength.  Once we understand how the Humean 
theory describes desire’s interactions with other mental states, we will be able to see why 
we act akratically in the cases where we do, and why weakness of will feels the way it 
does.   
     I will begin with two ordinary cases of weakness of will. First, a case of akrasia at 
bedtime.  I am watching television and I realize that it is 2 AM.  I am tired, and I know 
that I really should go to bed.  Tomorrow morning the Formal Epistemology Workshop 
begins, and I would like to attend as much of it as possible so I can learn something about 
formal epistemology.  But the exciting sports highlights on the screen and the amusing 
commentary of the SportsCenter announcers have me in their grip, and even as I tell 
myself that I really should go to sleep, I stay where I am and keep watching television for 
another hour.   
     Akrasia strikes again at 8 in the morning, after my alarm clock wakes me up.  
Thinking of the workshop, I realize that I should get out of bed and go there.  But my bed 
is warm and soft, and I am still tired, as the previous night’s weak-willed television 
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watching prevented me from getting enough sleep to feel fully refreshed.  So I lie there 
comfortably, knowing that I will end up missing the opening session as a result.   
     Both of these cases – and, I think, all cases of akrasia – have some common features.  
The agent is torn between two different desires, and her environment is such that she has 
vivid sensory or imaginative representations that relate to the object of one desire.  At the 
same time, she believes that the object of the other desire is in jeopardy, but does not 
have similarly vivid sensory or imaginative representations relating to it.  The vivid 
sensory and imaginative representations, as Hume would say, increase the violence of the 
passion whose object they represent.  This gives that passion more motivational force and 
causes significantly more violent emotions.  But it does not do quite as much for the 
violent passion’s ability to control the way that the agent directs her attention to various 
possibilities as she makes her judgment about what she ought to do.  Though her calm 
passion is too weak to overpower the violent passion and determine her behavior, the 
calm passion is still able to determine the course of her reflection.  As I discussed in the 
previous chapter, vivid images are especially powerful in increasing the motivational and 
emotional force of a passion, but they do not give an equal boost on all of the passion’s 
effects.  The agent’s reflection and judgment are dominated by one desire, while her 
behavior is dominated by the other, and this is why reflective judgment and behavior 
come apart in cases of weakness of will. 
     Searle was wrong to treat action against a prior intention as the whole of akrasia, but 
it is an interesting fact about akratic action that it often involves acting in a way that 
contradicts one’s prior intentions.  My account explains why this is so often the case.  
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Away from the TV or the comforts of my bed, I am not faced by the vivid images that 
would activate and excite the desires that eventually drive my akratic actions.  So in the 
calm hours of the afternoon, when I plan my evenings and my mornings, my desire to 
watch more TV and my desire to stay in bed operate at a lower strength than they would 
if I were presented with vivid images of television or the feeling of my bed.  As a result, I 
do not make prior plans to watch TV late at night or stay long in bed.  But when actually 
presented with these sensory experiences, the desires that drive my actions become more 
violent and control my behavior even as my judgment favors another course of action.   
     This account also explains why cases of akrasia often involve agents acting to attain 
sensory pleasures, even as they judge against doing so.  It is much rarer for agents to 
akratically pass up a sensory or physical pleasure in favor of a more abstract or remote 
satisfaction.  If the object of some desire is itself a sensory experience itself (as the 
experience of a warm and comfortable bed is, especially on a chilly morning) it will 
register vividly in sensation and imagination, increasing the violence of the desires that 
are directed towards it.  This will make that desire more capable of driving akratic 
behavior.   
     Now I will consider an objection to my proposal, which threatens to drive a wedge 
between Humeans about motivation and Humeans about practical rationality.22  It is an 
objection that Christine Korsgaard advances against this combination of Humean views 
in “The Normativity of Instrumental Rationality”: 
                                                
22 By calling this view the “Humean theory of practical rationality”, I do not mean to assert that it is the 
view that Hume himself actually held.  Elijah Millgram’s “Was Hume a Humean?” provides interesting 
arguments that Hume might have thought otherwise.   
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Hume identifies a person’s end as what he wants most, and the criterion of what 
the person wants most appears to be what he actually does.  The person’s ends are 
taken to be revealed in his conduct.  If we don’t make a distinction between what 
a person’s end is and what he actually pursues, it will be impossible to find a case 
in which he violates the instrumental principle.  (230)  
 
Korsgaard offers a general criticism of theories – like the Humean theory of practical 
rationality when combined with the Humean theory of motivation – that present us as 
guided by norms that we cannot violate: “how can you be guided by a principle when 
anything you do counts as following it?” (229) 
     Akrasia provides a case where the force of Korsgaard’s argument becomes clear.  If 
akrasia occurs when vivid representations make one desire strong enough to drive 
behavior, then it seems that akratic action is just another case where the agent acts on her 
strongest desire.  And if the Humean theory of practical rationality is correct, acting on 
one’s strongest desire (at least in cases where only two desires are relevant to the 
situation, and we are certain of getting what we choose) will be rational.  So this 
combination of Humean theories implies that akratic actions are rational.  But this is 
deeply counterintuitive – akratic actions are supposed to be among the paradigm cases of 
irrationality.  So it seems that my account of akrasia, when paired with a theory of 
practical rationality preferred by many people who are also Humeans about motivation, 
will make paradigmatically irrational behavior look rational.   
     The key to answering this objection is to see that a Humean theory of practical 
rationality need not – and should not – run along exactly the same lines as the Humean 
theory of motivation.  There are ways to build a Humean theory of practical rationality 
that sometimes endorses different actions than those predicted by the Humean theory of 
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motivation.  For example, in looking at desire strengths to determine which action is 
rational, one might only take into account the strengths of desires under conditions where 
the agent is presented with equally vivid representations of the various things she desires.  
Then the fact that my desire to stay in bed is temporarily stronger than my desire to teach 
well, merely because its object is more vividly represented at the time, would not make it 
rational to stay in bed.  To determine the rationality of staying in bed, however, we 
should not look at how strong the desires were at that particular moment.  Instead, we 
should consider how things looked when the images associated with both desires were 
equally distant from me – perhaps, the way they looked the previous afternoon as I made 
my plans for the next day.  Different actions would be endorsed by a Humean theory of 
practical rationality that worked with desires under conditions of equally vivid 
information than those predicted by the Humean theory of motivation as I have spelled it 
out.  This would leave room for agents to act irrationally.  A theory of practical 
rationality that calculated the rationality of actions by looking at desires under conditions 
of equally vivid imagination would still be distinctively Humean, as its judgments of 
actions would be grounded in the agent’s desires and means-end beliefs.   
     This combination of Humean theories accords with our pretheoretical judgments about 
how common rational action is.  It accounts for the truth of our pretheoretical belief that 
people act irrationally only in a minority of cases, since the general kinds of mental states 
that explain action – desires and means-end beliefs – are the same ones that justify it.  
The process by which these psychological states cause actions is geared towards 
producing rational actions, most of the time.  But there is room for irrationality, in cases 
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where one of the desires has become violent because of a vivid sensory or imaginative 
representation of a desired object (and perhaps in other cases as well).  Thus the theory 
can also explain the truth of our pretheoretical belief that people sometimes act 
irrationally.  
     This way of setting up the Humean theory of practical rationality should accord fairly 
well with our intuitions about rationality.  While it often happens that agents sacrifice 
their strongly desired but distant goals for smaller satisfactions that are right before them, 
it is part of our idea of a rational agent that she will not act in such shortsighted or 
impulsive ways.  A Humean picture of motivation can account for the behaviors of 
rational agents as well.  Presented with a nearby satisfaction that would require her to 
sacrifice a strongly desired goal in the future, the rational agent may – either as an 
automatic process driven by her desire for the strongly desired goal, or as an act of 
volition instrumentally generated by this desire – turn her attention to that goal.  This is 
something that an irrational agent would not do.  As she imagines that goal, her desire for 
it will become more violent, giving her sufficient motivation to set the nearer satisfaction 
aside.  One thing that contributes to an agent’s rationality, then, is having a psychological 
tendency to keep the big picture in mind, thinking of one’s distant but strongly desired 
goals when one might have otherwise sacrificed them for a lesser satisfaction.  The 
Humean theory offers us a simple explanation of how this tendency operates.   
 
Korsgaard and the choosing of aims 
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     So far in this chapter, I have concentrated on explaining phenomena that opponents of 
the Humean theory cite and which I also accept.  Rather than denying their descriptions 
of the surface phenomena, I have tried to show that Humean explanations offer a better 
account of these phenomena.  For example, I took Darwall’s story about Roberta, as he 
presented it, and showed that the Humean theory had a good explanation of her 
experiences and history.  Now I will turn to an area where the anti-Humean accounts of 
motivational psychology conflict with the surface phenomena, and where this should be 
decisive in favor of Humean accounts of motivation.  The target of my criticism will be 
Christine Korsgaard’s view that we can choose to enter into new motivational states 
when we choose the aims for which we act.  I will argue that this view is not correct, and 
the way of generating new motivational states that she describes is not psychologically 
possible for human beings.   
     In her Locke Lectures, Korsgaard argues for an anti-Humean position according to 
which we can choose not only what we do, but also the motivational force that causes us 
to do it.  Her way of expressing this view involves a distinction between “acts” and 
“actions.”  An action involves both an act and an aim.  Making a false promise and 
committing suicide are examples of acts, while making a false promise to get money and 
committing suicide to avoid misery are examples of actions, since they include the aims 
for which the acts are performed – getting money and avoiding misery.  According to 
Korsgaard, “it is the action that is strictly speaking the object of choice” (1.2.5).   She 
cites Aristotle as a predecessor of hers, saying it is his view that “that the aim is included 
in the description of the action, and that it is the action as a whole, including the aim, that 
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the agent chooses” (1.2.4).  Kant is also cited as holding this view, with the combination 
of act and aim constituting the maxim that the agent accepts in deciding to act.  
Korsgaard says that the form of a Kantian maxim is “I will do Act-A in order to promote 
end-E” (1.2.5).  With “Act-A in order to promote end-E” being a description of what 
Korsgaard calls an “action”, accepting a maxim is choosing an action.   
     Korsgaard is not alone in holding the view that agents can choose their aims.  John 
Searle agrees.  According to Searle, “when one has several reasons for performing an 
action, one may act on only one of them; one may select which reason one acts on” (65).  
He offers a case in which someone has several reasons for voting for a particular 
candidate, and claims that one can vote for the candidate for one of these reasons, but not 
for the other reasons that he has.     
     While Korsgaard accepts an anti-Humean view of human action, she has what appears 
to be a Humean view of animal action.  According to her, “an animal does not choose the 
principles of its own causality – it does not choose the content of its own instincts.  We 
human beings do choose the principles of our own causality – we choose our maxims.  
And the categorical and hypothetical imperatives are rules for doing this – rules for the 
construction of maxims.  It is because we, unlike the other animals, must choose the laws 
of our own causality that we are subject to imperatives.” (3.6.1).  Korsgaard’s use of 
“instinct” seems fairly close to the ordinary use of “desire” – she sets aside the major 
difference between the two terms, saying that she does not intend any contrast between 
“instincts” and motivational states that can be learned.  (4.2.2).  She allows that animals 
are capable of basic forms of intelligence that allow them to attain new desires through 
  173 
processes of conditioning, and also through instrumental reasoning.  These are all 
psychological processes that a Humean theory will happily admit.   
     Aims, on Korsgaard’s view, seem to be something like the contents of motivational 
states.  Choosing our maxims is choosing not only what act to perform, but choosing the 
“principles of our own causality.”  The principles of an animal’s causality, she says, are 
its instincts.  So the principles of a creature’s causality seem to be its motivational states.  
When we choose our maxims, then, we are choosing which motivational states to enter 
into.  And since choosing a maxim involves choosing an act and an aim, it makes sense to 
identify the choice of an aim with the generation, by choice, of a new motivational state.   
     As Korsgaard regards the categorical imperative as a rule that humans can follow in 
choosing maxims, it is clear that she is some sort of anti-Humean about human action.  
Following the categorical imperative to choose how one will be motivated must be 
regarded as a process of reasoning.  And since the categorical imperative applies to an 
agent regardless of what desires she has, the generation of new motivational states by 
following the categorical imperative is barred by the Humean theory.  The character of 
her anti-Humean view depends on her theory of motivational psychology.  If the choice 
of motivational states that occurs when one chooses a maxim involves a choice of 
desires, Korsgaard denies DODI in claiming that new desires can be generated by 
processes of reasoning that do not involve pre-existing desires.  But if the choice of 
motivational states in this case does not involve a choice of desires, she admits that 
humans can be motivated in the absence of desires, and thus denies DBTA.  Since she 
does not use the term “desire” in spelling out her theory, or any clearly equivalent 
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expression, it is unclear which part of the Humean theory she denies.  It may be that she 
denies both.   
     Now I will begin my criticism of Korsgaard’s claim that agents choose not only their 
acts but the complex of their acts and their aims.  Often when agents would like to act for 
one aim rather than another, they find themselves unable to act for the preferred aim.  
Suppose that Bob has received his draft notice from the army.  He is very worried about 
the consequences to his future political career if he dodges the draft.  But he would like to 
be the sort of person who obeys his nation’s call out of a proud desire to do his duty, and 
not for craven political reasons.  If he could choose his aims, he would gladly choose to 
serve in the military out of duty.  But since he lacks a sufficiently strong desire to do his 
duty, he will join the military out of a desire to protect his political career, and there is 
nothing he can do to make it the case that he joins the military with a different aim.  What 
makes it the case that we have certain aims is that the relevant desires drive our action.  If 
we lack these desires, if they are not strong enough to drive our actions, or if they fail to 
operate for some reason, there is nothing we can do about it.   
     That may put the point too strongly – sometimes there are things we can do to make 
some aim our own, but they are not the kinds of things that would be useful to 
Korsgaard’s account.  For instance, we can try to engage with stimuli that strengthen 
some of our desires.  As he walks into the Army recruiting station, Bob may look at a 
photo of the Iwo Jima memorial that he carries in his wallet or think of an older relative’s 
military heroism in an effort to stimulate his desire to serve his country.  In doing this, 
Bob would be trying to intensify his desire by vivid images, as was discussed in the 
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previous chapter.  But this does not count as choosing an action – choosing an act and the 
aim for that act.  Whether he employs an external stimulus or directs his attention by an 
act of will, he is not choosing the aim for the act that he is choosing at the moment – he is 
trying to affect his desires so as to determine the aim of some future act.  The object of 
choice is still the act, even if it will have causal consequences for some future aim.   
     There is, then, an asymmetry between acts and aims.  Often we choose between two 
acts to accomplish the same aim.  When I play tic-tac-toe, I may choose between the act 
of putting my X in the corner and the act of putting it in the center.  Either way, I have 
settled on the aim of winning the game.  But we do not settle on an act, and then choose 
which aim we should do it for.  So it is hard to see why we should regard “actions”, in the 
aim-including sense in which Korsgaard uses the term, as the objects of choice, with new 
motivational states being generated by choosing.  All deciding what to do involves 
choosing between acts, and making “actions” the objects of choice by attaching aims to 
acts is philosophically unmotivated.   
     Korsgaard (and anyone who follows her in building an anti-Humean theory on which 
agents can affect their motivational states through a simple act of choice) will have to 
find some way to explain why we are so often dissatisfied with our stock of motivational 
states, and why our dissatisfaction is so often impotent.  I wish that my desire to work 
hard were stronger.  Then I would work harder, be happy doing it, and be more 
successful.  The overarching goals that drive my life would stand a much greater chance 
of being achieved.  If there were some way to strengthen these desires through the 
processes of reasoning that Korsgaard says that we differ from animals in having, I am 
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fairly sure that I would have met with some success in strengthening my desires through 
those processes.  I do not see what resources Korsgaard’s view has to explain why I am 
never able to successfully carry out this activity.  On her theory, I am distinguished from 
the animals by my ability to perform it.  But as it stands, the only methods I have to 
strengthen my motivation are methods similar to the ones I described Bob as using.  I 
remind myself of the need to work by changing my desktop background to a picture of 
my dissertation co-chair, whose image brings up associations to my academic goals (and 
to the possibility of being rebuked if I am lazy).  And when I find my mind wandering, I 
force myself to imagine the rewards of work and the costs of indolence.  The short and 
simple internal route of strengthening my desire by choosing my aims is closed to me.   
     The Humean theory, on the other hand, accounts for my inability to change my 
motivational states perfectly well.  According to the Humean theory, desires can only be 
generated through reasoning by instrumental processes.  They can be strengthened this 
way too – if I previously had a purely gustatory desire for coffee, I may come to want it 
more upon realizing that its caffeine will allow me to be more alert during class.  A 
second-order desire like the desire to desire to work hard, however, has no way of 
transmitting its force directly to the first-order desire that it focuses on.  The only means-
end beliefs by which I can transmit the motivational force to the first-order desire involve 
external processes like the ones I described above.  (For example, the belief that by 
making my advisor’s face my desktop background, I will strengthen my desire to work 
harder.) 
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     Korsgaard presents a few arguments to support her claim that we choose actions rather 
than acts.  Perhaps the most substantial one, which runs through several of the lectures, is 
that a view on which we choose actions rather than acts will help explain how we can be 
morally responsible.  “Because we are self-conscious, and choose our actions 
deliberately,” she argues in Lecture 1, “we are each faced with the task of constructing a 
peculiar, individual kind of identity – personal or practical identity – that the other 
animals lack.  It is this sort of identity that makes sense of our practice of holding people 
responsible” (1.3.3).  In the fourth lecture, she says that “it is because our actions are 
expressive of principles we ourselves have chosen, principles we have adopted as laws of 
our own causality, that it makes sense for us to hold one another answerable in this way” 
(4.5.4).   
     It is not clear, however, how allowing an agent to generate her own motivational states 
by an act of choice opens the door to any sort of distinctive theory of how we can be 
morally responsible.  Korsgaard evidently means to offer a compatibilist account, and her 
view bears some similarities to that of Harry Frankfurt in “Freedom of the Will and the 
Concept of a Person.”  According to Frankfurt, free action requires not only a first-order 
desire that motivates a particular action, but also a second-order desire for the first-order 
desire to be effective.  With Korsgaard, free action requires more than the first-order 
desire as well – it requires some kind of higher-order mental state or process by which the 
first-order desire (or whatever psychological state embodies the agent’s aim on 
Korsgaard’s preferred theory of motivation) will be chosen.  So it seems that Korsgaard’s 
view may be subject to the same objection that is often regarded as decisive against 
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Frankfurt: if first-order mental states are unable to make action free, why should we think 
that higher-order mental states are able to do so?  As Tim O’Connor summarizes the 
point, referencing Gary Watson, “Why suppose that they inevitably reflect my true self, 
as against first-order desires?”23  Korsgaard’s account differs from Frankfurt’s in that the 
higher-order mental states are of a different kind than the lower-order ones, but it is not 
clear why this would be of any real benefit in developing an account of free action.   
 
Conclusion 
     Near the end of Desire, G.F. Schueler says,  
A very plausible research project, represented in this book by Dretske’s views, 
hopes to extend the blind-forces model to cover all cases of reasoning and 
intentional action, including the ones for which we use reflective explanations and 
that, I have argued, are amenable only to explanation only by means of the 
deliberative model.  (195) 
 
This project – the project of covering all cases of deliberative reasoning with a simple 
Humean model – is the one that I have tried to advance in this chapter.  Even on a strong 
notion of desire where an agent’s being motivated does not make it a conceptual truth 
that a desire is present, it does not seem that the actual world contains any genuine 
counterexamples to the Humean theory of motivation.  The theory offers elegant and 
powerful explanations of our deliberation and action in terms of desires and other 
familiar mental states coming together. 
     As I argued in the first chapter, the truth of the Humean theory throughout the space of 
human psychological possibility forces the difficult choice between cognitivism and 
                                                
23 O’Connor’s Stanford Encyclopedia article on Free Will 
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internalism upon us.  Theorists who desired to hold both of these views may be 
disappointed (or worried) by this conclusion.  But it is a conclusion to which our Humean 
nature forces us.   
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